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2 Abstrat
Tradeos between privay and utilities, and privay preserving ontrol mehanisms
in dynamial systems and networks are studied in this dissertation. Despite seurity
mehanisms and data enryption, these systems are still vulnerable to timing anal-
ysis, wherein an eavesdropper an use these observations to interpret the identity of
individuals. Motivated by this vulnerability, the rst three topis of this dissertation
investigates privay preserving mehanisms in dynamial systems and network. The
last hapter studies the eet of privay awareness of onsumers on retail ompetition.
The rst topi of this dissertation studies the tradeo between delay and paket
soure anonymity in a network of mixes. The ahievable anonymity is haraterized
analytially for a general multipath model, and it is shown that under light tra
onditions, there exists a unique single route strategy whih ahieves the optimal
delay anonymity tradeo. A low omplexity algorithm is presented that derives the
optimal routes to ahieve a desired tradeo. In the heavy tra regime, it is shown
that optimal anonymity is ahieved for any alloation of rates aross the dierent
routes. Simulations on example networks are presented where it is shown that the
optimal routes derived under light tra performs quite well in general tra regime.
Next, an analytial framework is presented to integrate and ontrol the degree of
link padding mehanisms in the funtioning of anonymous relays suh that a desired
degree of soure-destination pair anonymity is ahieved from timing analysis without
adding signiant lateny. In partiular, the optimal hoies of relays and the degree
of link padding are investigated to haraterize the best tradeo between anonymity
from timing analysis, as measured by Shannon entropy of soure destination pairs,
and the average lateny. The optimization required for the best tradeo is shown
to require exponential omplexity, and a sub optimal algorithm is presented that is
shown numerially to perform lose to the optimal, but only requires linear omplexity.
In addition, an inremental optimization is presented for a new user to be added
optimally to an existing system without altering the prevalent routing sheme.
The third part of this dissertation studies the reward optimal deision making in
Markov Deision Proesses (MDPs) while proteting against inferene of type of MDP.
Against an adversary attempting to lassify between two MDPs with idential state-
ation spaes but diering reward funtions and transition probabilities, a joint poliy
design is studied for the pair of MDPs that maximize a weighted sum of innite horizon
disounted rewards. Speially, the adversary observes the sequene of states with
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the goal of identifying whih of the two MDPs are in operation, while the ontrollers
are designed suh that an ǫ-dierential privay is guaranteed for the observed state
transitions. It is demonstrated that a unique optimal weighted disounted reward
exists for a xed privay parameter and the weighting fator. A value iteration
method is proposed to determine the optimal reward and obtain the dierentially
private poliies for the two MDPs. Convergene of the method is proved and the rate
of onvergene is haraterized. A speial appliation of this framework in routing
where nodes serve as states is also studied in this setion. Using dierential privay
as a metri to quantify the privay of the intended destination in networked data
olletions, optimal probabilisti routing shemes are investigated under uniast and
multiast paradigms. It is shown that the optimal private uniast routing an be
implemented in deentralized manner. Under a multiast paradigm, the optimal
solution when overhead is weighted equal to the intended ost, the optimal solution
is shown to be a variant of the Steiner tree problem. In general, it is proved that
multiast private routing is an np-omplete problem. Simulations and numerial
results for both private uniast and multiast routing on random graphs are presented.
In the last setion, the problem of oupon targeting ompetition between two
retailers who sell the same produt in a privay sensitive market is onsidered. In
partiular, onsumers purhasing deisions are inuened by produt pries as well
as prior privay violations by retailers. A Hoteling line model is utilized to investi-
gate the oupon targeting ompetition between the retailers. Within this framework,
privay sensitivity is modeled using a Markov hain, wherein onsumers swith bak
and forth probabilistially between a privay alerted state and privay non-alerted
state depending on whether or not they reeive targeted oupons from a retailer. The
ompetition between these two retailers at eah segment of Hoteling line is modeled
by a stohasti nonzero-sum game. In every segment of the Hoteling line, stationary
equilibrium strategies of retailers that provide optimal disounted return over an in-
nite horizon is derived. It is demonstrated that segments in a privay sensitive market
are divided to three ategories: 1) Segments not aeted by privay onstraints. 2)
Segments fully aeted by privay onstraints. 3) Segments partially aeted by pri-
vay onstraints. It is illustrated that in ontrast to a prie sensitive market, when
privay is a fator, onsumers with weak brand loyalty an be driven away from the
popular retailer beause of a targeted oupon from that retailer. It is also proved
that the popular retailer will be more onservative distributing targeted oupon to
onsumers with weak preferene for him whilst the rival retailer will be more oensive
2
on these onsumers.
3
3 Introdution
Information seurity in dynamial systems and networks extends beyond the prote-
tion of ommuniated data; hiding the identities of parties is equally ritial. Knowl-
edge of individuals' identities in a network suh as soure-destination pairs and routes
of information ow in networks whih an be obtained fully or partially through eaves-
dropping in a network not only ompromises user privay, but also provides ruial
information for an adversary to jam a partiular ow, deploy blak holes or launh
other sophistiated attaks. One of the earliest uses of suh analysis ourred in World
War II [1℄, when the US Army established a Tra Intelligene group (OP-G-20) on
Corregidor island [2℄. These tra analysts, muh before they broke the enemy ipher
ode, were able to use transmission timing to identify enemy hain of ommand and
to a good extent, predit troop movements. Sine the advent of the Internet, suh
retrieval of networking information through tra analysis, and more speially
transmission timing analysis, has been a ritial onern in the design and analysis
of network protools [3, 4℄.
In this dissertation, we investigate the protetion of the users' privay in dynamial
systems, and networks against an adversary who fully or partially observes the state
of the system. We demonstrate that users an ahieve privay, however, they may
reeive lower utilities. In other words, we illustrate that privay is ahieved in ost
of experineing higher lateny, ahieving lower data rate, or reeiving a lower reward
in general framework. We derive the routing and ontrol mehanisms for optimal
tradeos between privay measured by Shannon entropy [5℄ or dierential privay
[6℄ and utilities in dynamial systems and networks. Speially, we onsider pri-
vay preserving methodologies for three appliations: 1) Paket soure anonymity in
mix networks. 2) Soure-destination pair anonymity in networks 3) Markov Deision
Proesses (MDPs) under dierential privay onstraints. While privay preserving
mehanisms and tradeos between privay and utilities are well-studied in the liter-
ature, other related topis suh as the inuene of users' privay awareness on other
phenomena inluding retail ompetition require more attention. For example, privay
violations by an online soial media or an online retailer an result in users' distrust
whih an drive users away to other soial medias or retailers. The experiment by Tsai
[7℄ is an evidene that onsumers' privay awareness has inreased and onsumers pre-
fer to purhase from online retailers who protet their privay. Motivated by privay
awareness of onsumers, in the last hapter of this dissertation, we study the oupon
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targeting ompetition of retailers in a privay sensitive market, where onsumers may
get privay alerted and hange their purhasing brands.
The rst and the seond topi of this dissertation study the routing and ontrol
mehanisms for the optimal tradeo between lateny and paket soure anonymity
or soure-destination pairs anonymity in networks. The methodology to hide soure
identities from timing analysis was rst investigated by David Chaum [8℄. Chaum
proposed the onept of mixes whih are speial proxy servers or routers that use
layered enryption, random bit padding and paket shuing (or bathing) to provide
anonymity. The enryption and bit-padding ensure that an eavesdropper monitoring
the transmission links annot use the ontents or sizes of pakets to mathing an in-
oming paket to the mix with the orresponding outgoing paket from the mix. The
paket shuing redues the orrelation between the timing of inoming and outgoing
pakets. In pratie, a network of suh mixes are deployed and the pakets from
soures are routed through an arbitrary sequene of mixes prior to arriving at the
destination. In popular anonymous systems, many of them deployed on the Internet,
however, shuing strategies are rarely used and the analysis of transmission times
an still reveal to an adversary the identities of ommuniating parties and paths of
data ow. In fat, a areful read of the dislaimers in the largest publily deployed
anonymity network, Tor, reveals an open admittane of vulnerability to timing anal-
ysis (see [9℄). The primary reason for this vulnerability is that these systems impose
tight lateny onstraints on the transmitted pakets to satisfy Quality of Servie
(QoS) requirements and onsequently measures to limit timing based inferene suh
as mixing are not implemented under lateny onstraints. In general, modiations to
timing through paket shuing and link padding inrease the lateny of transmitted
pakets, and onsequently, when pakets are subjeted to strit lateny onstraints,
the abilities of mixes to shue are restrained, thereby reduing the ahievable paket
soure anonymity or soure-destination pair anonymity. Fundamentally, there is a
tradeo between the ahievable anonymity and the allowed delay in data networks.
In reent years, there has been signiant progress towards the design of optimal
mixing strategies and link padding mehanisms under suh strit delay onstraints
[1015℄. These results primarily study the optimal design of paket shuing and
link padding for a single node. This work expands on that investigation to study
the paket soure and soure-destination optimal anonymity lateny tradeo ahiev-
able in data networks with partiular emphasis on the optimal routing through the
network that maximizes a desired tradeo.
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In the rst hapter, we investigate the problem of optimal routing to ahieve
tradeo between paket soure anonymity and lateny in a network of mixes. Our
approah relies on an information theoreti measure of anonymity, quantied using
Shannon entropy of soures of pakets arriving at destinations as observed by an om-
nisient eavesdropper. While the maximum ahievable anonymity as a funtion of
delay is still an open problem, we onsider two extreme tra rate regimes where the
anonymity has been better investigated analytially - heavy tra regime λ → ∞
and the light tra regime λ → 0 to study the properties of optimal rate alloation
in the multipath system. It is known that, when Shannon entropy is used to quantify
the anonymity, in the heavy tra regime, the anonymity of the individual mix ap-
proahes the prior entropy of arrival rates as λ→∞, and in the light tra regime,
the anonymity-delay tradeo is linear and an be expressed using the light tra
derivative [16℄. Using this entropy based metri, we demonstrate: 1) In the heavy
tra regime, the impat of rate alloation on the anonymity of the multipath system
is negligible, or in other words, optimal routing in the heavy tra regime an be
designed based solely on traditional QoS onsiderations suh as lateny, throughput
and ongestion (whih expetedly beome ritial in high rate regimes). 2) In the light
tra regime, we investigate the anonymity and delay as funtions of rate alloation,
topology of the network, and delay onstraint of mixes. First, we show that to ahieve
the optimal tradeo between anonymity and delay, single route solutions are optimal
for eah soure. Based on this investigation, we propose a low omplexity algorithm
to determine the optimal route for eah soure. 3) Although the optimal rate alloa-
tion for medium (non extreme) tra rates is theoretially an open problem, in our
numerial results, we demonstrate that the light tra optimal sheme outperforms
other heuristi rate alloation shemes. 4) We also apply our results to a graphial
model of pratial anonymous systems (based on an abstration of the popular Tor
system) and demonstrate that the derived solution displays optimal saling behavior
as the network size inreases.
The seond topi of this dissertation studies the optimal relay seletion and ontrol
of relay operational modes in an anonymous network. We onsider a six relay sub-
system abstration based on the pratial anonymous system Tor. This abstration,
although not without loss of generality, naturally follows from the present operation
of the Tor network where eah user hooses the sequene of three intermediate nodes
based on bandwidth availability and delay-shortest path onsiderations. Another rea-
son for this abstration is the fat that not all users in an anonymous network have
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the same preferene on delay and anonymity. By onsidering a subgroup of relays
and optimizing their operation independently, that subgroup an ater to the subset
of users with similar preferenes for the levels of anonymity and delay. Considering
six relay abstration, our key ontributions are summarized as follows. Using Shan-
non entropy as the metri for anonymity from timing analysis, we haraterize the
maximum possible anonymity as a funtion of the relay seletion and anonymiza-
tion parameters, and provide onditions on bandwidth under whih this anonymity
is ahievable. When the bandwidth onstraints are satised, the problem of optimal
relay seletion that maximizes a weighted ombination of anonymity and delay is
shown to be a omputationally hard problem. In other words, we show that solving
the resulting optimization problem requires exponential omputation time O(2N ),
where N is the number of users. We therefore propose a sub-optimal heuristi based
on Hill Climbing method whih has linear omplexity O(N) and demonstrate that
the ahieved tradeo for the proposed algorithm is lose to optimal. In addition to
the global optimization, we also present inremental optimization and disuss a de-
entralized sheme. We prove that inremental sheme always ahieves the global
optimal when maximum anonymity is desired.
The third setion of this dissertation studies the design of ontrol poliies under
dierential privay onstraints. Markov deision proesses (MDPs) are a disrete time
mathematial framework for modeling deision making in dynami systems. In a las-
sial MDP, at eah time step, the system is in some state s, and the ontroller deides
on an ation a. Given the urrent state s, and ontroller's ation a, the ontroller
reeives a reward, and the state of the system transit to the next state aording to
a Markovian probability P (s′|s, a), and the ontroller's goal is to maximize the total
(disounted) reward over a nite or innite horizon [17℄. MDPs are widely used in
yber physial systems, nane, robotis, et. Another important appliation of MDP
is in reinforement learning [18℄, where an agent interats with an unknown environ-
ment towards maximizing some objetive, and the underlying proess is modeled as
an MDP. The main dierene between a lassial MDP and reinforement learning is
that the latter does not assume the knowledge of the mathematial model of the MDP.
In many appliations of MDPs, the sequene of states (or some funtion of the states)
are observable to eavesdroppers. For example, in a wireless network, an adversary
an aess length of pakets [19℄, timing of pakets transmitted [20℄, routes of paket
ow over a network [21℄ and suhlike by eavesdropping. Using the observations, an
adversary an infer about the nature of the MDPs, and onsequently obtain sensitive
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information about the hyphenate deision-making. As mahine learning algorithms
ontinually improve the ability to identify personal preferenes from seemingly unre-
lated data, it is ritial that stohasti deision making proesses be investigated from
a privay perspetive whih is the fous of this work. Motivated by this, we inves-
tigate the mathematial framework of Markov Deision Proesses with the objetive
of limiting adversarial inferene of a type of MDP. In partiular, onsider two MDPs
with idential state-ation spaes but diering reward and transition dynamis. For
instane, these ould represent user ations on a pair of websites. It is well known
that sequene of lik times or download sizes an reveal whih websites are being
aessed even if data transmitted is enrypted [22℄. In this ontext, if the sequene
of ations or response times were so designed to maximize user experiene, then an
eavesdropper an identify the website aessed by performing a hypothesis test on
the observations. However, if the ations were so designed suh that the observations
from the pair of websites had near similar dynamis, then privay of aess an be
preserved. In broader terms, for a pair of MDPs, if the poliies were jointly designed
suh that the observed state dynamis for both MDPs were ǫ lose to eah other in a
likelihood sense, then any hypothesis test between the MDPs would have very limited
suess. It is preisely the joint design of the poliies for a pair of generi innite
horizon MDPs that we onsider in this work suh that a weighted sum of rewards of
the two MDPs are maximized subjet to an ǫ-dierential privay guarantee for the
observed state dynamis. We provide a value iteration method to reursively derive
the optimal rewards and the poliies for the two MDPs that are dierentially private
at the desired ǫ level. The proposed method is shown to onverge and the onvergene
rate of this method is proved to be equal to the disount fator. Further, in this se-
tion, we investigated an appliation of MDPs under privay onstraints in routing in
networks, where nodes an be onsidered as states of the MDP. Speially, the prob-
lem of destination privay in networked data olletion under onstraints on routing
overhead is studied, where, we propose an alternative approah wherein additional
destinations are inluded in the path of transmission to reate destination privay for
soure pakets. In partiular, using dierential privay to quantify the privay of the
intended destination, we investigate optimal probabilisti routing for single soure
destination ommuniation. We propose private routing shemes based on uniast
and multiast routing. We demonstrate that the optimal solution of private uniast
routing when overhead weighting fator is one is equivalent to the solution of the trav-
eling salesman problem. However, for general overhead weighting fator, the optimal
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private uniast routing only alloates positive probabilities on 2M − 2 routes, where
M is total number of destinations. Consequently, optimal routing an be derived by
solving the resulting linear programming. When multiast routing is used to provide
privay to a single soure-destination setup, we prove that the optimal solution is
an np-omplete problem. In partiular, we demonstrate that the optimal solution of
multiast routing when overhead weighting fator is one is equivalent to a Minimum
Steiner Tree (MST) and for the general ase, we prove that eah soure will alloate
positive probabilities over 2M − 2 spanning trees.
In the nal setion of this dissertation, we study ompetitive oupon targeting
between a pair of retailers when prie and privay are fators in the onsumer deision
making. We use the privay sensitivity model as proposed by Sankar et al in [23℄,
wherein onsumers are assumed to exist in one of two states with respet to a retailer
1) Non-alerted state where onsumers trust a retailer, and 2) Alerted state, where
onsumers are aware and wary by privay violations by the retailer. Consumers
swith between these states depending on whether they reeive targeted oupons
from a retailer. Following the oupon targeting model in a prie sensitive market in
[24℄, we assume that onsumers are loated on a Hoteling line suh that the loation
of onsumers on the line represents their preferene for the retailers. We demonstrate
that a privay sensitive market is divided into 12 segments. Moreover, we derive
the optimal stationary oupon targeting poliies and disounted rewards for both
retailers at eah spei segment of the Hoteling line. We prove that onsumers with
weak preferene for a retailer will hange their purhasing brand if they notie their
privay is violated by the retailer. We also prove that at segments whih adopts
mixed strategies, the popular retailer has a less defensive strategy whilst the rival
retailer has a more oensive targeting strategy as the disount fator inreases. In
other words, as the importane of future prot gets higher, the popular retailer will
be more onservative about onsumers with weak preferene for him, beause, these
onsumers are more likely to hange their purhasing brand in the future, if they get
alerted about this retailer. On the other hand, the rival retailer will be more aggressive
to 1) get a higher share of market, 2) push the popular retailer to distribute targeted
oupons. Eventually, we demonstrate that despite the prie sensitive market, the
rival retailer will have a non-negative disounted reward on the onsumers with weak
preferene for the other retailer.
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3.1 Related Works
Using Shannon entropy to quantify paket soure anonymity, fundamental trade-
os between delay and paket soure anonymity were haraterized in [11, 16℄. The
study of soure anonymity in this work treats eah paket as an independent entity,
similar to the approahes in [16, 25, 26℄. This applies to systems with short bursts of
transmission suh as email, browsing, texting et. For heavy tra appliations suh
as peer-to-peer le sharing, multimedia transmission, the entire stream of pakets
needs to be onsidered together and individual paket shuing tehniques are no
longer suient. For a deeper investigation into anonymity for long streams of pakets
in networks, refer to the work in [10, 27, 28℄. Optimal single path routing to provide
paket soure anonymity has been a subjet of analytial investigation in [2931℄.
In these and other subsequent improvements, protools that leverage randomness in
routing to provide anonymity at the ost of higher end-to-end delay were studied.
The analysis in [2931℄, however, did not onsider anonymity-delay harateristis
of individual mixes or topologial inuene on anonymity. Sine the original design
by Chaum, shuing strategies for mixes have been designed to optimize the tradeo
between loal anonymity (serey of input-output pairing at a mix) and performane
metris suh as delay [32, 33℄, memory [34℄, throughput [35℄ et. These shuing
strategies study the protetion of individual pakets as opposed to long streams.
Reent signal proessing approahes [36,37℄ have demonstrated fundamental tradeos
between delay and privay in timing side hannels as well. Proteting streams require
the transmission of dummy pakets, or in other words link padding, so as to make
the outgoing streams from a mix indistinguishable to an external eavesdropper. The
minimum rate of dummy pakets required and the orresponding padding mehanism
have been studied under dierent tra and node parameters in [12, 35℄. Several
of these works onsider Poisson arrival proesses and derive the optimal strategies
and rates. In the seond setion of this dissertation, we apply the dependent link
padding strategies as derived in [12,35℄, and use numerial simulations to obtain the
orresponding dummy rates for pratial heavy tailed tra proesses.
Theoretial analyses of optimal relay seletion and ontrol for anonymity are lim-
ited in the literature. In [35℄, the authors onsidered multi hop ommuniation in
adho wireless networks under the assumption that routes are xed apriori and the
key parameters to optimize were the modes of operation. By optimizing the seletion
of relay nodes that add the dummy pakets, the authors demonstrated the tradeo
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between the throughput and anonymity in the same system model using rate distor-
tion tradeo in Information Theory. From a pratial standpoint, the relay seletion
or routing problem has been investigated to an extent in the Tor network under dif-
ferent adversarial onditions [38℄ and under dierent riteria suh as bandwidth on-
straints[39,40℄, low lateny[40℄, and autonomous system awareness[41℄, albeit without
taking into onsideration timing analysis. The work on Tor systems that is losest to
the seond topi of this work is [42℄, where the authors introdued a new Tor lient
named LASTor where they showed that LASTor an redue lateny in omparison
with regular Tor lients by using an appropriate shortest path mehanism. Although,
they investigated the delay anonymity tradeo by doing simulations and showed the
performane of their proposed LASTor, they did not onsider operational ontrol of
relays to investigate the delay anonymity tradeo.
The literature on privay in routing is primarily foused on anonymous networks
[8,43℄, where paket enryption and sheduling are used to provide anonymity. Prob-
abilisti routing has been onsidered from a game theoreti perspetive when an
adversary has limited knowledge but is apable of interepting routes [44℄. To our
best knowledge, there is no work in literature investigating probabilisti uniast and
multiast routing to ahieve spei degree of dierential privay. Dierential privay
was introdued as a tool to provide privay in data from learners and statistiians [6℄
and provides a point-wise measure on users privay (without Bayesian assumptions).
Using dierential privay as a metri to quantify privay, we propose private uniast
and multiast routing in data networks.
Algorithms for uniast routing for dierent appliations in data networks have
been presented in the literature [4549℄, whih are typially variants of shortest path
algorithms with no additional onstraints. Adding onstraints suh as delay inreases
the omplexity of algorithms; for instane, the problem of uniast routing with ost
onstraints is an np-hard problem In [46, 47℄, authors proposed heuristi distributed
algorithms for uniast routings under onstraints on delay and path ost respetively.
Multiast routing is typially implemented by sending pakets through a Steiner
tree whih spans all the destination nodes. Determining the Minimum Steiner Tree(MST)
whih has the minimum aggregated ost over all Steiner trees is known to be an np-
omplete problem [50℄. There are some near optimal shemes for Minimum Steiner
Tree problem whih are run in polynomial time [5155℄. The problem of delay on-
strained multiast routing is well-studied in [55℄, where the authors demonstrated
that the orresponding problem is np-omplete and proposed a heuristi algorithm
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based on the KMB algorithm.
Tradeos between privay and utility in dynamial and ontrol systems are well-
studied in the literature [5660℄. The problem of privay utility tradeos has been
explored in [57,58℄ using a notion the authors refer to as ompetitive privay. In [59℄,
the authors investigated ltering in a dynamial systems under dierential privay
onstraints, where they derived methods developed to approximate a given lter by a
dierentially private version, so that the distortion aused by the privay mehanism
is minimized. An overview of privay in ontrol and dynamial system is presented in
[60℄, where two topis of appliations of dierential privay in Kalman and general l-
ters, and appliation of dierential privay to distributed optimization algorithms are
studied. In [61℄, the authors proposed a privay mehanisms suh that at eah time,
the most aurate approximation of the system's state whih preserves the privay is
published. In [62℄, an optimization framework is presented whih solves onstrained
multi-agent optimization problems while keeping eah agent's state dierentially pri-
vate. The authors demonstrated that under mild onditions eah agent's optimization
problem onverges in mean-square to its unique solution while eah agent's state is
kept dierentially private. MDPs under privay onstraints are also studied in the lit-
erature. In [56℄, the authors studied the tradeo between system utility and ahievable
privay in MDPs where privay is measured by Shannon entropy. In their approah,
they expressed the problem of MDP under privay onstraints as a Partially Observ-
able Markov Deision Proess (POMDP) with belief dependent rewards. In [63℄, the
authors investigated a subset of deentralized MDPs, where the anonymity in inter-
ation is speied within the joint reward and transition funtions. In [64℄, privay is
modeled by beliefs in system's state, where the authors demonstrated that for MDPs
and POMDPs, privay veriation an be omputationally derived by solving a set
of semi-denite programs and sum-of-squares programs, respetively.
Targeted oupon and advertisements in prie sensitive market is well studied in
literature [24,6568℄. In [65℄, targeted advertisement is studied against massive adver-
tisement and it is shown that ombination of massive and targeted advertisement an
inreases retailers prot and soial welfare . In [66℄, the authors demonstrate that
eah retailer an inrease its prot by targeting advertisement on onsumers with
higher preferene for the retailer more than shoppers who may be attrated to the
ompetition, or have weaker preferene for the retailer. The problem of ompetitive
one-to-one promotions is onsidered in [67℄, where the authors investigate the om-
petition of two retailers in a market where eah onsumer is individually addressable,
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and retailers know eah onsumer's taste. They demonstrated that one-to-one pro-
motion inreases prie disrimination and dereases the average prie in market, and
hanges market share between two retailers. In [68℄, the authors investigated oupon
targeting ompetition between two retailers under imperfet prie information. Re-
tailers an distribute either ordinary oupon, oupon advertising, or both at the same
time. They show that prie, promotional eort, and seller's prot is higher in the
ordinary oupon equilibrium, ompared to oupon advertising equilibrium.
One of the rst works on eonomy of privay was introdued by Varian [69℄, where
he studied how one may dene property rights in private information suh that on-
sumers may manage how their private information is shared with retailers. Aqusiti
[70℄ studies the evolution of the eonomy analysis of privay by disussing online and
oine identities of individuals on eommere and their privay onerns and eonomi
impliations. In [71℄, Aquisiti studies the inentive to partiipate in an anonymity
system whih protets identity and privay. Tsai [7℄ studied the eet of online pri-
vay information on purhasing behavior of onsumers. Speially, they design an
experiment in whih privay poliy information was learly shown before the online
purhase and observed that onsumers tend to purhase from online retailers who
better protet their privay. In [72℄, the authors investigated the exhange between
two prinipals who sequentially make ontrat with an agent, and they prove that
based on some onditions, it is optimal if an upstream priniple oers the agent full
privay. If any of these onditions is violated, then, dislosure of information may
our. In [73℄, the authors proved that it is protable for retailers to oer dierent
pries to onsumers based on their purhasing history. Speially, they onsidered a
problem with a single prot maximizing retailer, and a rational onsumer with a set of
preferenes on the pries oered for the good, as well as on the amount of private in-
formation provided. For example, a onsumer ould stop sharing private information
using a number of alternatives inluding deleting the web browser ookie, hanging
the payment information (e.g., redit ard), or using anonymous paying.
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4 Paket Soure Anonymity and Delay Tradeo in Mix
Networks: Optimal Routing
In this setion, we investigate the protetion the soure identities of pakets that
ow through a network towards their intended destination, or in other words, enable
anonymous ommuniation over data networks.
The theme of our work an be understood by the routing problem in a simple
network shown in Figure 1 where two soures S1, S2 transmit pakets to the ommon
destination D1 through a network of three mixes M1,M2,M3. The mixes have delay
onstraints d1, d2, d3 respetively; in other words, mix Mi an delay a paket for no
greater than di seonds. Without loss of generality, we assume d2 > d1. Larger
the delay onstraint, higher the unertainty reated by the shuing strategy of an
individual mix. Soures have xed arrival rates, λ1, λ2 respetively, and hoose to
route a fration of their pakets through mix M1 and the remainder through mix M2.
If both soures transmitted their entire tra through M1 their strategy would be
delay optimal, but the anonymity ahieved would be low sine M1 has limited delay
to shue pakets. If, instead they transmitted their pakets all through M2, the
anonymity ahieved would be higher but it would inur higher delay. Consequently,
the right balane between anonymity and delay would depend on the proportions
of eah soure's tra transmitted through the two routes, and the strategies and
delays of the individual mixes. The following questions that naturally arise in this
setup form the basis of this work. 1)Given the topology and delay onstraints, does
multipath routing inrease the anonymity? 2) If it inreases anonymity, then, what
is the optimal alloation of transmission rates on the dierent routes for eah soure
destination pair that ahieves a desired tradeo? 3) How does this optimal tradeo
vary with the topology, tra harateristis and delay parameters of the system?
Through this setion, we study multipath routing to ahieve optimal tradeo
between paket soure anonymity and average lateny in data networks. In setion
4.1, we present the system model. In setion 4.2, we investigate the problem of
tradeo in light tra. Moreover, we propose a low omplexity algorithm to determine
optimal single path route four eah user to ahieve a ertain degree of tradeo. The
routing problem in high tra regime is studied in setion 4.4. Finally, we present
our simulation results for optimal paket soure anonymity and lateny tradeo in
setion 4.5.
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4.1 System Model
A mix network is denoted by a 3-tuple N = (G,D,Λ), where G = (V, E) is a direted
network graph, V is the set of verties representing network nodes and E is the set
of edges denoting direted ommuniation links. The set of nodes V is divided into
three mutually exlusive sets: a. S: set of soures. b. M: set of mixes. . D:
set of destinations. D is the set of delay onstraints for the elements of set M and
Λ = {Λij , 1 ≤ i ≤ |S|, 1 ≤ j ≤ |D|} is the set of arrival rates for the soure-destination
pairs. Eah element Λij denotes the total rate from the soure Si to the destination
Dj . In order to study the system under high and low limiting tra onditions, we
parametrize the set Λ by a salar λ, suh that eah Λij = λRij , and Rij is kept
onstant as λ → 0 or λ → ∞. We desribe the partiipants of the system in more
detail below.
Soure: Eah soure Si transmits pakets to eah destination Dj aording to an
independent Poisson proess of rate Λij . Given the topology of the network, eah
soure has a xed and known set of routes to eah destination through the mixes
and our primary goal is to alloate the transmission rates aross these routes to
maximize anonymity. The set P(Si,Dj) is the set of all the routes from soure
Si to the destination Dj suh that P
(i,j)
k ∈ P(Si,Dj) is a direted walk on the
graph G denoting the kth route between soure Si and destination Dj . Speially,
we denote P
(i,j)
k = (Si,MP (i,j)
k
,Dj), where MP (i,j)
k
is the sequene of mixes on this
route. We assume that there are no yles in any route. For example in Figure 1,
P
(1,1)
1 = (S1,MP (1,1)1
, R1) ∈ P(1, 1), where MP (1,1)1
= (M1,M5,M13,M18). For every
soure-destination pair (Si,Dj), we assume eah paket is independently randomly
hosen to be transmitted through a spei route in P(Si,Dj). Consequently, the
resulting set of point proesses from soure Si to destination Dj will be independent
stationary Poisson proesses with rates {λ
P
(i,j)
k
} respetively.We parametrize eah
λ
P
(i,j)
k
by salar λ suh that λ
P
(i,j)
k
= λr
P
(i,j)
k
, and r
P
(i,j)
k
is onstant as λ → 0 or
λ→∞. For the pair (Si,Dj),
∑
P
(i,j)
k
∈P(i,j)
λ
P
(i,j)
k
= Λij
We note that the Poisson assumption of arrivals is a limiting one and has been used
here due to its analytial tratability. Typial Internet tra is better modeled using
Markov modulated Poisson or Heavy tail distributions. We do expet, albeit without
a formal proof, that the broad inferenes from this work suh as the optimality of
single path routing in light tra and the QoS preferential routing in heavy tra
would hold under other distributions as well.
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Figure 1: Example Network: S1, S2 are soures, M1,M2,M3 are mixes, D1 is the
destination. The rate of paket arrivals alloated on a path Si,Mk,M3,D1 is denoted
as λ
(i,1)
k
Mix: Eah mixMi observes point proesses on eah of its inoming links, eah proess
orresponds to the sequene of pakets transmitted by the node originating the link.
The soures, prior to transmitting pakets to the mixes, employ layered enryption,
whih is desribed below:
Let a soure S transmit a message denoted by X to destination R through
a sequene of mixes M1, · · · ,Mk. There exists a publi private key pair for
every mix and the nal destination. Let AN denote the address of node N ,
and let EN (X) denote the iphertext obtained by enrypting message X with
the publi key of node N . When soure S wishes to transmit a message X to
destination R through a sequene of mixes M1, · · · ,Mk, it performs multiple
layered enryption and generates the iphertext:
EM1(AM2 , EM2(AM3 , EM3(· · ·EMk(AR, ER(X)))) · · · ))
whih is transmitted to M1. M1 upon reeiving uses its private key to derypt
the outermost message and determines the address of the subsequent node AM2
and a iphertext enrypted with the publi key EM2 whih is then transmitted
to M2. M2 subsequently derypts the reeived message, obtains the address
AM3 of the sueeding node M3 and transmits the EM3 enrypted iphertext
to it. This repeated deryption and transmission ontinues in sequene until
the R-enrypted message ER(X) reahes the destination node. When suh a
layered enryption sheme is utilized, eah mix is only aware of the immediate
preeding and sueeding node in the path of a paket.
Consequent to the layered enryption, the pakets that depart from the mix are,
from the perspetive of an eavesdropper, ontent-wise not identiable to a partiular
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Figure 2: Example of System Model
inoming stream. Further, the layered enryption also ensures that the mix is unaware
of the path of eah arriving paket exept for the immediate preeding and sueeding
nodes. To prevent inferene through transmission timing, every arriving paket an be
delayed using a randomized strategy subjet to the mix's maximum delay onstraint
di and transmitted on one of the outgoing streams of the mix based on the route
whih the paket belongs to. The mix an also transmit multiple pakets in a bath
where the order of pakets in this bath is uniformly random. Let the set of all
possible mixing strategies for the network of mixes N be denoted by Ψ(N ). In
this work, we do not onsider the spei design of mixing strategies to maximize
anonymity. For a delay onstrained mix, refer to [74℄ for the design of optimal mixing
strategies. The fous of this work is on optimal routing and rate alloation by soures
to maximize anonymity. For this purpose we onsider spei mixing strategies that
exhibit optimality properties under light tra and heavy tra onditions.
Eavesdropper: We onsider an omnisient eavesdropper (Eve) who observes eah
individual point proess in the network. Eve knows the topology of the network,
the set of routes available to eah soure, the rate alloation aross these routes
and the strategy of eah mix. Speially, the reordering and bathing strategy of
every mix is known to Eve, exept for the atual realization of the randomness used
by the mixes, whih is responsible for the unertainty in her inferene. Given the
observations, Eve's goal is to determine the soure of eah paket arriving at the
destination using her omplete knowledge. Suh an omnisient model is used to
guarantee the provable degree of anonymity; in pratie eavesdroppers, unless they
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own all network resoures, will have aess to lesser information and the results in
this work are provably guaranteed to be ahievable in that senario.
Anonymity Denition
Eah route P
(i,j)
k ∈ P(i, j)(whih is the k
th
route between soure Si and desti-
nation Dj) ontains an ordered sequene of mixes MP (i,j)
k
. We dene d
P
(i,j)
k
=∑
Ml∈M
P
(i,j)
k
dMl whih denotes the maximum possible end to end delay experiened
by a paket traversing this route. Let
dmax = sup
i,j,k
d
P
(i,j)
k
Any paket an experiene a delay of at most dmax seonds in the mix network.
Based on this fat, we divide the time horizon into non overlapping cycles. Eah
yle begins with a paket arriving after an idle period of at least dmax seonds and
ends when there has been no departure for at least dmax seonds. From the denition
of dmax, all pakets that arrive in a yle will neessarily arrive at the destination
before the yle ends. This division of time into yles is an analytial onstrut used
to study the proess in stationarity. Due to the strit delay onstraints, the arrivals
and departures in eah yle are independent aross yles. Furthermore, sine the
inoming proesses are memoryless, we an study the expeted anonymity ahieved
in a yle instead of the entire time horizon of observation.
The omplete observation and knowledge of Eve is denoted by Θ. Let N(Θ)
denote the total number of pakets in the yle. We dene the random variables
X1,X2, · · · ,XN(Θ) suh that Xk ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} denotes the soure of the kth paket
whih departs the mix network in that yle. Conditioned on Θ, the knowledge of the
mixing strategy results in a posterior joint distribution of X1,X2, · · · ,XN(Θ) from
the Eve's perspetive, over the originating soures of departing pakets in the yle.
Let Γψ(Θ) denote the Shannon entropy of this joint posterior distribution of
(X1,X2, · · · , XN(Θ)) when ψ is the set of mixing strategies used by mixes, then
we dene the anonymity as follows:
Denition 4.1 The anonymity ahieved by a mixing strategy ψ ∈ Ψ(N ) is dened
as:
AψN (λ) =
E(Γψ(Θ))
E(N(Θ))
(1)
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The anonymity of the network, as expeted, is a funtion of the mixing strategies, the
soure arrival rates, mix delay onstraints and the rates alloated to multiple paths by
the soures. We use Shannon entropy as our anonymity metri whih has been used in
many previous literature as it is tratable and has losed form solutions. The entropy
measured has a physial onnotation from the perspetive of Eve: when the measure
takes its minimum value (zero), Eve an perfetly determine the soures of pakets
at a destination. When the measure takes the maximum value (logarithm of number
of soures), eah paket is equally likely to belong to any one of the dierent soures,
whih is equivalent to having no information. In general, a key result in information
theory, Fano's Inequality [5℄, proves that an observer's probability of error in deoding
the soures of pakets is lower bounded by the entropy of posterior random variables.
We do note that entropy based measures have a weakness wherein they require a
Bayesian framework and measure the stohasti average aross the observations. As
a result they are better used for a priori design of protools.
In this work, we study anonymity in two tra regimes, named light tra and
heavy tra. In light tra regime, we use light tra derivative to investigate the
optimal routing parameters for two reasons: the losed form haraterization of the
derivative whih makes it amenable to optimization, and the fat that the light tra
derivative represents the sharpest gain in anonymity per unit tra and onsequently,
the solution performs well at medium tra rates as well. The light tra derivative
is dened as follows:
∆0(M) ≥ lim
λ→0
d
dλ
AψN (λ)
In heavy tra regime, using anonymity denition in equation (1), we derive
the anonymity ahieved in a network of mixes as a linear funtion of anonymities of
individual mixes.
For a single mix, the following result whih was proved in Theorem 4 of [11℄
Charaterizes the anonymity in the two extreme rate regime.
Theorem 4.1 For a single mix (M1) with delay onstraint d, serving two unequal
rate soures, and a single destination, the light tra derivative and the anonymity
in high tra are as follows:
lim
λ→0
d
dλ
AψM1(λ) =
2r1r2
r1 + r2
d (2)
lim
λ→∞
AψM1(λ) = h(
r1
r1 + r2
), (3)
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where h(p) is entropy of a Bernoulli random variable with parameter p and λ1 =
r1λ and λ2 = r2λ are rates of soures S1 and S2, respetively. As an be seen from
the theorem, the optimal anonymity inreases linearly with delay under light tra,
and approahes the maximum possible (prior entropy) in high tra onditions. In
this work we apply this single mix result in a network and derive the optimal routing
parameters that maximize a weighted sum of network anonymity and average delay,
whih is desribed more formally below.
Delay: In our model, the average delay of network N as a linear funtion of routing
parameters and eah mix delay onstraints is dened as follows:
D =
1
λT
∑
u,v
∑
P
(u,v)
i ∈P(u,v)
λ
P
(u,v)
i
d
P
(u,v)
i
, (4)
where λT =
∑
i,j Λij .
Delay Anonymity Tradeo: The primary hallenge of this work is investigating
the tradeo between anonymity and delay. We model the preferene of the network
on delay and anonymity by the parameter 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 suh that the objetive is to
maximize the weighted sum of delay and anonymity αA − (1 − α)D. As disussed
in the example in Setion 4.1, a longer path is likely to inrease anonymity at higher
delay whereas a shorter path an limit the delay with lower ahieved anonymity. In
the forthoming setions, we study the optimal routing parameters that maximize
this objetive under the two extreme tra onditions desribed earlier.
Using this model, in the subsequent setion we will study the optimal multipath
routing problem for two extreme tra regimes. We demonstrate that in the light
tra regime, as λ → 0, the maximization requires every soure to transmit solely
on a single path to eah destination and we, onsequently, provide a low omplexity
algorithm to determine the optimal path. We also prove that under heavy tra
onditions, where λ→∞, that maximum possible anonymity is ahievable regardless
of the routing parameters whih means the network may hoose the routing strategy
based on minimizing delay alone. The analysis of eah of these tra regimes requires
a orresponding haraterization of anonymity in the network as a funtion of the
topology, routing parameters and the mix delays, whih forms the analytial basis for
the optimization.
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4.2 Optimal Routing in Light Tra
In this setion we onsider the general network with N soures and M destinations
suh that the arrival rates for all soure destination pairs are equal. The equality
assumption is used merely to ease presentation. The results are imminently extend-
able to unequal rate models. More importantly, the key inferenes derived ontinue
to hold for the general model. Our approah is based on a spei mixing strategy
proposed in [16,75℄. The strategy was shown to be optimal in the light tra regimes
for individual mixes and linear asade networks. Aording to this strategy (ψl),
eah mix Mi waits for an arrival after an idle period of at least dmax seonds. All
the pakets whih arrive in di seonds following this arrival will be transmitted in
a single bath at the end of di seonds. During the (li − di) seonds following this
bath transmission (li is the supremum of the sum of the delays in the route whih
inlude mix Mi and start from this mix), all the pakets arrived to this mix will be
transmitted without any delay. Upon ompletion of the li seonds, the mix resets and
wait for a new arrival to restart this proess.
This strategy, as shown in [16℄, obtains the optimal light tra derivative in (2)
for a single mix and linear asade mix networks. In the following we study the
derivative ahieved by the strategy in a mix network as a funtion of the topology
and multipath routing parameters.
4.2.1 Anonymity of a Mix Network in Light Tra
In this setion, we will see that the anonymity is a nononvex funtion of the multi-
path routing parameters λ
P
(i,j)
k
. The non onvexity of the anonymity funtion would
typially imply that we might need to apply approximation methods to eiently
ompute the optimal parameters. However, as will be seen in the proof of Theorem
4.4, the quadrati form we derive for the optimal anonymity results in a unique opti-
mal path for eah soure destination pair.
Prior to going through the anonymity of a general network, we present a simple
example to develop the idea of anonymity in light tra. Consider a network with
two soures, two destinations and a single intermediate mix M1. We assume a yle
with only two pakets, wherein the rst paket belongs to the route P
(1,1)
1 and the
seond one belongs to the route P
(2,2)
1 . If these two pakets depart from mix M1 in
a bath, then Eve will be onfused between two pair of routes: 1) P
(1,1)
1 and P
(2,2)
1
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Figure 3: Mix Network in Lemma 4.2
2) P
(1,2)
1 and P
(2,1)
1 . Thus, the anonymity ahieved in this two paket yle will be
equal to:
Γ = h(
λ
P
(1,1)
1∑
k,j λPk(1,j)
λ
P
(2,2)
1∑
k,j λPk(2,j)
λ
P
(1,1)
1∑
k,j λPk(1,j)
λ
P
(2,2)
1∑
k,j λPk(2,j)
+
λ
P
(1,2)
1∑
k,j λPk(1,j)
λ
P
(2,1)
1∑
k,j λPk(2,j)
), (5)
where h(p) is the Shannon entropy of Bernoulli random variable with parameter p.
If the destinations of these two pakets are idential, then the ahievable entropy will
be h(0.5) = 1. If the pakets do not leave in a bath, then Eve an perfetly identify
the soure-destination pairs, thus ahieving zero unertainty.
Let's onsider the following events in a general network dened with respet to
the yle initiated by a paket arriving at time 0 after a duration with no arrivals of
length at least dmax seonds:
E2 : There are exatly two pakets in the yle.
Ea
P
(i,j)
k
,P
(u,v)
l
: There are two pakets in the yle one from route P
(i,j)
k ∈ P(i, j)
and the other from P
(u,v)
l ∈ P(u, v)and the rst paket initiates the yle.
Eψli : is an indiator random variable dened for the spei two-paket yle as:
Eψli =


1 if the two pakets depart the ith mix ommon
to both routers in a bath when the mixes
use strategy ψl
0 otherwise
Now, we dene the variable Υ(i, j, k, u, v, l) = E{Γψl |Ea
P
(i,j)
k
,P
(u,v)
l
, E2} whih is Eve's
expeted unertainty in the ase where there are two pakets in the yle; one paket
on route P
(i,j)
k and the other on route P
(v,l)
u , and the paket on route P
(i,j)
k initiates
the yle.
When both pakets in a two paket yle arrive from the same soure, the yle
has zero entropy, sine the soure of eah paket is perfetly identiable while the
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ase where these two pakets belongs to two dierent soures the ahievable entropy
should be alulated based on the posterior probabilities as follows:
A two paket yle dened by an event Ea
P
(i,j)
k
,P
(u,v)
l
orresponds to a sub-network
as shown in Figure 3 where there are two soures and two destinations and a set of
intermediate mixes. We use M ′ = (M ′1, M
′
2, . . . , M
′
α) to denote the ordered sequene
of mixes where the two paths interset. The walks Y1, · · · , Yα+1 and Z1, · · · , Zα+1
are eah mutually exlusive sequenes of mixes. There are therefore 2α−1 possible
routes from soure Si to destination Dj through the mixes ((Y1 or Z1), M
′
1, (Y2 or
Z2), ..., M
′
α, (Yα+1 or Zα+1)). The following Lemma omputes the average uner-
tainty ahieved in suh two paket yles.
Lemma 4.2 For a xed routing parameters, the Eve's expeted unertainty in the
network in Figure 3, where there are two pakets in the yle one from soure Si
to destination Dj through the route P
(i,j)
k and the seond paket from soure Su to
destination Dv through the route P
(u,v)
l respetively is given by:
Υ(i, j, k, u, v, l) = E{Γψl |Ea
P
(i,j)
k
,P
(u,v)
l
, E2} =

∑
(b1,··· ,bα)6=(0,··· ,0)
h(0.5)P{Eψl1 = b1
, · · · , Eψlα = bα|E
a
P
(i,j)
k
,P
(u,v)
l
, E2} if j = v∑
(b1,··· ,bα)6=(0,··· ,0)
h(
cuvij
cuvij +c
uj
iv
)P{Eψl1 = b1
, · · · , Eψlα = bα|E
a
P
(i,j)
k
,P
(u,v)
l
, E2} if j 6= v
,
where cuvij is the posterior probability that the pakets from soures Si and Su arrive at
destinations Dj and Dv respetively from Eve point of view given all the observations
and knowledge of Eve.
Proof: Refer to [76℄ .
Lemma 4.2 omputes the ahieved unertainty for spei two paket yles in
the sub-network of Figure 3 as a funtion of routing parameters and the routes of the
two pakets. The expression in the lemma, although ompliated, an be explained
using a simple idea. If the two pakets in a yle leave any mix in a bath, then
non-zero entropy is generated; this non-zero entropy is given by the h(·) term. This
entropy term depends on the posterior probability of a given realization of the soure
destination pairing (Si,Dj), (Su,Dv) given that the two pakets departed in a bath
from a partiular mix. The atual omputation of this probability depends on the
exat realization of the routing parameters (a generalization of the expression in (5)
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). However, as will be seen in the forthoming analysis, this omputation will be
unneessary sine the optimal rate alloation results in single paths for the soure
destination pairs in whih ase, the posterior probability of a partiular pairing is
1
2 .
In a general network, by identifying the set of mixes where pakets are bathed
and the orresponding probabilities, the overall anonymity an be haraterized, as
in the following Theorem.
Theorem 4.3 The light tra derivative of Anonymity of a general mix network
N = (G,D,Λ) is lower bounded by:
∆0(N ) ≥ sdmax
∑
i,j,k,u 6=i,v,l
λ
P
(i,j)
k
λT
λ
P
(u,v)
l
λT
Υ(i, j, k, u, v, l), (6)
where λT =
∑
i,j Λij = Nλ, s =
λT
λ = |S| = N , and Υ(i, j, k, u, v, l) is Eve's expeted
unertainty in the event where there are two pakets in the yle; one paket on route
P
(i,j)
k and the other on route P
(v,l)
u .
Proof: For any strategy ψ, the anonymity is dened as follows:
AψM(λ) =
E(Γψl(Θ)
E(N(Θ))
=
∑∞
n=2 E(Γ
ψl |N = n)P(N = n)
E(N(Θ))
, (7)
where Θ is the total available information for Eve in the yle begins from t = 0.
For the light tra derivative, it is easily seen that the yles where N > 2 do not
ontribute to the light tra derivative (as λ → 0), only linear terms will have non
zero ontributions, and yles with N > 2 neessarily ontain O(λ2) fators by virtue
of the Poisson proess. Therefore, ∆0(M) an be written as:
∆0 ≥ lim
λ→0
d
dλ
E{Γψl |N(Θ) = 2}P{N(Θ) = 2}
E{N(Θ)}
In order to nd E{Γψl |N(Θ) = 2}, we need to average Eve's unertainty on all the
possible pairs of routes P
(i,j)
k and P
(u,v)
l . We an express E
0{Γψl |E2} as follows:
Γ = E{Γψl |E2} =
∑
i,j,k,u 6=i,v,l
P{Ea
P
(i,j)
k
,P
(u,v)
l
|E2}
E{Γψl |Ea
P
(i,j)
k
,P
(u,v)
l
, E2}
E{Γψl |Ea
P
(i,j)
k
,P
(u,v)
l
, E2} is omputed in Lemma 4.2, and
P{Ea
P
(i,j)
k
,P
(u,v)
l
|E2} =
λ
P
(i,j)
k
λT
λ
P
(u,v)
l
λT
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Using the properties of Poisson proesses, we an write
P{E2} = (1− e−sdmax)e−sdmax
E{N(Θ)} = esdmax
onsequently,
∆0(M) ≥ lim
λ→0
d
dλ
Γ(1− e−sdmax)e−sdmax
esdmax
= sdmaxΓ (8)
.
Theorem 3.2 provides the omplete analytial haraterization of the ahievable
light tra anonymity as a funtion of the topology, routing parameters and the
individual delay onstraints of the mixes in the network. This anonymity is omputed
assuming that every mix uses the light tra optimal strategy proposed in [16℄, and
Eve is aware of the topology and the strategy of the mixes.
In the following Theorem, we show that the optimal routing parameters that
maximizes the anonymity in Theorem 4.3 orrespond to single path optimal solutions.
Theorem 4.4 The solutions λ∗
P
(i,j)
k
whih maximizes the total light tra anonymity
of any mix network that uses strategy ψl must neessarily be of the form:
∀i, j∃kij s.t. λ
∗
P
(i,j)
kij
6= 0, λ∗
P
(i,j)
l
= 0, l 6= kij (9)
Proof: There are three basi steps to proving the result of the theorem whih are
desribed as follows:
1. We ompute an upper bound on the light tra derivative using standard
bounds on the binary entropy funtion. Lemma 4.5 demonstrates a property
of the quadrati light tra derivative form that enables the derivation of the
upperbound and the resulting optimization.
2. We prove that the rate alloation parameters that optimize the upper bound
have the single-path form stated in (9). This is shown in Lemma 4.6.
3. We then show that the optimal value for the upperbound is indeed an ahievable
light tra derivative, thus proving the result of the Theorem.
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1. Upper bound on light tra derivative Note that the form of the light
tra derivative expression involves a quadrati funtional of the routing parameters
saled by the probability of a partiular event (that the two pakets in the yle depart
in a bath at least one) in the orresponding two paket yle. Before expressing
the optimization problem and its solution, it is important to prove that for eah
pair of routes the event probability P{Eψl1 = b1, · · · , E
ψl
α = bα|E
a
P
(i,j)
k
,P
(u,v)
l
, E2} is
independent of rate alloation parameters λ
P
(i.j)
k
s in light tra. This is shown in the
following lemma.
Lemma 4.5 For any pair of routes P
(i,j)
k ∈ P(i, j) and P
(u,v)
l ∈ P(u, v), P{E
ψl
1 =
b1, · · · , E
ψl
α = bα|E
a
P
(i,j)
k
,P
(u,v)
l
, E2} is independent of rate alloation λ
P
(i,j)
k
s and is only
a funtion of the topology G and the delay onstraints D, as λ→ 0.
Proof: Refer to [76℄. .
It is evident from Theorem 4.3 that the anonymity is a nononvex funtion of
alloated rates. The general optimization problem we wish to study an be stated as
follows.
Φ : max
{λ
P
(i,j)
k
}
A =
sdmax
∑
i,j,k,u 6=i,v,l
λ
P
(i,j)
k
λT
λ
P
(u,v)
l
λT
Υ(i, j, k, u, v, l)
subjet to : ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, j ∈ {1, · · · ,M} :∑
k
λ
P
(i,j)
k
=
λ
M
,λ
P
(i,j)
k
≥ 0 (10)
Let qijk,uvl denote the probability that the two pakets in the yle depart in a bath
from at least one ommon mix in the pair of routes P
(i,j)
k and P
(u,v)
l :
qijk,uvl ,
∑
(b1,··· ,bα)6=(0,··· ,0)
P{Eψl1 = b1, · · · , E
ψl
α = bα|
Ea
P
(i,j)
k
,P
(u,v)
l
, E2} (11)
In order to solve this problem, we rst ompute an upper bound on A, whih uses
the fat that the entropy terms 0 ≤ h(
cuvij
cuvij +c
uj
iv
) ≤ 1 and h(0.5) = 1, and the fat that
the probability qijk,uvl is bounded as
0 ≤ qijk,uvl ≤ 1,
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Consequently,
A = sdmax
∑
i,j,k,u 6=i,v,l
λ
P
(i,j)
k
λT
λ
P
(u,v)
l
λT
Υ(i, j, k, u, v, l)
≤ sdmax
∑
i,j,k,u 6=i,v,l
λ
P
(i,j)
k
λT
λ
P
(u,v)
l
λT
qijk,uvl , Q (12)
2. Optimizing the Upper bound
Lemma 4.6 The solutions λ∗
P
(i,j)
k
to the optimization problem
Ψ : max
{λ
P
(i,j)
k
}
Q = sdmax
∑
i,j,k,u 6=i,v,l
λ
P
(i,j)
k
λT
λ
P
(u,v)
l
λT
qijk,uvl
subjet to : ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, j ∈ {1, · · · ,M} :∑
k
λ
P
(i,j)
k
=
λ
M
,λ
P
(i,j)
k
≥ 0
must neessarily be of the form:
∀i, j∃kij s.t. λ
∗
P
(i,j)
kij
=
λ
M
,λ∗
P
(i,j)
l
= 0, l 6= kij
Proof: Due to Lemma 4.5, we know that qijk,uvl is independent of λP (i,j)
k
. In the
Hessian matrix of the funtion Q, we an see that all the elements on the diagonal of
the Hessian matrix are zero as ∀i, jandk ∂
2A
∂λ2
P
(i,j)
k
= 0. This fat shows that the sum
of the eigenvalues of this matrix should be zero. Consequently, all of them annot
be either positive or negative and this shows that the subspae where the gradient is
zero, we will just have saddle points whih annot be the optimal solution and the
maximum should exist in the boundary of the domain of rate alloation parameters.
If, for any i, j, we hoose set the λ
P
(i,j)
k
s to be binary (dening a boundary), our
resulting domain would orrespond to a subspae of funtions whih an be viewed
as a boundary for the funtion Q. With eah subspae, if we set eah λ
P
(i,j)
k
equal
to zero individually again all the elements on the diagonal of the new Hessian matrix
will be zero whih shows that all the eigenvalues of the new Hessian matrix annot
have the same sign and the subspae where the gradient of new funtions are zero
annot be optimal as it ats as a saddle point. We therefore ought to onsider the new
funtion's boundaries. Due to the quadrati nature of the anonymity funtion, this
proedure when repeated is going to yield an idential onlusion and onsequently,
the only possible optimum points are the true verties of the rate spae where for eah
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i ∈ {S1, S2, ..., SN} and eah j ∈ {D1,D2, ...,DN } only one the λP (i,j)
k
s is nonzero and
equal to
λ
M . 
3. Equality of the optimal solution for the light tra derivative and the
upper bound Without loss of generality, for eah soure-destination pair (Si,Dj),
let the kijth route, denoted by P
(i,j)
kij
, be the optimal route. Let the vetor λopt =
(λ∗
P
(1,1)
k11
, ...λ∗
P
(1,M)
k1M
, λ∗
P
(2,1)
k21
, ...λ∗
P
(2,M)
k2M
, · · · , λ∗
P
(N,1)
kN1
, ... λ∗
P
(N,M)
kNM
) be the optimal solution of
problem Ψ and Q∗ be this optimal value. We know that
max
λ
P
(i,j)
k
s
A ≤ max
λ
P
(i,j)
k
s
Q = Q∗ (13)
As the optimal solution of Ψ yields single routes for a pair of pakets one belonging
to soure destination pair (Si,Dj) and the other belonging to (Su,Dv) h(
cuvij
cuvij +c
uj
iv
) =
h(0.5) = 1 as long as the two pakets depart in a bath from at least one of the ommon
mixes. Consequently, using Lemma 4.2 and Theorem 4.3, A(λopt) =
∑
i,j,u 6=i,v
λ∗
P
(i,j)
kij
λT
λ∗
P
(u,v)
kuv
λT
qijk,uvl whih is equal to Q
∗
. Therefore, λopt is also the optimal solution of Φ
and A∗ = Q∗, whih ompletes the proof of the theorem. .
The proof of the theorem exposes an interesting artifat of the system: it does not
matter how many mixes end up bathing the pakets in a yle; as long as the pakets
are bathed at least one, then maximum unertainty an be ahieved in light tra
yles. Consequently, the single path solution is suient to maximize the overall
anonymity. In the following setion, we prove that the single path optimality extends
to maximizing the weighted sum of delay and anonymity as well, and subsequently
propose an algorithm to determine the optimal routes that ahieve a desired tradeo
between anonymity and delay.
4.2.2 Delay Anonymity Tradeo in Light Tra
As mentioned in Setion 4.1, the average end to end delay of network is a linear
funtion of routing parameters λ
P
(u,v)
i
expressed as follows:
D =
1
λT
∑
u,v
∑
P
(u,v)
i ∈P(u,v)
λ
P
(u,v)
i
d
P
(u,v)
i
,
We model the network preferene on anonymity and delay by the parameter 0 ≤ α ≤
1. To express the delay anonymity tradeo, we present the following optimization
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problem for a xed α:
Ω : max
{λ
P
(i,j)
k
}
αA− (1− α)D
subjet to : ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, j ∈ {1, · · · ,M} :∑
k
λ
P
(i,j)
k
=
λ
M
,λ
P
(i,j)
k
≥ 0 (14)
Corollary 4.6.1 The optimal solution for problem Ω must neessarily be of the form:
∀i, j∃kαij s.t. λ
∗
P
(i,j)
kα
ij
6= 0, λ∗
P
(i,j)
l
= 0, l 6= kαij (15)
Proof:: As the average delay funtion is a linear funtion of rate alloation parame-
ters, the above orollary naturally follows from the result of Theorem 4.4. .
The above orollary extends the optimality of single path routing solutions to
maximizing the weighted sum of anonymity and delay as well. We do note that this
is a onsequene of average delay being a linear funtional of the parameters. It is
oneivable that should another QoS riterion suh as ongestion be onsidered whih
is better inuened by multipath routing, then this optimality may not extend to those
problems. In suh senarios, the result of Theorem 3.2 should be used in onjuntion
with the orresponding QoS metri to determine the optimal routing parameters.
Following Corollary 4.6.1, we propose a low omplexity algorithm to determine
the omplete delay-anonymity tradeo for any network of mixes.We know that for
any weighting fator 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the optimal routing yields single path route for
eah soure destination pair. Let's onsider the set of all suh single path routing
strategies Q = {(A1,D1), · · · , (A|Q|,D|Q|)}. |Q| is the total number of suh strategies.
Eah pair (Au,Du) orresponds to a single path routing strategy, where for eah
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} and j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, just one of the λkP (i,j) is nonzero. Without
loss of generality we assume that these pairs are ordered suh that their delays are
inreasing, so D1 is the minimum ahievable end-to-end delay.
First, any pair (Ai,Di) suh that ∃u < i : Ai < Au is removed from the set Q,as
αAi − (1 − α)Di < αAu − (1 − α)Du for any weighting fator 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Eah
remaining pair (Ai,Di) orresponds to a line segment (Ai +Di)α−Di as a funtion
of α. Starting from α0 = 0, the pure delay optimal solution orresponds to the pair
(A1,D1) represents the optimal routing. This pair is reorded as (A0−opt,D0−opt).
Then, algorithm nds the pair whih interset this line for smaller α ompared to the
other pairs and reords this α as α1, and this pair as (A1−opt,D1−opt). Then, at eah
step, algorithm ontinues to nd the next line segment whih intersets the urrent
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm to nd the optimal routing for eah α
1: u← 1
2: while u < |Q|
3: p = argmin{j > u : Aj > Au}
4: Q = Q/{Au+1, · · · , Aj−1}
5: u← p
6: i← 0
7: u← 1
8: (Aopt−i,Dopt−i)← (A1,D1)
9: while u < |Q|
10: p = argminj>u{
1
1+
Aj−Au
Dj−Du
}
11: αi+1 =
1
1+
Ap−Au
Dp−Du
12: i← i+ 1
13: (Aopt−i,Dopt−i)← (Ap,Dp)
14: u← p
optimal segment for smaller α till it reahes α ≥ 1. At any step of algorithm, the
pair (Ai−opt,Di−opt) is reorded to be the optimal pair for the interval [αi, αi+1]. The
following theorem demonstrates the optimality of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 4.7 Algorithm 1 derives the optimal routing for any weighting fator α.
Proof:: Let's assume for a weighting fator αi ≤ α ≤ αi+1, there is a pair (At,Dt)
suh that αAt − (1 − α)Dt > αAopt−i − (1 − α)Dopt−i, then (At,Dt) should satisfy
the following inequalities:
1
1 +
Aopt−(i+1)−Aopt−i
Dopt−(i+1)−Dopt−i
≥ α ≥
1
1 +
At−Aopt−i
Dt−Dopt−i
≥
1
1 +
Aopt−i−Aopt−(i−1)
Dopt−i−Dopt−(i−1)
(16)
whih ontradits with the denition of (Aopt−(i+1),Dopt−(i+1)) .
It is noted that the optimal routing were derived assuming a spei mixing strat-
egy desribed in [16℄; the light tra derivative for the strategy is known to be optimal
for individual mixes and for a lass of mix networks, referred to as mix asades [16℄.
We therefore onsider a general lass of networks that are modeled after pratial
anonymous systems, and demonstrate that this lower bound has optimal saling be-
havior with the size of the network. In pratial anonymous systems, suh as Tor [9℄
the network of intermediate nodes are divided into two groups, entry (or exit) nodes
and transit nodes; eah soure (or destination) ommuniates with a single entry (or
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Figure 4: Complete graph mix network. The blue lines shows the worst onnetivity
between soures and mixes and destinations and mixes whih ahieves the lower-
bound. The blak lines shows one of the best possible onnetivity whih ahieves
the upperbound
exit) node, and the transit nodes typially form a omplete graph. In the following,
we use the previous results to derive the optimal saling behavior of the light tra
anonymity for suh networks.
4.3 Saling Behavior of Complete Graphs
In this setion, we onsider a network modeled by a omplete graph with K mix
nodes, N soure nodes, and T destination nodes. The set of mixes ontain N entry
mix nodes and T exit mix nodes suh that all soures transmit only to entry nodes
and destinations are diretly aessible only from exit nodes. The K mixes nodes,
however, form a omplete graph. Eah mix has an idential delay onstraint d.
In the following theorem, we apply the results of the previous setion to prove
that the optimal anonymity for suh omplete mix networks sale as O(NK). We
show that for both upper bound and lower bound the mix network, the light tra
anonymity sales identially to a single mix with a delay onstraint dmax, whih an
simulate any strategy of the original mix network.
Theorem 4.8 The optimal light tra derivative of anonymity of the omplete mix
network with N soures and T destinations in the light tra regime is bounded from
above and below as follows:
d(N − 1)(K −N − T ) ≤ AMc ≤ d(N − 1)K (17)
Proof: We do not onsider any spei set of routes between soures and destinations
in the mix network. In order to provide a lower bound, we onsider a senario where
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eah soure and eah destination has just one onnetion to separate entry and exit
mixes respetively (Figure 4). Based on Theorem 4.4, for eah soure destination pair,
it is suient to hoose exatly one route to transmit pakets. In order to maximize
the light tra derivative under this assumption, we let eah soure transmits its
pakets through the longest possible route. For example, soure S1 transmits the
pakets to destination D1 through the route (M1,MN+1, · · · ,MK−T ,MK−T+1). This
asade assumption would then imply that the sequene (MN+1, · · · ,MK−T ) =MLow
an be viewed as a single mix with the delay onstraint equal to sum of all the mixes in
it whih is equal to (K−T −N)d. Using Theorem 4.3 for this system, the anonymity
in light tra an be proven to be lower bounded as
A ≥ NKdNT 2(N − 1)
λ
T
Nλ
λ
T
Nλ
(K + 2−N − T )d
Kd
=
d(N − 1)(K −N − T ) (18)
The upper bound is obtained by replaing the network of mixes with a single mix
having delay onstraint dmax = Kd suh that all soures transmit to the mix and
all destinations reeive pakets from the mix (Figure 4 ). That the anonymity of
this system is an upper bound to the network of mixes omes from the fat that any
strategy used by the network of mixes an be simulated by the enhaned single mix,
and sine Eve observing only one super mix has fewer observations, the anonymity
ahieved by the super mix is higher than that by the network of mixes. For suh a
system, the light tra anonymity an easily be shown to be d(N − 1)K. .
4.4 Optimal Routing in Heavy Tra
In this setion, we will demonstrate that in the heavy tra regime, as λ → ∞,
maximum anonymity is ahievable regardless of the hoie of routing parameters.
Consequently, the derived rate alloation from the light tra analysis would be
suitable under heavy tra onditions as well. An important step in the heavy
tra analysis required expressing the ahievable anonymity of a general multiple-
destination network as a linear ombination of smaller sub-networks involving single
mixes. This result, whih is proven in Lemma 4.10, requires the denition of the
intermediate anonymity ahieved by an individual mix in the network.
Speially, for a single mix Mi in the network N , we dene A
j
Mi
to be the
intermediate anonymity of pakets on the jth outgoing edge of mix Mi as follows:
AjMi(λ) = limλ→∞
H(Xij)
N ij
, (19)
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where Xij = (Xij1 , · · · ,X
ij
N ij
) and Xijk is the soure of the k
th
paket from Eve's
perspetive on the jth outgoing edge and N ij is number of pakets on the jth outgoing
edge.
In [75℄, we demonstrated that in the heavy tra regime for a single destination
network, the ahieved anonymity is independent of the rate alloation thus allowing
soures to optimize their multipath route seletion based on other desired QoS met-
ris. In the following Theorem, we show the same fat holds for multiple destination
networks as well. An important step in proving this result is the expression of the
anonymity of the mix network as a linear funtional of the intermediate anonymities
given by (19).
Theorem 4.9 If eah mix utilizes an asymptotially optimal mixing strategy, then
the maximum anonymity in a multiple destination mix network is ahieved for
any set of alloated rates as long as eah destination node reeives pakets from a
single mix.
Proof: In order to prove this theorem, we rst need to nd the exat expression of
high tra anonymity in terms of the rate alloation parameters whih is given by
following lemma:
Lemma 4.10 Anonymity of any arbitrary network in the high tra rate regime is
lower bounded by:
AM(λ) ≥
|M|∑
i=1
ξi∑
j=1
wjMi
w
(AjMi −
|S|∑
k=1
∑ζi
u=1w
jk
Miu
wjMi
H(
wjkMi1∑ζi
u=1w
jk
Miu
, · · · ,
wjkMiζi∑ζi
u=1 w
jk
Miu
)), (20)
where w is the total rate of soures and wjkMiu is rate of pakets from soure Sk arriving
on the uth inoming edge to mix Mi and leaving mix Mi from the j
th
outgoing edge.
wjMi is the rate of pakets on the jth outgoing edge of mix Mi. ζi is number of
inoming edges of mix Mi and ξi is the number of outgoing edges of mix Mi.
Proof: Refer to [76℄. .
Lemma 4.10 expresses the anonymity ahieved by the network of mixes as a
weighted sum of the anonymity of eah individual mix and the multipath rate al-
loation parameters. To prove the result of this theorem, we require that eah mix
ahieves the maximum possible anonymity asymptotially. In other words, we must
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prove the existene of a mixing strategy ψ for any mix Mi in the system, suh that
if wjkMix are the set of arrival rates to the mix, then the ahieved anonymity is the
optimal anonymity whih is given by following equation.
lim
λ→∞
AψM (λ) =
∑
Mi∈F
∑
j∈Fi
wjMi
w
h(
w1Mij
wjMi
, · · · ,
wNMij
wjMi
), (21)
where F is the set of mixes whih has at least one edge onneted diretly to one of
the destinations and Fi is the set of outgoing edges of mix Mi whih are onneted
to destinations. wkMij is the rate of pakets of soure Sk on the j
th
outgoing link of
mix Mi. w
j
Mi
is the total rate of pakets on jth outgoing edge of mix Mi.
Existene of suh a strategy has been shown in [16℄ and is a subjet of a deeper
investigation in [74℄, where the strategy with the best asymptoti onvergene rate is
presented. In so far as the disussion in this paper is onerned, onsider the simple
bathing strategy of a mixMi, wherein the mix bathes all pakets that arrive within
periodi time intervals of di seonds. As λ → ∞, the number of pakets that arrive
within any time period, say NT would also inrease towards innity. Aording to
the law of large numbers, the proportion of pakets arriving on eah link in this bath
of pakets would onverge to the proportion of arrival rates from those respetive
links. By reordering the pakets suh that every possible ordering within a bath is
uniformly random, the anonymity ahieved will onverge to the prior entropy given in
inequality (20) as λ→∞. Given that eah mix ahieves the prior entropy as λ→∞
regardless of the nature of arrival proesses, it remains to be seen that the anonymity
of the network onverges to the maximum possible regardless of the rate alloation;
this an be shown by substituting the right-hand-side in (20) bak into Lemma 4.10,
so we get the optimal anonymity whih is given in (21). .
As the optimal anonymity is ahieved for any rate alloation in high tra regime,
the optimal delay anonymity region has one optimal point whih is the delay optimal
point. In a broader sense, the optimal routing problem an be designed based on
other QoS riteria suh as lateny, throughput and ongestion.
4.5 Simulations and Numerial Results
In this setion, we present our simulation results on two example mix networks shown
in Figures 1 and 5. We ompare the anonymity optimal rate alloation to the other
intuitive shemes. We see that the optimal routing derived in the light tra regime
also performs better when ompared to other shemes in the regions where the traf-
 is neither heavy nor light. Finally, we present simulation results of the delay
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Figure 5: Mix network onsidered for the delay anonymity trade-o simulation
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Figure 6: Comparing performane of optimal strategy in light tra ase to the other
rate alloations
anonymity tradeo for the mix network in Figure 5. In Figure 6, the anonymity
ahieved by the optimal light tra based rate alloation for the 2 soure network
in Figure 1 is plotted as a funtion of general arrival rate λ, and the performane is
ompared to two intuitive rate alloation shemes, namely equal alloation and delay
optimal alloation. In equal alloation, eah soure transmits half the tra through
mix M1, and the other half through mix M2, while in delay optimal alloation, eah
soure transmits its tra through the shortest path. In the simulation, the rate of
S2 was assumed to be twie that of S1. For general tra the optimal anonymity
delay relationship is as yet an open problem, and any suh optimization of rate al-
loation parameters would have to be performed using sub optimal strategies and
analytially intratable expressions. An example strategy that is optimal under light
tra onditions and heavy tra onditions but sub optimal for the general tra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λ2
would be that of a strategy that simply pools pakets that arrives within the delay
onstraint and transmits a uniform random shue of a bath. Under our framework
the anonymity an be omputed as
A =
∑
i
∑
j
Pr{i pakets from S1 and j pakets from S2}
Pr{leaving in a bath} log2
(
i+ j
i
)
(22)
This strategy is used to haraterize the anonymity for eah set of routing parameters.
From Theorem 4.9, we know that all of these alloations will ahieve the maximum
anonymity h(13)as λ→∞. However, for the region where the tra is neither heavy
nor light, the optimal alloation we found using the light tra derivative performs
better than the intuitive shemes. This is not surprising, as the linear portion in the
light tra region provides the maximum gain per unit of rate inrease. Consequently,
the rise of the anonymity urve is best for the light tra based optimal alloation.
Sine all alloations eventually onverge to the maximum possible anonymity, the
performane is expeted to be better for a wide range of rates.
In Figure 7, we ompared the ahievable anonymity of delay optimal, anonymity
optimal strategy, and equal rate alloation strategy for the network in Figure 1.
Figure 8 plots the anonymity-delay tradeo for the network shown in Figure 5.
There are four optimal strategy points here that eah of them is optimal strategy for
dierent ranges of α. Note that these points an be easily derived by the algorithm
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Figure 8: Delay Anonymity Trade-o in Mix Networks
presented in setion 4.2.2. This tradeo is ompared to an intuitive linear alloation
strategy wherein, for α = 0, we use the optimal delay strategy and for α = 1, we use
the anonymity optimal strategy. As we inrease α, we derease the rate alloated to
the delay optimal strategy and add it to anonymity optimal strategy until α = 1 and
at this point all the rate is alloated to the anonymity optimal strategy.
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5 Relay Seletion and Operation Control for Optimal De-
lay and Soure-Destination Anonymity Tradeo in Anony-
mous Networks
In this setion, we provide an analytial framework to address soure-destination pair
anonymity and propose relay seletion and operation methodologies that are resistant
to timing analysis while satisfying low lateny requirements.
In partiular, we investigate the optimal relay seletion and ontrol of relay opera-
tional modes in an anonymous network. To understand operational mode, onsider
the senario depited in Figure 10, where there are soures S1 and S2 transmitting
to the destinations D1 and D2, respetively. In Figure 10a, the intermediate node
follows the rule of First Come First Serve (FCFS) in whih ase an eavesdropper
who observes the tra in this network an identify the destination orresponding
to eah soure. If, however, the intermediate node an delay the pakets for upto d
seonds, where d is greater than the interpaket timing on the high rate stream, then
the relay an add dummy transmissions suh that the output streams are indistin-
guishable to any eavesdropper (see Figure 10b). The optimal rate and mehanism to
insert dummy pakets to maintain this indistinguishability have been well studied in
[1215, 35℄. Indeed it has been shown that if the inoming rates of the soures are
made equal then the overhead dummy rate dereases inverse quadratially with the
inoming tra rate thus making it an eetive mehanism for high rate tra with
limited bandwidth infringement. This tehnique however results in a linear saling of
dummy rate with the number of users aessing a relay and, when ombined with the
fat that it results in added delay, it has been largely ignored in pratial anonymous
systems.
In this setion, we propose to alleviate these onerns by inluding two impor-
tant hoies in the implementation of suh dependent link padding. First, we expand
the ability of an intermediate relay to seletively introdue dummy transmissions
to make a fration of streams indistinguishable as opposed to introduing dummy
transmissions on all outgoing streams. Seond, in a virtual iruit, we enable the
route seletion mehanism for eah soure to determine if a partiular relay should
be adding dummy transmissions on its stream at all. Naturally, these hoies are
required to be made with the net goal of ahieving the best possible anonymity whilst
not introduing substantial lateny. That is the primary theme of this setion whih
is an investigation of the optimal relay seletion and ontrol for a sub-network ab-
38
Figure 9: Six Relay System Abstration.
stration as shown in Figure 9 whih optimally trades o delay for anonymity. Using
the developed methodology, protool designers an hoose a desirable operating point
on this tradeo urve.
Rest of this setion is presented as follows: In setion 5.1, we present the system
model for anonymous system to provide soure-destination anonymity. In setion
5.2, we derive anonymity as funtion of rely seletion and ontrol mehanism pa-
rameters. Moreover, we provide suient onditions on this parameter suh that
optimal anonymity is provided. The problem of soure-destination anonymity and
delay tradeo is investigated in setion 5.3. Finally, we present the simulation results
in setion 5.4.
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(a) Anonymous relay node in First
Come First Serve (FCFS) mode (no
anonymity)
(b) Anonymous relay node in
Anonymizing mode (maximum
anonymity)
Figure 10: Standard and Anonymous Relays
5.1 System Model
The anonymous network abstration ontains six relay nodes whih inludes two
entry guards, two intermediate relay nodes, and two exit guards. To emphasize that
eah of these six relay nodes are apable of adding dummy transmissions to boost
anonymity, we shall often refer to them as anonymous relays. We assume that the
users orresponding to eah suh group of six relays to have idential preferenes for
anonymity and delay. A large network an be viewed as ontaining hundreds of these
groups of six. We fous our investigation on the anonymity in a single group. An
example network with six relay nodes wherein eah soure hooses a sequene of three
anonymous relay nodes (one eah from the two entry guards, two intermediate relays
and two exit guards) and is shown in Figure 11a. Our abstration is dened formally
as a 3-tuple (G,∆,B), where G = (V, E) is a direted graph with the set of nodes
denoted by V and E the set of direted edges. V = S
⋃
M
⋃
D, where S is the set of
soure nodes, D the set of destination nodes, andM the set of six anonymous relays.
We further reneM =ME
⋃
MM
⋃
MQ, whereME is the set of entry guard nodes,
MM is the set of intermediate relays, and MQ is the set of exit guard nodes. The
3-tuple ontains a set B of bandwidth onstraints for eah anonymous relay and a set
∆ of delays assoiated with eah edge.
Soure: Eah soure Si ∈ S transmits pakets aording to a stohasti proess
to a destination through a sequene of three anonymous relays- an entry guard from
ME , an intermediate relay from MM and an exit guard from MQ. Let ri denote
the paket arrival rate on the paket stream from soure Si. Eah soure has two key
deisions to make. First, the soure hooses the sequene of three anonymous relays;
this hoie is represented by the relay seletion parameter Ri = (X1i,X2i,X3i), where
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(a) Dotted links represent the unpadded links.
(b) Unpadded outgoing links an be perfetly mathed to their orresponding in-
oming link.
Figure 11: Link Padding.
X1i ∈ ME ,X2i ∈ MM , and X3i ∈ MQ. Seond, the soure hooses if it wishes its
stream to be padded with dummy transmissions by eah anonymous relay in eet
ontrolling the operated mode of the relay partially. We denote this ontrol ation
using the anonymization parameter Ai = (ISi,X1i , ISi,X2i , ISi,X3i), where ISi,Xji = 1
indiates that anonymous relay Xji should add dummy transmissions to the stream
from soure Si, and ISi,Xji = 0 indiates that the relay Xji would transmit pakets
from Si on a FCFS basis without any link padding thus allowing an eavesdropper
to math the outgoing stream with its orresponding inoming stream. Note that
although the intended data rate for soure Si is ri, the hoie of anonymization
parameter ould result in an overhead dummy rate whih we denote by rSiDu.
Anonymous relay: Eah anonymous relay will be denoted by M ij , where j =
1, 2, 3 denotes respetively the entry guard, intermediate relay, and exit guard. Eah
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anonymous relay M ij has a delay onstraint dM ij
, and bandwidth BM ij
. The aggregate
inoming paket rate to the anonymous relay nodeM ij annot exeed BM ij
. If there are
totally n inoming streams to the anonymous relay M ij , where k inoming streams
have requested their streams not to be padded by that relay and n − k inoming
streams have requested to be anonymized through padding by setting ISu,M ij
= 1,
then the anonymous relay will transmit the pakets of the k inoming streams on
FCFS basis without any delay or padding. Pakets from the remaining n−k inoming
streams an be delayed by the anonymous relay node for a maximum of dM ij
seonds.
So that outgoing stream of those n − k soures are indistinguishable. This waiting
period allows the anonymous relay to aumulate pakets from the n − k streams,
suh that one paket from eah of these streams an be transmitted at the same time
in a bath on their orresponding outgoing edge. Note that if there is no paket from
some of these streams in this period the relay will transmit a dummy paket on the
orresponding outgoing edges so that all n−k outgoing streams have idential timing.
This is the essene of dependent link padding whih is known to be optimal under
delay onstraints. This ensures that from Eve's perspetive, the outgoing streams
(that have been padded) annot be uniquely assoiated to the orret inoming stream
from the timing. Dependent link padding, while not in use in real systems due to
onerns about bandwidth onsumption, is essential to thwart timing analysis. In
this work, by imposing tight lateny onstraints and ontrolling the number of stream
padded at eah relay, we alleviate these onerns.
Eavesdropper: For purposes of this work, we onsider an omnisient eavesdrop-
per (Eve) who observes the transmission timing on every ommuniation link in the
network. Eve knows the topology of the network and the link padding strategy of
the anonymous relays. Eve's goal is to use this timing information to determine a-
urately the pairs of soure-destination (Si,Dj) who are ommuniating. We note
that Eve is a spei type of adversary a passive one and is not the only type
of adversary in an anonymous system. That being said, the objetive of this paper
is to understand the optimal tradeo between anonymity and delay under a timing
analysis attak, and other mehanisms to thwart ative adversaries an be built in
onjuntion with the framework delineated here.
Quantifying Anonymity from Timing: We use Shannon onditional entropy
to quantify anonymity from timing analysis in partiular to measure the unertainty
in the soure-destination pairing from the perspetive of Eve. We dene random
variables X1,X2, · · · , XN where random variable Xi denotes the destination node for
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pakets from soure Si. We denote the omplete observation and knowledge of the
Eve by Θ. Conditioned on Θ, (X1,X2, · · · ,XN ) follows a posterior joint distribution
indued by the hoies of relay seletion and anonymization parameters. Let Ψ(M)
denote the set of all possible relay seletion and anonymization strategies.
Denition 5.1 The anonymity ahieved by a spei strategy ψ ∈ Ψ(M) is dened
as:
Aψ =
H(X1, · · · ,XN |Θ)
logN !
, (23)
where for any pair of random vetors X,Y, H(X|Y) is the onditional entropy.
Shannon onditional entropy was proposed as a measure of anonymity in [77℄.
Sine then, it has been used to design optimal mixing strategies [7880℄ and hara-
terize fundamental relationships between anonymity and network resoures [35,81,82℄.
In an N−soure, N−destination system, the total number of permutations of soure-
destination pairings possible is N !, and for any strategy ψ, the unertainty H(X1, · · · ,
XN |Θ) ≤ logN ! [83℄. This maximum is ahieved, if from Eve's perspetive, ev-
ery soure is equally likely to be ommuniating with eah destination. Likewise, an
unertainty H(X1, · · · , XN |Θ) = 0 indiates that Eve an perfetly identify the desti-
nation orresponding to eah soure. As per equation (23), the normalized anonymity
is bounded as 0 ≤ A ≤ 1. In general, Eve's probability of error in identifying soure
destination pairs inreases with A (see Fano's inequality, [83℄) whih provides the
tangible onnetion between the metri and the ation of the adversary.
Delay: In our model, there are two soures of lateny:
1) Transmission delay that ours on eah link represented by dX,Y where (X,Y ) ∈ E
whih is the delay inurred by eah paket on its transmission from node X to node
Y .
2) Delay inurred by pakets at an anonymous relay M ij , denoted by dM ij
, should the
soure of the pakets hoose to have its stream padded by relay M ij . The average
delay for the network abstration an be expressed as linear funtion of the relay
seletion and anonymization parameters:
D¯ =
1
rtot
∑
Si∈S
ri(dSi,Ri(1) + ISi,Ri(1)dRi(1) + dRi(1),Ri(2) +
ISi,Ri(2)dRi(2) + dRi(2),Ri(3) + ISi,Ri(3)dRi(3) + dRi(3),Di), (24)
where rtot =
∑
i ri.
43
Delay Anonymity Tradeo: The primary hallenge we investigate in this work
is the tradeo between anonymity and lateny. That suh a tradeo exists is amply
evident from the the single anonymous relay system disussed in the introdution (see
Figure 1). In the six relay abstration we onsider, this tradeo is a funtion of the
hoies made by the soures. Although eah soure is liable to have an individual
preferene for the degree to whih performane an be traded for anonymity, in our
work, we assume all the users in a single abstration have similar preferenes for the
operating point on the tradeo urve. We model this preferene using a weighting
parameter 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, where the soures desire to maximize the weighted sum αA−
(1 − α)D¯. An α lose to zero would indiate that the soures desire less lateny,
whereas an α lose to 1 would indiate that they desire high anonymity. Our goal
is to study the joint optimization of the relay seletion parameters {Ri} and the
anonymization parameters {Ai} suh that this weighted sum is maximized for any
hosen α.
A summary of notations in this paper is presented in Table1.
5.2 Anonymity Optimal Relay Seletion
For xed relay seletion parameters {Ri} and anonymization parameters {Ai}, the
network may be represented as shown in Figure 11a, where dotted edges represent
links whih are not padded with dummy transmissions and solid edges represent
padded links. If an inoming tra stream is not padded, Eve an identify the or-
responding outgoing edge using timing analysis. In ontrast, if at least two inoming
links are padded, then the orresponding outgoing edges will have idential timing pat-
terns and are thus indisinguishable to Eve. Eah of these padded outgoing links will
have an idential paket rate equal to the maximum inoming rate amongst the orre-
sponding inoming links; whereas the rate of unpadded links will remain unhanged.
Sine an unpadded outgoing link an be mathed to an inoming link perfetly and
inurs no overhead, removing the dotted links and onneting them to the subsequent
anonymous relay on their path will not hange the analysis of anonymity and dummy
rate in the network (See Figure 11b). Therefore, it is suient to merely onsider the
anonymized links in the network's graph (See Figure 12).
For a given hoie of relay seletion and anonymization parameters, we dene
three sets of ounting variables. l
M
i1
j ,M
i2
j
denotes the number of padded links from
the anonymous relay M i1j to the anonymous relay M
i2
j , ls,M ij
denote the number of
soures requesting the anonymous relay M ij to be the rst anonymous relay on its
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route whih anonymize their streams by padding, and the variable lM ij ,d
denotes the
number of padded links from the anonymous relay M ij to the destinations whih are
not padded any further downstream. These parameters are dened mathematially
as follows:
ls,d =
∑
u
1(Au = (0, 0, 0))
lsM ij
=
∑
u:Ru(j)=M ij
1(Au(j) = 1, k < j : Au(k) = 0)
lM ij ,d
=
∑
u:Ru(j)=M ij
1(Au(j) = 1, k > j : Au(k) = 0)
lM ij ,M lv
=
∑
u:Ru(j)=M ij ,Ru(v)=M
l
v
1(Au(j) = Au(v) = 1,
j < k < v : Au(k) = 0)
where 1 is the indiator funtion (1(σ) = 1 if σ is TRUE and 0 otherwise). Sine
padding a set of inoming streams results in the orresponding outgoing streams to
have idential timing patterns, the anonymity ahieved by a partiular hoie of relay
seletion and anonymization parameters an be expressed as a funtion of the ounting
variables dened above.
We note that, only a subset of possible hoies of relay seletion and anonymiza-
tion parameters are feasible, owing to the bandwidth onstraints at the anonymous
relays. Prior to haraterizing the ahieved anonymity, we shall derive the neessary
onditions for the relay seletion and anonymization parameters to satisfy eah anony-
mous relay's bandwidth onstraint and subsequently haraterize the anonymity for
feasible parameters. We dene the variables rM ij
to be the rate of pakets on eah of
the links padded by the anonymous relay M ij derived as follows:
rM ij
= max{ max
l=1,2,k<j
{rM l
k
1(lM l
k
,Muj
6= 0)},
max
Si:k<j:Ai(k)=0,Ri(j)=Muj
{ri}}
The above rate is haraterized assuming that the transmission of dummy pakets
is merely due to the inoming rates of paket streams being dierent. In general
there is an additional overhead that is inverse quadratially related to the maximum
inoming rate whih is not expliitly onsidered for the mathematial portions, but
is used in the numerial setions. This dierene is shown in Figure 13, where we
onsidered a single anonymous relay and four paket streams whih have heavy tail
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Figure 12: The networks graph after removing the unpadded outgoing links. (The
dashed lines represents the variables dened in Lemma 5.1)
tra distribution. The rate of dummy transmission required for the streams are
shown as funtion of the anonymous relay's allowable delay. As is observable, as long
as the allowed delay at the relay exeeds a ertain threshold this additional overhead
is negligible. Assuming the allowable delay is in the negligible overhead region, we
an express the rate of dummy transmissions padded for eah soure as:
rSiDu = maxj
{rRi(j)1(Ai(j) 6= 0)} − ri (25)
The bandwidth onstraint of eah anonymous relay Muj ∈ M will restrit the relay
seletion and anonymization parameters:∑
Si:Ri(j)=M
u
j
1(k < j : Ai(k) = 0)ri +
∑
l,k<j
r
Mlk
l
Mlk,M
u
j
≤ BMuj
In the rest of this paper, we denote the relay seletion parameters {Ri} and anonymiza-
tion parameter{Ai} feasible if they satisfy the bandwidth onstraints.
Assuming the relay seletion and anonymization parameters satisfy the bandwidth
onstraints, omputation of the ahieved anonymity requires a ounting of all possible
soure destination pairings that ould result in the observed set of paket streams from
Eve's perspetive. Considering the network shown in Figure 12 where all the links are
padded, we are interested to nd the destinations Djs that a spei soure Si may
46
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Delay(Seconds)
D
um
m
y 
Ra
te
(P
ac
ke
ts/
Se
co
nd
)
Dummy Rate Analysis for a Single Anonymous Relay
 
 
Rate=9.64
Rate=10.79
Rate=11.42
Rate=12.34
Simulation Region
Analytical Region
Figure 13: Dummy rate for a single anonymous relay where there are four inoming
streams modeled by heavy tail tra.
ommuniate with. Let's onsider three dierent ases for soure Si: 1) If soure Si
enters the network using the anonymous relay M13 , then it is surely ommuniating
with one of the destinations onneted to M13 . 2) If soure Si enters the network
using the anonymous relay M12 , then it is surely ommuniating with one of the
destinations onneted to M12 or M
1
3 or M
2
3 . 3) If soure Si enters the network
using the anonymous relay M11 , then it annot ommuniate with the destinations
onneted to the anonymous relay M21 .
Thus, we onsider six sets of soures: ls,M11 , ls,M21 , · · · , ls,M23 , where all the soure
belonging to any of these sets an ommuniate with the same set of destinations
disussed above. In order to ount all the possible ommuniating soure- destination
pairs, we need to exhaustively delineate the viable ases by every soure. Considering
ls,M11 soures onneted to the anonymous relayM
1
1 , we have lM11 ,d out of ls,M11 soures
whih ommuniate with the destinations diretly onneted to M11 , we may have i1
soures whih ommuniate with the destinations diretly onneted toM12 , i2 soures
ommuniate with the destinations diretly onneted toM22 , i31+i32+lM11 ,M13 soures
whih ommuniate with the destinations onneted to M13 (i31 soures through the
path (M11 ,M
1
2 ,M
1
3 ), i32 soures through the path (M
1
1 ,M
2
2 ,M
1
3 ), and lM11 ,M13 through
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the path (M11 ,M
1
3 )), and the rest of soures will ommuniate with the destinations
onneted to M23 . We also dene the variables j1, j2, j31, j32 for the soures belong
to ls,M21 in the same way. One these variables are xed, the number of soures
from the other four sets ommuniating with eah set of destinations is known. For
example, number of soures from the set ls,M12 ommuniating with the destinations
onneted to M12 will be lM12 ,d− i1− i2. We note that the quantities i1, i2, · · · will be
restrited by some of the graphs struture parameters. For instane i1 an not exeed
min{lM11 ,M12 , lM12 ,d}. Through an exhaustive ounting of all senarios and onsidering
the onstraints on the variables i1, i2, · · · , the ahieved anonymity as a funtion of
variables lX,Y is expressed in the following lemma:
Lemma 5.1 For a xed feasible set of route seletion parameters {Ri} and anonymiza-
tion parameters {Ai}, the ahieved anonymity an be expressed as follows:
A =
log(C
∏2
i=1
∏3
j=1 lMji ,d
!)
log(N !)
, where
C =
∑
ζi1≤i1≤ǫi1 ,
ζi2≤i2≤ǫi2
∑
ζi31≤i31≤ǫi31 ,
ζi32≤i32≤ǫi32
∑
ζj1≤j1≤ǫj1 ,
ζj2≤j2≤ǫj2
∑
ζj31≤j31≤ǫj31 ,
ζj32≤j32≤ǫj32
1
Norm(i31, i32)
(
lS,M11
lM11 ,D, i1, i2, i31 + i32 + lM11 ,M13
)
1
Norm(j31, j32)
(
lS,M21
lM21 ,D, j1, j2, j31 + j32 + lM21 ,M13
)
(
lS,M12
lM12 ,D − i1 − j1, lM12 ,M13 − i31 − j31
)
(
lS,M22
lM22 ,D − i2 − j2, lM22 ,M13 − i32 − j32
)
, (26)
where ǫi1 , ζi1 denotes the maximum and minimum number of soures onneted di-
retly to M11 (lS,M1
M
) whih an ommuniate with the destinations onneted to M12
(lM12 ,D), and so on (the boundaries and onstant are speied in the appendix) and
Norm() is a normalization onstant.
Proof: In order to nd the anonymity we need to ount all the possible pairs of
soure-destination whih may ommuniate. For this purpose, we will ount all the
ases whih may our to eah group of l
s,Mji
. We divide the soure of group lM11 to
5 groups:1) lM11 ,d ommuniating with the destinations lM11 ,d. 2) i1 ommuniating
with the destinations lM12 ,d. 3) i2 ommuniating with the destinations lM22 ,d. 4)
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i31 + i32 + lM11 ,M13 ommuniating with the destinations lM13 ,d. 5) The rest of soures
ls,M11 − lM11 ,d − i1 − i2 − i31 − i32 − lM11 ,M13 are ommuniating with lM23 ,d.
j1, j2, j13, andj23 are also dened in the same manner. One all of these quantities
are xed. The number of soures whih may ommuniate from ls,M12 or ls,M22 to
the other sets of destinations are identied. For example number of soures from
ls,M12 to lM12 ,d will be equal to lM12 ,d − i1 − j1. Considering the onstraint on eah of
the quantities i1, i2, i31, i32 and j1, j2, j31 + j32, we an ount all the possible pair of
soure-destination whih may ommuniate. However, we should notie that there
are ases where i31+ i32+ lM11 ,M13 and j31+ j32+ lM21 ,M13 are xed and ounted several
times in our summation. Thus, by dening the Norm funtion whih ounts this
redundany for the xed i31 + i32 + lM11 ,M13 and j31 + j32 + lM21 ,M13 , we eliminate the
redundant ases. .
The anonymity haraterized in Lemma 5.1 is at most equal to 1 whih ours
when given an observation of the timing proesses on all the links, every soure desti-
nation pairing is equally likely. We nd onditions on the hoies of parameters {Ri}
and {Ai} suh that this maximum anonymity is ahieved. Note that it is not suient
merely for all relays to pad all outgoing streams to ahieve maximum anonymity. For
instane, if half the soures hoose a partiular sequene of relays, and the remaining
hoose a mutually exlusive sequene, then the ahieved anonymity would be at most
1
2 .
Theorem 5.2 The feasible relay seletion parameters {Ri} and anonymization pa-
rameters {Ai} yields in optimal anonymity if they satisfy the following onditions:
C1 : ∀X ∈ ME,∀Y ∈ MQ : lX,d = ls,Y = lX,Y = ls,d = 0
C2 : ∀Z,Z
′ ∈ MM : 1(ls,Z 6= 0, lZ′,d 6= 0) = 0
C3 : ∀Z ∈ MM : lZ,M13 , lZ,d ≤
lM11,Z + lM21,Z, lM11,Z + ls,Z, lM21,Z + ls,Z (27)
Proof: We need to nd suient onditions suh that all N ! possible ommuniat-
ing pairs of soure-destination {(Si,Dj)} are possible in Eve's perspetive whih are
derived as:
-Condition C1: It is straightforward that ls,d should be zero, otherwise Eve an as-
ertain the destination of these soures perfetly and the maximum number of pos-
sible ommuniating pairs will be less than (N − ls,d)! whih does not yield optimal
anonymity. If lM11 ,d 6= 0, Eve an asertain that the soures whih use M
2
1 as their
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entry guard and request it to anonymize their stream will not ommuniate with the
destinations diretly onneted to M11 (in the graph shown in Figure 12). If ls,M i3
6= 0,
Eve an asertain that these soures will ommuniate with destinations onneted
to M i3. If lM i1,M
j
3
6= 0, then, Eve an infer that there are l
M i1,M
j
3
of soures whih use
M i1 as entry guard that will ommuniate with the destinations onneted to M
j
3 .
-Condition C2: If ls,M12 6= 0, lM22 ,d 6= 0, then Eve asertains that that the soure belongs
to ls,M12 will not ommuniate with the destinations onneted diretly to M
2
2 (lM22 ,d).
-Condition C3 is obtained by applying the Chu-Vandermonde identity assuming on-
ditions C1, and C2 hold. .
Theorem 1 gives suient onditions to ahieve maximum anonymity. As an
be observed from the onditions, in order to ahieve maximum anonymity, it is not
neessary for all soures to request all the three anonymous relays in its route sequene
to pad their streams. Nevertheless, the anonymity is ahieved at the ost of additional
delay. Any hoie of parameters that satisfy these onditions would maximize the
weighted reward αA− (1− α)D¯ merely for α = 1.
5.3 Delay Anonymity Trade-o
That a tradeo exists between the ahieved anonymity and the delay aused by
intermediate nodes padding the streams is easy to understand. Although, it may
not seem straightforward, there is also a tradeo between the ahieved anonymity
and the lateny aused by the transmission delay between the nodes. For exam-
ple, onsider a network with four soures where eah soure hooses its relay se-
letion parameters based on the minimum lateny aused by the delay between
the nodes and all anonymization parameters are set (1, 1, 1). Assume that due to
bandwidth onstraints, eah anonymous relay an serve no more than two streams.
Then, without loss of generality,we may assume R1 = R2 = (M
1
1 ,M
1
2 , M
1
3 ) and
R3 = R4 = (M
2
1 ,M
2
2 ,M
2
3 ). Suh hoie of relay seletion and anonymization parame-
ters yields minimum lateny aused by the delays between the nodes, and anonymity
equal to
log(2!∗2!)
log(4!) whih is far less than the optimal anonymity. If the network is
willing to inrease the lateny by hanging the parameters of soures S2 and S3 to
R2 = (M
1
1 ,M
2
2 ,M
1
3 ), and R3 = (M
2
1 ,M
1
2 ,M
1
3 ), respetively, whih yields in higher
lateny, the optimal anonymity will be ahieved.
In the six relay abstration, the average delay of the network was dened in
equation (24) as a linear funtion of relay seletion and anonymization parameters.
As mentioned in Setion 5.1, we model the preferene of all the soures on the delay
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anonymity tradeo urve by the weighting parameter 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. In order to nd the
optimal trade o between anonymity and the average delay we need to nd the relay
node seletion and ontrol whih maximizes the weighted sum of anonymity and delay
whih is αA− (1−α)D¯. This an be expressed as the following integer programming
problem:
Φ : max
(R1,··· ,RN ,A1,··· ,AN )
αA− (1− α)D¯, (28)
where {Ai} and {Ri} are feasible solutions. Note that the integer programming
problem as stated above with a non-onvex metri is np−hard and in order to nd
the optimal anonymity delay tradeo region, a omputational solver needs to searh
among all feasible parameters whih yields in O(2N ) searh points. This is impratial
partiularly if the algorithm would have to be implemented in real time. We therefore
present a suboptimal heuristi whih requires only O(N) searh points to haraterize
the delay anonymity tradeo region (whih sweeps aross the domain of α from 0 to
1).
5.3.1 Suboptimal Delay Anonymity Region
The main idea behind the suboptimal algorithm to ompute the delay-anonymity
tradeo is as follows. Assume all the anonymization parameters are zero, i.e. ∀Si ∈ S :
Ai = (0, 0, 0). For eah soure Si, we have the sequene (d
1
i , R
1
i ), (d
2
i , R
2
i ), · · · , (d
8
i , R
8
i )
whih are the sorted delays of eah routes for the soure Si suh that d
1
i is the least
delay for soure Si and R
1
i is the relay seletion parameter for soure Si whih has the
delay d1i (We note that d
j
i is the lateny aused by the transmission time between nodes
and does not inlude the delay by the intermediate nodes). The route seletion Ri =
R1i and anonymization parameter Ai = (0, 0, 0) yields in the delay optimal point A
∗
0 =
0, D¯∗0 . The algorithm works by inrementally altering the relay seletion parameters
from this minimum delay setup until the maximum possible anonymity is ahieved.
Speially, at eah iteration, the algorithm searhes for a hange in either an element
of a soure anonymization parameter or hanging the route of one of the soures whih
yields in the least inrease in delay. If this least inrease is aomplished through a
hange in an anonymization parameter, then the resulting inreased anonymity and
delay are reorded, and the algorithm moves to the subsequent iteration. If instead,
the least delay inrease is an outome of a route hange, the algorithm veries if indeed
the anonymity has inreased. If so, then the values and parameters are reorded. If
not, then this seletion is disarded and the algorithm moves on to the hoie that
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results in the next lowest delay inrease to repeat this proess. Thus the algorithm, at
every suessful iteration reords a hoie of parameters R1, · · · , RN , and A1, · · · , AN ,
and the orresponding anonymity and average delay A(R1, · · · , RN , A1, · · · , AN ), and
D¯(R1, · · · , RN , A1, · · · , AN ), respetively. The set of these reorded pairs delineates
the omplete tradeo (suboptimal). At every iteration, sine only one parameter is
hanged, the omplexity is linear in the number of nodes (O(N) per point on the
tradeo. In the following we provide a bound on the dierene between the optimal
and suboptimal tradeos and in Setion 5.4 we demonstrate numerially that the
performane of this algorithm is lose to that of the exponential omplexity optimal
searh.
Algorithm 2 Suboptimal Algorithm for delay anonymity region
1: For i=1:N
2: Ri ← R
1
i , Ai = (0, 0, 0)
3: Endfor
4: Z ′ = sort(r1, r2, · · · , rN ), Z = [Z
′ Z ′ Z ′], U = 0, q = 1
5: F = {R11, · · · , R
8
1, · · · , R
1
N , · · · , R
8
N}
6: AU ← A(R1, · · · , RN , A), D¯
U ← D¯(R1, · · · , RN , A)
7: j, o = argminRki ∈F
{ri(d(R
k
i )− d(Ri))}
8: If dMZ(q) < rj(d(R
o
j )− d(Rj)) and q ≤ 3N
9: Ai(⌈
q
N ⌉) = 1,
10: AU ← A(R1, · · · , RN , A), D¯
U ← D¯(R1, · · · , RN , A)
11: U=U+1, q=q+1, go to 6.
12: Elseif A(R1, · · ·R
o
j , · · · , RN , A) > A(R1, · · · , RN , A)
13: F = F/Roj , Rj ← R
o
j
14: AU ← A(R1, · · · , RN , A), D¯
U ← D¯(R1, · · · , RN , A)
15: U=U+1, go to 6
16: Elseif F 6= ∅
17: F = F/Rj , go to 6
18: Endif
Let the delay onstraint of eah anonymous relay be d, and B be the maximum
number of streams that an be served by a single relay. Then, the following theorem
provides an upper bound on the performane loss due to suboptimality. Note that
these assumptions are for the sake of presentation simpliity and the bound an be
easily derived for the general ase.
Theorem 5.3 If A∗(α) and D¯∗(α) are the optimal anonymity and average delay for
weighting fator α, then, suboptimal algorithm (Asub(α), D¯sub(α)) ensures the perfor-
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mane bounded as follows:
[αA∗(α)− (1− α)D¯∗(α)] − [αAsub(α)−
(1− α)D¯sub(α)] ≤
log(N)
log(N !)
+
δ
d
1 + 13(1−B/N)d
, (29)
where δ = max
1≤k≤N,1≤j≤7
{dj+1k − d
j
k}.
Proof: Let's dene a(i) = log(i!)log(N !) . The following lemma presents the minimum
number of padded links required to ahieve anonymity a(i).
Lemma 5.4 The minimum number of padded links required in order to ahieve
anonymity a(i) is
m(i) =
{
i if i ≤ B
i+ 3(i −B) if i > B
Proof: If i ≤ B, one anonymous relay an perform link padding for all i soures.
When i > B, if the network served only i soure-destination pairs, then the onditions
in Theorem 1 for maximum anonymity redue to the expression in the Lemma. When
the number of soure-destination pairs is inreased to N, this expression would serve
as a lower bound on the number of padded links. .
For a xed α, there exists i suh that a(i) ≤ A∗(α) ≤ a(i+1). By using the result of
Lemma 2, it is straightforward to hek that:
D¯∗(α) ≥
m(i)d
N
+ D¯∗0 , D¯(i) (30)
where D∗0 is the delay of the shortest path in the algorithm. 1)If i ≤ B, then,
suboptimal algorithm hanges at most B−N/2 routes and pads m(i) links to ahieve
Asub(α) = a(i) and
D¯sub(α) ≤ D¯(i) +
(B − N2 )δ
N
(31)
Using inequalities (30) and (31),
α[A∗(α) −Asub(α)] ≤ α[
log((i+ 1)!)
log(N !)
−
log(i!)
log(N !)
] ≤
log(N)
log(N !)
, D¯∗(α)− D¯sub(α) ≥
(B − N2 )δ
N
(32)
2)If i > B, suboptimal algorithm hanges at most 3(i − B) routes and pads exatly
m(i) links to ahieve Asub(α) = a(i) and
D¯sub(α) ≤ D¯(i) +
3(i−B)δ
N
(33)
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Using inequalities (30) and (33),
α[A∗(α)−Asub(α)] ≤
log(N)
log(N !)
D¯∗(α) − D¯sub(α) ≥
3(i −B)δ
N
(34)
Moreover, using the fat that αA∗(α)− (1− α)D¯∗(α) > −(1− α)D¯∗0 and A
∗ ≤ 1, we
an upper bound 1− α as:
1− α ≤
1
1 + (D¯∗ − D¯∗0)
≤
1
1 + m(i)dN
(35)
Combining (32), (34), and(35) provides the bound. .
The performane of suboptimal algorithm improves as B inreases whih is intu-
itive as for larger B, number of hanges in routes dereases. For example, if B = N ,
suboptimal algorithm just needs to hange at most N/2 routes suh that all N soures
are using at least one ommon anonymous relay and this relay is the only relay per-
forms link padding.
5.3.2 Inremental Optimization
The algorithms desribed thus far are joint optimization shemes where relay seletion
and ontrol parameters are hosen for all soures together. In pratie, users arbi-
trarily join the system, and onsequently, we propose an inremental mehanism that
merely requires eah arriving soure to obtain numerial information from routers
to ompute the optimal route and anonymization parameters. We will show that if
an existing system is anonymity optimal then a new arriving user an maintain that
optimality. We assume the new user wants to join the system, has the equal (or
agreeably lose to) preferene parameter α to its own. To minimize the bandwidth
draw of dependent link padding, it is beneial if users in this network have data
rates that are lose to eah other, thus limiting network ongestion. For a new user
who wishes to join the network, the following inremental optimization needs to be
solved to nd his optimal parameters assuming the hoies for the existing nodes are
undisturbed.
Assume we have the system with N users and for a spei 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the
value of the optimal inremental optimization are AincN and D¯
inc
N and the solution is
denoted by RNinci . When the new user is added, we want to maximize the value of
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αAincN+1−(1−α)D¯
inc
N+1. We therefore express the new optimization problem as follows:
Γ : max
RN+1
αAincN+1 − (1− α)D¯
inc
N+1
Subjet to: ∀1 ≤ i ≤ N : Ri = R
Ninc
i , Ai = A
Ninc
i
This is a simple integer programming problem due to the division of the whole systems
into sub-systems and the searh is over 16 possible solutions and identifying the hoie
that maximizes αAincN+1 − (1 − α)D¯
inc
N+1. Thus, whenever a new user wants to enter
the network AincN+1 − (1 − α)D¯
inc
N+1 is omputed for eah of the possible routes and
anonymization parameter, and then the route orresponding to the maximum value
is seleted. Although an inremental optimization to add a user to an optimal system
need not be a jointly optimal solution for all users, in the following Lemma, we show
that in the maximum anonymity senario, where α = 1, inremental optimization will
always yield in the jointly optimal solution.
Lemma 5.5 If α = 1, and the existing route seletion for the existing users is
anonymity optimal, then the inremental optimization will also yield in an anonymity
optimal solution for all N + 1 users.
Proof: As α = 1 and delay is not the preferene, we assume all the urrent soures
and the new soure has anonymization parameter equal to (1, 1, 1). If AincN = 1 holds,
based on Theorem 1, we have lM11 ,M12 (N), lM21 ,M12 (N) ≥ lM12 ,M13 (N), and lM11 ,M22 (N),
lM21 ,M22 (N) ≥ lM22 ,M13 (N). If these inequalities are strit, then adding the new route to
any eight andidates yields in optimal anonymity, as all the {lX,Y (N+1)} will satisfy
the onditions of Theorem 1. If at least one of these inequalities holds with equality,
then adding the new user to the route for whih equality holds again satises the
new inequalities of Theorem 5.2, while also satisfying the bandwidth onstraint as it
is added to the route whih has lighter tra. Let's assume both of them hold with
equality, ie lM11 ,M12 (N) = lM21 ,M12 (N) = lM12 ,M13 (N) = x, then the new route an be
added to the route M11 ,M
1
2 ,M
2
3 or M
2
1 ,M
1
2 ,M
2
3 , then the new parameters will again
satisfy the ondition of Theorem 1, and it will also satises the bandwidth onstraint
as it is added to the route whih have lighter tra. The same senario an be applied
for the ase where all the four inequalities hold with equality. Consequently, we an
always add the new users route in a way that ensures AincN+1 = 1 .
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5.4 Numerial Results and Simulations
In our simulations, using the model proposed in [84℄, we simulated users' streams by
heavy tailed distributed tra. Even though the analytial results thus far assume
that the delay onstraint does not ause overhead, in our numerial simulations we
ompute the true rate of dummy transmissions required for heavy tailed distributed
tra.
Speially, using the heavy tail tra model, we simulated the network onsisting
six anonymous relays, six soures with average rate of 10 pakets/seond for all the
feasible sets of anonymization and relay seletion parameters in time period of [0, 100]
seonds. We assumed eah anonymous relay has delay onstraint equal to 0.3 seonds
(to be in quadrati region) and bandwidth onstraint equal to 36 pakets/seonds.
The dummy rate, average paket delay(aused by anonymous relays), and anonymity
is plotted for all the feasible solutions in Figure 14. The simulation starts with zero
anonymization parameters whih yields in zero anonymity, dummy rate, and average
delay. Eah jump in the plot shows a hange in anonymization parameters, and the
swings in eah of these regions are aused by hanging the relay seletion parameters.
While theorem 5.3 ensures that the performane of suboptimal algorithm in the
six relay abstration model is bounded by (29), in Figure 15, we simulated our sub-
optimal algorithm on a more general network whih onsists eight anonymous relays
and six pairs of soure-destination. Eah soure may hoose any multihop path to
ommuniate its desired destination and it will deide whether any of the anonymous
relays on this path will perform link padding or not. We note that the omplexity
of optimal delay anonymity tradeo in suh a network is O((|M|!)N2N |M|). Unlike
the six relay abstration, for general networks, a "losed form" expression for the
anonymity is not likely to exist. The ahieved anonymity an, however, be derived
using reursion from N pairs of soure-destination to N − 1 pairs. As it is evident in
Figure 15, the delay gap between the optimal solution and suboptimal solution for a
xed anonymity value is negligible.
Next, we ompared the performane of suboptimal solution of problem Φ with
the solution of the inremental optimization problem while number of soures are
inreased from 10 to 19. For the inremental solution, we start with the suboptimal
solution for 10 soures, then, any new soures will hoose it's relay seletion and
anonymization parameters to solve the optimization problem Γ. As it is shown in
Figure 16, the gap between the urves dereases as α inreases and for α = 1, both
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Figure 14: Anonymity, average delay, and average dummy of six relay network for
dierent relay seletion and anonimization parameters onsidering heavy tail tra
for users.
the urves ahieves the optimal anonymity.
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N # soure-
destination
pairs
BM ij
bandwidth
onstraint
of M ij
ri arrival
rate of Si
D¯ average
delay of
network
V set of
nodes
Ri relay sele-
tion param-
eter of Si
rtot
∑N
i=1 ri lX,Y # of
padded
links from
X to Y
E set of
edges
Ai anonymization
parameter
of Si
dM ij
delay on-
straint of
M ij
dji transmission
delay of
Rji
S set of
soures
Xi r.v denotes
destination
of Si
M set of
anony-
mous
relays
D set of des-
tinations
Θ omplete
observa-
tion and
knowl-
edge of
Eve
Xij jth anony-
mous relay
on Si's
route
SiDu overhead
dummy
rate of Si
rM ij
paket
rate on
padded
links of
M ij
ME,
MM ,
MQ
set of
entry
guards,
inter-
mediate
nodes,
and exit
guards
ISi,
Xij
anonymization
parameter
orrespond-
ing to jth
anonymous
relay on
Si's route
dX,Y transmission
delay
from X to
Y
Rji relay se-
letion
parame-
ter of Si
yields jth
shortest
path
Table 1: Notation table
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Figure 15: Delay anonymity region for a network onsisting 6 pairs of soure-
destinations and 8 anonymous relays.
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Number of Sources
α
 
A 
−(1
− α
) D
 
 
Suboptimal Solution
Incremental Opt
α= 0.04
α =1
α=0.28α=0.52
α= 0.76
Figure 16: Comparing performane of suboptimal solution and inremental optimiza-
tion solution.
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6 Dierential Privay in Dynamial Systems and Net-
works
In this hapter, we study the design of ontrol poliies under dierential privay on-
straints. Dierential privay was introdued as a tool to provide privay in data from
learners and statistiians [85℄ provides a point-wise measure on users privay (without
Bayesian assumptions). In partiular to providing point-wise privay, dierential pri-
vay is also immune against any side information that an adversary may have. Using
the notation of dierential privay, and for a x privay parameter, we aim to design
optimal ontrol poliies whih ahieves the weighted sum of maximum rewards. In
the rst setion of this hapter, we study dierential privay preserving poliies for
Markov Deision Proesses. In the seond setion, we onsider an appliation of this
framework in routing, where nodes serve as states of the dynamial system.
6.1 Inferene Resistant Poliy Design for Markov Deision Pro-
esses
Markov deision proesses (MDPs) are a disrete time mathematial framework for
modeling deision making in dynami systems. In a lassial MDP, at eah time step,
the system is in some state s, and the ontroller deides on an ation a. Given the
urrent state s, and ontroller's ation a, the ontroller reeives a reward, and the
state of the system transit to the next state aording to a Markovian probability
P (s′|s, a), and the ontroller's goal is to maximize the total (disounted) reward over
a nite or innite horizon [17℄. MDPs are widely used in yber physial systems,
nane, robotis, et. Another important appliation of MDP is in reinforement
learning [18℄, where an agent interats with an unknown environment towards maxi-
mizing some objetive, and the underlying proess is modeled as an MDP. The main
dierene between a lassial MDP and reinforement learning is that the latter does
not assume the knowledge of the mathematial model of the MDP. In many applia-
tions of MDPs, the sequene of states (or some funtion of the states) are observable
to eavesdroppers. For example, in a wireless network, an adversary an aess length
of pakets [19℄, timing of pakets transmitted [20℄, routes of paket ow over a network
[21℄ and suhlike by eavesdropping. Using the observations, an adversary an infer
about the nature of the MDPs, and onsequently obtain sensitive information about
the deision making entity. As mahine learning algorithms ontinually improve the
ability to identify personal preferenes from seemingly unrelated data, it is ritial
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that stohasti deision making proesses be investigated from a privay perspetive
whih is the fous of this work.
In this work, we investigate the mathematial framework of Markov Deision Pro-
esses with the objetive of limiting adversarial inferene of a type of MDP. In par-
tiular, as shown in Figure 17, onsider two MDPs with idential state-ation spaes
but diering reward and transition dynamis. For instane, these ould represent
user ations on a pair of websites. It is well known that sequene of lik times or
download sizes an reveal whih websites are being aessed even if data transmitted
is enrypted [22℄. In this ontext, if the sequene of ations or response times were so
designed to maximize user experiene, then an eavesdropper an identify the website
aessed by performing a hypothesis test on the observations. However, if the ations
were so designed suh that the observations from the pair of websites had near similar
dynamis, then privay of aess an be preserved. In broader terms, for a pair of
MDPs, if the poliies were jointly designed suh that the observed state dynamis for
both MDPs were ǫ lose to eah other in a likelihood sense, then any hypothesis test
between the MDPs would have very limited suess. It is preisely the joint design of
the poliies for a pair of generi innite horizon MDPs that we onsider in this work
suh that a weighted sum of rewards of the two MDPs are maximized subjet to an
ǫ-dierential privay guarantee for the observed state dynamis.
Further, we provide a value iteration method to reursively derive the optimal
rewards and the poliies for the two MDPs that are dierentially private at the desired
ǫ level. The proposed method is shown to onverge and the onvergene rate of this
method is proved to be equal to the disount fator.
6.1.1 System Model
In this work, we onsider the inferene resistant ontrol of two Markov Deision Pro-
esses,M1 andM2. Eah MDPMi is represented by a 5-tupleMi = (S,A, ri, Pi, β),
where S = {1, 2, · · · , n} is the set of states and A is the set of ations, and 0 ≤ β < 1
is the disount fator, all idential for both MDPs. Eah ri : S × A → R denotes
the reward funtion wherein ri(s, a) is the immediate reward reeived when the on-
troller for MDP Mi hooses ation a in state s. Pi represents the set of transition
probabilities for MDP Mi suh that Pi(s
′|s, a) is the probability that the state of
MDP Mi transit to state s
′
, given the urrent state is s, and the ontroller i takes
ation a. Let's denote the spae of all poliies for MDP Mi by Πi, suh that for a
poliy πi = {π
0
i , π
1
i , · · · } ∈ Πi, π
t
i(a|s) represents the probability of taking ation a by
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Figure 17: In our system model, there are two MDPs with the same state and ation
spaes and dierent transition probabilities and rewards. There is an adversary who
observes a sequene of states from one of the MDPs and aims to identify whih MDP
the sequene belongs to.
ontroller i at time t, given the urrent state is s. We also denote the spae of joint
poliies of MDPs M1 and M2, by Π, where Π = Π1 ×Π2.
In a stohasti ontrol problem, in general, poliies may be dependent on all the
history of previous states, and ations. However, in MDPs, beause of their Markovian
property, it is shown that the optimal poliies are just dependent on the urrent state.
For MDP Mi, if ontroller i has the poliy πi, given the initial state is s, the
disounted reward will be as follows:
V πii (s) =
∞∑
t=0
βtEπi{ri(S
i
t , A
i
t)|S
i
0 = s}, (36)
In a lassial MDP, a ontroller by hoosing a poliy makes a sequene of deisions
to maximize his disounted reward expressed in equation (36). For eah standalone
MDP, it is known that optimal poliy is stationary and deterministi, in other words,
the optimal poliy is a sequene of idential deterministi mapping from state to ation
spae. If privay was not a onern, then, eah MDP ould be solved independently
and the optimal stationary poliy and disounted reward for eah standalone MDP an
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be derived by methods suh as value iteration, poliy iteration, or linear programming
[17℄. However, in the presene of an adversary who is trying to identify the MDP,
two ontrollers ooperate to hide their identity to the adversary while maximizing a
weighted sum of their disounted rewards.
Before, we move forward with the rest of our system model and the tehnial
results, we need to dene the adversary, and his knowledge.
• Adversary: We onsider a passive adversary who is aware of the state spae,
ation spae, transition probabilities and rewards of both MDPs. At any given
time, the adversary observes a sequene of states for one of the MDPs and his
goal is to identify whih MDP it belongs to. In fat, the adversary maps the
sequene of states to one of two hypotheses:
H1 : The observed state sequene belongs to M1
H2 : The observed state sequene belongs to M2
This is a lassial hypothesis testing problem, where it is known that the optimal
strategy for adversary is to implement a likelihood ratio detetor [86℄. For
example, if the adversary observes a sequene of states s0, s1, · · · , sT , then, he
omputes the following log-likelihood ratio and deides on eah hypothesis based
on the log-likelihood ratio:
1
T
l(s0, s1, · · · , sT ) =
1
T
log
Pr(s0, s1, · · · , sT |M1)
Pr(s0, s1, · · · , sT |M2)
=
1
T
log
µπ11,0(s0)
∏T−1
t=0 p
π1
1,t(st+1|st)
µπ22,0(s0)
∏T−1
t=0 p
π2
2,t(st+1|st)
1
T
[log
µπ11,0(s0)
µπ22,0(s0)
+
T−1∑
t=0
log
pπ11,t(st+1|st)
pπ22,t(st+1|st)
]
H1
≥
H2
< 0, (37)
where µπii,t(s) is the stationary distribution of state s, and p
πi
i,t(s
′|s) is the prob-
ability of transiting from state s to state s′ at time t, given the poliy πi is
applied by the ith ontroller. pπii,t(s
′|s) and µπii (s) an be derived as follows:
∀s, s′ ∈ S, i = 1, 2 : pπii,t(s
′|s) =
∑
a
πti(a|s)Pi(s
′|s, a)
∀s′ ∈ S, i = 1, 2 : µπii,t(s
′) =
∑
s
µπii,t(s)p
πi
i,t(s
′|s) (38)
If l(.) ≥ 0, then, the optimal detetor aepts H1, else it aepts H2. By taking
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the limit on equation (37), when T →∞, we have:
lim
T→∞
1
T
l(s0, s1, · · · , sT ) =
∑
(s,s′)
µ(s) log
pπ11 (s
′|s)
pπ22 (s
′|s)
, (39)
where µ(s) represents the stationary distribution of state s under the true
hypothesis. Note that µ(s) is funtion of π1 or π2, depending on the true
hypothesis. The above equation implies that limT→∞
1
T l(s0, s1, · · · , sT ) is a
onvex ombination of the terms log
p
π1
1 (s
′|s)
p
π2
2 (s
′|s)
. Therefore, if for eah pair of
(s, s′) and ǫ ≥ 0, we guarantee −ǫ ≤ log
p
π1
1 (s
′|s)
p
π2
2 (s
′|s)
≤ ǫ, it is assured that
−ǫ ≤ limT→∞
1
T l(s0, s1, · · · , sT ) ≤ ǫ whih implies the notion of ǫ-dierential
privay for the normalized log likelihood between pair of MDPs. In eet, by
hoosing an appropriate ǫ, the optimal adversarial inferene an be made as
hallenging as desired. In other words, if the ǫ-dierential privay is guaranteed
for all transition probabilities (pπ11 (s
′|s), pπ22 (s
′|s)), then, ǫ-dierential privay is
guaranteed against the adversary who uses the optimum likelihood ratio dete-
tor.
• ǫ-Dierential Private Poliies: The struture of adversary whih was ex-
plained in the previous setion motivates us to use dierential privay to guar-
antee that two MDPs will not be detetable to the adversary. Thus, in order to
guarantee the privay, we need to assure that at anytime the transition prob-
abilities between states for both MDPs are ǫ-dierentially private. We note
that transition probabilities are suient statistis for the adversarial detetion
problem. Partiularly, perturbation bounds in [87℄ an be used to guarantee dif-
ferential privay on stationary distribution, given that transition probabilities
are dierentially private.
The following denes what makes a pair of poliies for the two MDPs ǫ-dierential
private.
Denition 6.1 For a xed ǫ ≥ 0, and transition probabilities P1 and P2, we
all the set Πǫ,P1,P2 ⊂ Π, the set of all ǫ-dierential private poliies, if for all
pairs of poliies (π1, π2) ∈ Πǫ,P1,P2, the following onditions hold:
∀s, s′ ∈ S and t = 0, 1, · · · : e−ǫ ≤
pπ11,t(s
′|s)
pπ22,t(s
′|s)
≤ eǫ
Moreover, we all any pair of poliies (π1, π2), pair of ǫ-dierential private poli-
ies if (π1, π2) ∈ Πǫ,P1,P2.
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Similar to a lassial MDP, the disounted reward of MDP Mi for a xed poliy πi,
given the initial state is s is denoted by V πii (s), and an be derived by equation (36).
Through this paper, we may also onsider the vetor of disounted rewards as V
πi
i =
(V πii (1), · · · , V
πi
i (n))
T
. In a dierentially private setting, the ontrollers ooperate to
maximize a weighted sum of their disounted rewards while preserving the dierential
privay onstraints. In other words, we aim to derive pair of ǫ-dierential privay
(π1, π2) whih maximizes the following disounted reward:
Q(s) = λV π11 (s) + (1− λ)V
π2
2 (s), (40)
where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 is the weighting fator and (π1, π2) ∈ Πǫ,P1,P2 . In other words, the
optimal weighted disounted reward denoted by Q∗ǫ,λ satises the following:
∀s ∈ S : Q∗ǫ,λ(s) = λV
∗
1,ǫ,λ(s) + (1− λ)V
∗
2,ǫ,λ(s) =
max
(π1,π2)∈(Π×Π)ǫ,P1,P2
λV π11 (s) + (1− λ)V
π2
2 (s) (41)
6.1.2 MDPs under ǫ-Dierential Privay
In this setion, we propose an iterative method to derive the optimal weighted sum of
disounted rewards and optimal ǫ-dierentially private poliies. First, we introdue
the mapping Tǫ,λ : R
2n → R2n, and prove that by applying mapping Tǫ,λ suessively
on any arbitrary vetor in the spae of R
2n
, the optimal disounted rewards an be
derived.
Let's onsider two arbitrary vetors V1 = (V1(1), · · · , V1(n))
T
and V2 = (V2(1),
· · · , V2(n))
T
. We dene the mapping Tǫ,λ suh that for (V
new
1 ,V
new
2 ) = Tǫ,λ (V1,
V2), we have:
V newi (s) =
∑
a
q∗i (a|s)[ri(s, a) + β
∑
s′
Pi(s
′|s, a)Vi(s
′)]
where (q∗1 , q
∗
2) is the maximizer of the following linear programming:
Ψ : max
q1,q2
λ
∑
a
q1(a|s)[r1(s, a) + β
∑
s′
P1(s
′|s, a)V1(s
′)]
+(1− λ)
∑
a
q2(a|s)[r2(s, a) + β
∑
s′
P2(s
′|s, a)V2(s
′)]
subjet to:
∀s, s′ ∈ S : e−ǫ ≤
∑
a q1(a|s)P1(s
′|s, a)∑
a q2(a|s)P2(s
′|s, a)
≤ eǫ
∀s ∈ S :
∑
a
q1(a|s) =
∑
a
q2(a|s) = 1, (42)
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We also dene the weighted addition operator Aλ : R
2n → Rn suh that for Q =
(Q(1), · · · , Q(n))T = Aλ(V1,V2), we have: ∀s ∈ S : Q(s) = λV1(s) + (1− λ)V2(s).
In the following theorem, we prove that for any arbitrary vetors V1 and V2,
the sequene QK = Aλ(T
K
ǫ,λ(V1,V2)) onverges to the optimal weighted sum of
disounted rewards. Moreover, pair of optimal disounted rewards (V∗1,ǫ,λ,V
∗
2,ǫ,λ)
satises a xed point equation whih is similar to Bellman equation.
Theorem 6.1 The following statements hold:
1. ∃V∗1,ǫ,λ,V
∗
2,ǫ,λ ∈ R
n
suh that Q∗ǫ,λ = Aλ(V
∗
1,ǫ,λ,V
∗
2,ǫ,λ) = AλTǫ,λ(V
∗
1,ǫ,λ,V
∗
2,ǫ,λ).
2. ∀V1,V2 ∈ R
n : Q∗ǫ,λ = limK→∞Aλ(T
K
ǫ,λ(V1,V2))
3. Q∗ǫ,λ is unique.
Proof: Before proving the theorem, in the following lemma, we demonstrate that
mapping Tǫ,λ is monotone. This result while being straightforward, is very ritial for
understanding the xed point equations and proof of Theorem 6.1.
Lemma 6.2 Consider two vetors V = (V1,V2) and V
′ = (V′1,V
′
2) suh that
Aλ(V1,V2) ≤ Aλ(V
′
1,V
′
2). In other words, for eah s ∈ S, we have λV1(s) + (1 −
λ)V2(s) ≤ λV
′
1(s) + (1 − λ)V
′
2(s). Then, for any K > 0, we have AλT
K
ǫ,λ(V1,V2) ≤
AλT
K
ǫ,λ(V
′
1,V
′
2).
Proof: AλT
K
ǫ,λ(V1,V2) derives the optimal weighted sum of disounted rewards of K
nite horizon problem with terminating rewards λV1(s)+ (1−λ)V2(s). It is straight-
forward that as terminating rewards inreases in all states, the disounted reward of
K nite horizon problem inreases as well. .
We start by proving the seond argument. First, we prove that the sequene QK
dened by QK = Aλ(T
K
ǫ,λ(V1,V2)) is a Cauhy sequene. In other words, we need to
demonstrate that for eah µ > 0 there exists a positive integer Kµ suh that for eah
k1, k2 ≥ Kµ, we have ||Qk1 −Qk2 ||∞ ≤ µ, where ||Qk1 −Qk2 ||∞ = maxs |Qk1(s) −
Qk2(s)|. For a given pair of ǫ-dierential private poliies π1 = {π
0
1 , π
1
1, · · · }, and
π2 = {π
0
2 , π
1
2 , · · · }, and xed K, we an split the rewards of ith MDP to two parts as
follows:
V πii (s) =
K−1∑
t=0
βtEπi{ri(S
i
t , A
i
t)|S
i
0 = s}+
∞∑
t=K
βtEπi{ri(S
i
t , A
i
t)|S
i
0 = s} (43)
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Considering that rewards are bounded, i.e. maxi,s,a |ri(s, a)| ≤ R, we have:
|
∞∑
t=K
βtEπi{ri(S
i
t , A
i
t)|S
i
0 = s}| ≤
βKR
1− β
(44)
By ombining equation (43) and inequality (44), we an derive the following:
λV π11 (s) + (1− λ)V
π2
2 (s)−
βKR
1− β
≤
λ
K−1∑
t=0
βtEπ1{r1(S
1
t , A
1
t )|S
1
0 = s}+
(1− λ)
K∑
t=0
βtEπ2{r2(S
2
t , A
2
t )|S
2
0 = s}
≤ λV π11 (s) + (1− λ)V
π2
2 (s) +
βKR
1− β
By taking maximum over all ǫ-dierential private poliies on all sides of above in-
equality, we have:
λV∗1,ǫ,λ + (1− λ)V
∗
2,ǫ,λ − β
KL ≤ AλT
K
ǫ,λ(V1,V2)
≤ λV∗1,ǫ,λ + (1− λ)V
∗
2,ǫ,λ + β
KL, (45)
where L = (||Q0||∞ +
R
1−β ) and ||Q0||∞ = maxs{λV1(s) + (1 − λ)V2(s)}. In other
words, we have ||AλT
K
ǫ,λ(V1,V2)−Q
∗
λ,ǫ||∞ ≤ β
KL. Using triangle inequality, we have:
||AλT
k1
ǫ,λ(V1,V2) − AλT
k2
ǫ,λ(V1,V2)||∞ ≤ 2β
min(k1,k2)L. Therefore, for any k1, k2 ≥
Nµ = ⌈logβ
µ
2L⌉, we have ||Qk1 −Qk2 ||∞ ≤ µ whih proves that the sequene Qk is a
Cauhy sequene.
Now, we an take limit on all sides of equation (45), when K →∞. Consequently,
we have limK→∞ AλT
K
ǫ,λ (V1, V2) = Q
∗
. Moreover, it is evident from equation (45)
that the onvergene rate of QK is equal to the disount fator β.
Now, we an apply mapping Tǫ,λ on all sides of equation (45) and using the
monotoniity of Tǫ,λ we have:
AλTǫ,λ(V
∗
1,ǫ,λ,V
∗
2,ǫ,λ)− β
K+1L ≤ AλT
K+1
ǫ,λ (V1,V2)
≤ AλTǫ,λ(V
∗
1,ǫ,λ,V
∗
2,ǫ,λ) + β
K+1L, (46)
Now, by taking the limit whenK →∞, ombined with the fat that limK→∞ AλT
K+1
ǫ,λ
(V1, V2) = Q
∗
ǫ,λ, we onlude that Q
∗
ǫ,λ = Aλ(V
∗
1,ǫ,λ, V
∗
2,ǫ,λ) = AλTǫ,λ (V
∗
1,ǫ,λ,
V∗2,ǫ,λ). .
As a result of Theorem 6.1, we an derive the optimal stationary poliies whih is
presented in the following lemma.
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(a) A graph with 3 soure nodes and
2 destination nodes.
(b) Two private routes are shown by
blak and blue arrows.
Figure 18: Private Routes in Networked Data Colletion.
Corollary 6.2.1 The pair of stationary ǫ-dierential poliies (π∗1, π
∗
2), where π
∗
1 =
{q∗1 , q
∗
1, · · · }, and π
∗
2 = {q
∗
2, q
∗
2 , · · · } is optimal if (q
∗
1, q
∗
2) are the poliies whih solves
the following:
Aλ(V
∗
1,ǫ,λ,V
∗
2,ǫ,λ) = AλTǫ,λ(V
∗
1,ǫ,λ,V
∗
2,ǫ,λ) (47)
Using the results of theorem 6.1 and Corollary 6.2.1, we an solve for the optimal
ǫ-dierential private poliies for any pair of nite state MDPs, for any weighted re-
wards. In partiular, by starting from an arbitrary vetors (V1,V2), and suessively
applying the mapping Tǫ,λ, the optimal disounted rewards, and subsequently, the
optimal stationary ǫ-dierential private poliies an be derived.
6.2 Dierential Privay in Networked Data Colletion
In this setion, we study the problem of uniast and multiast routing in networks
under dierential privay onstraints. We explain our approah using a ouple of
examples. Consider the graph shown in gure 18a. There are some routes from the
soure node S1 to the destination node D2 inluding the shortest path between these
two nodes whih travels through S3. If S1 transmits pakets through any of these
routes to D2, an eavesdropper observing this route an identify the destination of
eah paket departing soure node S1. If there is overhead routing, privay may be
ahieved, albeit it results in higher ost. For example, if the intended destination is
D2, the paket may ontinue traveling to D1 as well. In this ase, the eavesdropper
will be unertain about the intended destination. In gure 18b, two suh routes are
shown. The ost of the route till the paket arrives it's intended destination may
have higher priority to the ost of the rest of route. For example, if the ost is
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representing lateny, the soure will desire less lateny to it's intended destination
than the other one. Consequently, we assume the ost of a route is simply sum of
the osts assoiated with eah edge till the paket arrives it's intended destination,
added with sum of the weighted osts assoiated with the other edges on the route.
This weighting fator is denoted by 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. For example the route shown by
blak edges will have ost 3 + 2β if the intended destination is D2, and ost 5 for the
ase that the intended destination is D1. Note that the route represented by blak
edges has the minimum ost over all suh routes if the intended destination is D2.
Similarly, the route represented by blue edges has the minimum ost over all suh
routes if the intended destination is D1. If soure node S1 always hooses the blak
route if D2 is intended and blue route if D1 is intended, no privay will be provided,
as an eavesdropper an identify the intended destination, based on her knowledge
and observation. Consequently, in order to ahieve some degree of privay, the soure
should hoose a probability distribution over all suh routes whih travels through all
destination nodes. As multiast routing is a sheme to transmit overhead to other
destinations as well, it an also be used to provide privay for the single intended
destination ase. For example, in gure 19a, a graph with two soure nodes and two
destination nodes are represented and two private spanning tree are shown by blue
and blak arrows. The tree represented by blak arrows minimizes the total ost
for the ase when D1 is the intended destination and the route represented by blue
arrows minimizes the ost for the ase when D2 is the intended destination. Similar
to private uniast routing, for the sake of privay, soure S1 an hoose a probability
distribution over all suh spanning trees suh that the weighted ost is minimized
subjet to the privay requirements..
6.2.1 System Model
We model the network by a graph G = (V,E), where V = S
⋃
D is the set of verties,
and E is the set of direted edges. The set V is union of two sets: S = {S1, · · · , SN}
whih is set of soure nodes, and D = {D1, · · · ,DM} whih is set of destination nodes.
We assume that the set D is given; in a broader ontext, the soure needs to deide
the grouping of destinations that would balane the overhead osts with the desire for
privay. Eah edge (i, j) ∈ E of the network orresponds to a ost ci,j . If privay was
not a onsideration, eah soure would nd the shortest path (minimum total ost
of edges) to eah destination and transmit pakets through the respetive paths. To
provide privay, we propose that a paket whih departs soure Si to any destination
69
(a) A graph with 2 soure nodes and
2 destination nodes.
(b) Two private spanning tree are
shown by blak and blue arrows.
Figure 19: Private Spanning Trees.
Dj ∈ D will neessarily travel through all other destinations in D as well. Intuitively,
as the number of spanned destinations inreases eavesdropper's unertainty about the
intended destination will inrease, albeit in ost of higher average ost.
• Uniast Private Routing: Let's denote the set of private routes for a soure
Si ∈ S by RSi whih is the set of all the routes in the graph that start at node
Si and ontains all nodes in D. A private route r ∈ RSi an be expressed as a
sequene of nodes r = (Si,M
r
Si,Djr
1
,Djr1 ,M
r
Djr
1
,Djr
2
,Djr2 , · · ·DjrM ), whereM
r
X,Y is
the sequene of soure nodes between node X and node Y in route r. For exam-
ple, in Figure 20 where there are two destinations D1 and D2, a route r ∈ RS1
is shown by a red urve whih an be written as r = (S1, S4,D2, S2, S4, S7,D1).
Note that in this ase M rS1,D2 = (S4), M
r
D2,D1
= (S2, S4, S7), Djr1 = D2, and
Djr2 = D1. The orresponding ost of private route r if the intended destination
is Dj is equal to:
∀r ∈ Ri,∀Dj ∈ D : C(r,Dj , β) =
k:r(k+1)=Dj∑
n=1
cr(n),r(n+1) + β
l(r)−1∑
n=k+1
cr(n),r(n+1), (48)
where l(r) is the length of route r, r(n) is the nth node in route r, and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1
is the weighting fator. Equation (48) has two parts: the rst sum reets the
ost till the paket arrives to it's intended destination and the seond sum
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Figure 20: A private route r ∈ RS1 is shown by the red urve and a private spanning
tree t ∈ TS1 is shown by the green urve.
reets the weighted ost for the rest of the route. The β fator quanties the
degree of importane aorded to the overhead beyond ahieving the intended
target.
We assume eah soure Si ∈ S ommuniates with all nodes Dj ∈ D. To
eetively balane privay with total ost, node Si hooses a probability distri-
bution P
Dj
Si
= {P
Dj
Si
(r)|
∑
r∈RSi
P
Dj
Si
(r) = 1} on the set of private routes RSi to
ommuniate with node Dj . If the soure hooses probability distribution P
Dj
Si
,
then, the expeted ost will be as follows:
C(Si,Dj , β) =
∑
r∈RSi
P
Dj
Si
(r)C(r,Dj , β) (49)
The goal of uniast private routing sheme is minimizing
∑
Dj
C(Si,Dj , β) while
satisfying ǫ−dierential privay onditions, whih will be explained in denition
6.2.
• Multiast Private Routing: Multiast routing is primary used to transmit a
paket to a group of destinations. In the ontext of this paper, multiast routing
by virtue of the multitude of destinations an be used to provide destination
privay, ie we use multiast to privatize uniast routing. For soure Si to multi-
ast to all nodes in D, the pakets would be transmitted on a tree whih spans
D
⋃
{Si}, in other words, the Steiner Tree. The Minimum Steiner Tree (MST)
is dened as the Steiner Tree whih has the minimum total ost.
For a soure Si, we dene TSi as the set of all the trees in the graph G whih
span all the elements of {Si}
⋃
D (We will all these trees as private spanning
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trees). The overhead weighted ost of a private spanning tree will be dierent
for the dierent intended destination. For a private spanning tree t ∈ TSi , in
order to dene the ost W (t,Dj , β) whih is the ost of private tree t when
the node Dj is the intended destination for this paket, we need to identify
the unique path t(Si,Dj) in tree t whih travels from node Si to node Dj .
For example, in Figure 20, a private spanning tree t for soure S1 is shown
by the green urve. In this ase, t = {(S1, S4), (S4,D2), (S4, S7), (S7,D1)},
t(S1,D1) = {(S1, S4), (S4, S7), (S7,D1)}, and t(S1,D2) = {(S1, S4), (S4,D2)}.
Considering a tree t ∈ TSi , the ost l(t,Dj) will be dened as follows:
∀t ∈ TSi ,∀Dj ∈ D : W (t,Dj, β) =∑
(u,v)∈t(Si ,Dj)
cu,v + β
∑
(u,v)∈T/t(Si ,Dj)
cu,v, (50)
where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. Note that equation (50) has two parts: the rst sum whih
has weighting fator one is the path that paket will travel to it's intended
destination, and the seond sum whih has weighting fator β for the edges not
inluded on this path.
In order to eetively balane privay with osts, we add randomness in the
hoie of private spanning trees. Soure Si hooses a probability distribution
P
Dj
TSi
= {P
Dj
TSi
(t)|
∑
t∈TSi
P
Dj
TSi
= 1} over the set of private spanning trees. For a
spei probability distribution P
Dj
TSi
, the expeted ost will be as follows:
W(Si,Dj , β) =
∑
t∈TSi
P
Dj
TSi
W (t,Dj , β) (51)
The main goal of private multiast routing is minimizing
∑
Dj
W(Si,Dj , β)
while providing ǫ− dierential privay whih we dene in the following.
• Dierential Private Routing:
Eavesdropper (Eve): We onsider an omnisient eavesdropper (Eve) who
observes the tra in the network. Eve knows all the information of the network
inluding identity of nodes, osts of eah edge, set of private routes, and set
private spanning trees. In partiular, Eve knows the probability distribution
that eah soure hooses on it's private routes, ie Eve knows all {P
Dj
Si
} and
{P
Dj
TSi
}. Eve's goal is identifying the destination node for a spei paket
whih departs soure Si. By observing the route a paket travels, Eve deides
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on the destination of this paket. In this work, we use the dierential privay
to quantify the destination privay. Based on the denition of dierential,
onditioned on the fat that Eve observes the private route r or private spanning
tree t, the ǫ−dierential private routing for uniast and multiast routing sheme
will be dened as follows:
Denition 6.2 (ǫ−Dierential Uniast Private Routing) We say that a
route probability distribution {P
Dj
Si
} for the 3−tuple (G,S,D) is ǫ−dierential
private if:
∀Si ∈ S,∀r ∈ RSi ,∀Dk,Dj ∈ D :
P
Dj
Si
(r)
PDkSi (r)
≤ eǫ (52)
Denition 6.3 (ǫ−Dierential Multiast Private Routing) We say that
a spanning tree probability distribution {P
Dj
TSi
} for the 3−tuple (G,S,D) is ǫ−
dierential private if:
∀Si ∈ S,∀t ∈ TSi ,∀Dk,Dj ∈ D :
P
Dj
TSi
(t)
PDkTSi
(t)
≤ eǫ (53)
We note that the above follows the standard denition of dierential privay (as
applied in the ontext of a dataset). In the broader ontext of the problem, how-
ever, the hoie and size of the set D brings an added dimension to the privay
notion in routing. In the rest of this artile, we investigate the optimal routing
whih minimizes the aggregated uniast ost (
∑
Dj∈D
C(Si,Dj , β)) for a spei
soure Si and minimizing the aggregated multiast ost (
∑
Dj∈D
W(Si,Dj , β))
while satisfying the onditions dened in denitions 6.2, and 6.3, respetively.
6.2.2 Private Uniast Routing
In this setion, our goal is to optimize the probability distributions {P
Dj
Si
} suh that
the total average ost is minimized while satisfying dierential privay onditions. In
other words, for eah soure node Si our objetive is to solve the following optimization
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problem:
Φ : min
P
D1
Si
,··· ,P
DM
Si
∑
Dj∈D
∑
r∈RSi
P
Dj
Si
(r)C(r,Dj , β)
Subjet to :∀Dj ∈ D :
∑
r∈RSi
PD1Si (r) = 1
∀r ∈ RSi ,∀Dk,Dj ∈ D :
P
Dj
Si
(r)
PDkSi (r)
≤ eǫ (54)
First, we onsider solving this problem for the equal weighting parameter ase where
β = 1. In the following theorem, we prove that the optimal solution of problem Φ
where β = 1, is idential to the optimal solution of traveling sales man problem.
Theorem 6.3 Optimal uniast private routing for the ase of equal weighting param-
eter (β = 1) yields
∀Dj ∈ D : P
Dj
Si
(r∗TSM ) = 1,
where r∗TSM ∈ RSi is the optimal route for traveling sales man problem where the
starting node is Si and the sales man should visit all the nodes in D.
Proof: r∗TSM satises the following inequality:
∀Dj ∈ D,∀r ∈ RSi : C(r
∗
TSM ,Dj , 1) ≤ C(r,Dj , 1)
The immediate onsequene of above inequality is that for a spei destination node
Dj , C(r
∗
TSM ,Dj , 1) will be smaller than any onvex ombination of C(r,Dj , 1). Thus,
MC(r∗TSM ,Dj , 1) ≤
min
P
D1
Si
,··· ,P
DM
Si
∑
Dj∈D
∑
r∈RSi
P
Dj
Si
(r)C(r,Dj , β) (55)
and the ondition of theorem presents a feasible solution whih ahieves this lower-
bound and this ompletes the proof. .
We note that the optimal uniast routing in the ase of β = 1 yields the highest
degree of privay whih is 0−dierential privay. While the optimal uniast private
routing for β = 1 yields a single route, the following theorem proves that the optimal
uniast private routing for the ase 0 ≤ β < 1 alloates nonzero probabilities on
2M − 2 dierent routes. Let's dene the set of private route RSH to be the set of
all the private routes whih inludes the shortest path from the soure node Si to
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a destination node Dj and then the shortest path from the destination node Dj to
the destination node Du, and so on suh that all the destination nodes are inluded
on the route. There are M ! suh routes and the following theorem proves that there
are only 2M − 2 private routes between the elements of RSH whih have nonzero
probability for the optimal uniast routing. Before going through the theorem, we
introdue vetor C¯(r, β) suh that the mth element of this vetor is C(r,Dm, β).
Theorem 6.4 Optimal uniast private routing for the ase of 0 ≤ β < 1 yields
nonzero probability alloation only over all the routes r∗ ∈ R∗ ⊂ RSH . Moreover eah
r∗ ∈ R∗ is the unique solution of following optimization problem
min
t∈RSi
ET C¯(t, β), (56)
where E1×|D| is a vetor suh that eah elements of it is either 1 or e
ǫ
exluding two
ases of 1¯1×|D| and e1¯1×|D|, where 1¯1×|D| is the vetor with all elements equal to one.
Proof: Considering the dual optimization problem of Φ and Complementary
Slakness, we will prove this theorem. For a spei private route r, we haveM×(M−
1) inequality onstraints whih indiate privay onstraints. For eah route r, we may
have two senarios: 1)∀Dj ∈ D, we have P
Dj
Si
(r) = 0. 2)∀Dj ∈ D, we have P
Dj
TSi
(r) 6= 0
and they satisfy privay inequality onstraints. Moreover, Complementary Slakness
fores P
Dj
TSi
(r) to satisfy the following onditions:
∃Dj,Dk ∈ D : P
Dj
Si
(r) = eǫPDkSi (r)
∀Du 6= Dk,Dj : P
Du
Si
(r) = P
Dj
Si
(r) or PDuSi (r) = P
Dk
Si
(r) (57)
Considering the onditions expressed in (57), we an set the routes whih have nonzero
probabilities to 2M−2 groups and it is straightforward to hek for eah of these groups
just one of them whih is the solution of optimization problem expressed in (56) will
have nonzero probability. It is also straightforward to hek that for eah vetor E
the solution of (56) is an element of RSH . Consequently, R∗ ⊂ RSH .
By the result of theorem 6.4, eah node will use Dijkstra's algorithm to nd the
elements of the set RSH and then by performing a simple searh, one an nd the
elements of the set R∗ and subsequently solve the orresponding linear programming
problem.
6.2.3 Private Multiast Routing
In this setion, we onsider the problem of multiast routing for privay in graph G.
As we disussed in setion 6.2.1, multiast routing an be used to provide destination
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privay. However, the overhead weighted ost for dierent intended destination will
be dierent and eah soure will hoose a probability distribution over all it's private
spanning trees. The optimal multiast routing sheme an be found by solving the
following optimization problem:
Ψ : min
P
D1
TSi
,··· ,P
DM
TSi
∑
Dj∈D
∑
t∈TSi
P
Dj
TSi
(t)L(t,Dj , β)
Subjet to:∀Dj ∈ D :
∑
t∈TSi
P
Dj
TSi
(t) = 1
∀t ∈ TSi ,∀Dj ,Dk ∈ D :
P
Dj
TSi
(t)
PDkTSi
(t)
≤ eǫ (58)
Similar to uniast private routing, we rst onsider the ase of equal weighting fator
(β = 1). In the following theorem, we prove that the optimal multiast routing for
privay when β = 1 is idential to the solution of the Minimum Steiner Tree (MST)
problem:
Theorem 6.5 Optimal multiast private routing for the ase of equal weighting (β =
1) yields
∀Dj ∈ D : P
Dj
TSi
(t∗MST ) = 1, (59)
where t∗MST is the Minimum Steiner Tree whih spans all the elements of {Si}
⋃
D.
Proof: by the denition of MST, we know that ∀Dj ∈ D and ∀t ∈ TSi , we have
W (t∗MST ,Dj , 1) ≤W (t,Dj , 1). Consequently, W (t
∗
MST ,Dj , 1) is less than any onvex
ombination of W (t,Dj , 1) and we have
MW (t∗MST ,Dj , 1) ≤
min
P
D1
TSi
,··· ,P
DM
TSi
∑
Dj∈D
∑
t∈TSi
P
Dj
TSi
W (t,Dj , 1) (60)
and the onditions in the theorem presents a feasible solution whih ahieves this
lowerbound. .
Note that the solution of theorem 6.5 yields the highest degree of privay whih
is 0−dierential privay. Prior to investigating the solution when 0 < β < 1, let's
onsider the optimal multiast routing when β = 0. It is straightforward to prove that
the optimal multiast routing with ǫ−dierential privay when β = 0, is ahieved by
always transmitting through a tree whih has it's root at Si and there is an individual
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route from Si to eah destination Dj whih is the shortest path from the node Si to
the node Dj .
For notation onveniene, we dene the vetor W¯ (t, β) suh that the mth element
of this vetor isW (t,Dm, β). The following theorem proves that the optimal multiast
routing for privay in graph G = (V,E) when 0 < β < 1, alloates nonzero probability
P
Dj
TSi
(t) only over 2M − 2 trees, where M is the number of destination nodes.
Theorem 6.6 The optimal Solution of Ψ yields on alloation of nonzero P
Dj
TSi
(t) over
the set T ∗ suh that |T ∗| = 2M − 2 and elements of this set are the solution of the
following problem:
min
t∈TSi
ET W¯ (t, β), (61)
where E1×|D| is a vetor suh that eah elements of it are either 1 or e
ǫ
exluding two
ases of 1¯1×|D| and e1¯1×|D|.
Proof: Similar to proof of Theorem 6.4 . .
Note that there is no polynomial time solution to nd the elements of T ∗, beause
the problem is np-omplete. In our simulation, we nd the suboptimal solution of
this problem using KMB algorithms. We onstrut the KMB omplete graph over the
nodes {Si}
⋃
D suh that the edge between eah pair of nodes in the new omplete
graph is the shortest path between those node in the original graph and then, we look
for the solutions of (61) between the spanning trees of this new subgraph. In the next
step, we solve the orresponding linear programming over these spanning trees.
The following theorem proves that nding the optimal private multiast routing
for the ase of 0 < β ≤ 1 is NP-Complete.
Theorem 6.7 Given a graph G = (V,E), the problem of private multiast routing
from a soure node Si ∈ V whih spans all the elements of D ⊂ V and minimizes the
ost dened in equation (50) is an NP-Complete problem.
Proof: we will prove that the solution of optimization problem expressed in (61)
is NP-Complete whih will be suient for the whole problem. The problem is NP, as
a non-deterministi guess an list a set of edges and in polynomial time, it is possible
to hek:1)These edges form a tree.2)The tree spans all the elements of {Si}
⋃
D.
The problem is NP-hard as the solution of optimization problem expressed in (61)
for the ase of β = 1 yields Minimum Steiner Tree. Consequently, the problem is
NP-Complete. .
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Figure 21: Cost of optimal uniast and suboptimal multiast routing as a funtion of
β for dierent amount of ǫ in a omplete random graph.
6.2.4 Simulations and Numerial Results
In our rst simulation, we onsidered a network modeled by a omplete random graph
whih onsists of 12 soure nodes and 3 destination nodes. The ost of eah edge is a
uniform random variable U [0, 1] and total ost urves are derived for dierent ǫs for
optimal private uniast and suboptimal multiast routing. It is seen that the total
ost inreases as ǫ dereases for both shemes whih is intuitive as higher ǫ yields lower
degree of privay, onsequently, soures are allowed to alloate higher probabilities
on the paths (or spanning trees) with lower ost. Another interesting fat is that all
the usniast routing urves merge eah other for higher βs, whih is also intuitive as
it was seen for β = 1, optimal routing was independent of ǫ. Multiast routing ost
merges for both β = 0 and β = 1 as we proved that for these ases optimal routing
is independent of ǫ. In the seond simulation, we plotted the average ost for spei
amount of ǫ, and β as a funtion of number of soure nodes in the graph while there
are three destination nodes. For eah n, the simulation was run over 1000 random
graph of size n + 3, and the average is plotted. It is known that the average ost of
the shortest path, and the minimum steiner tree onverge asymptotially as the size
of the omplete graph grows. The gure demonstrates the onvergene of optimal
dierntially private paths and trees as well.
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ost for dierent amount of ǫ, and β as a funtion of
network size.
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7 Coupon Targeting Competition in a Privay Sensitive
Market
In the era of massive data olletion, retailers ollet and utilize private information
about onsumers by analyzing their purhasing history, trading private data, traking
Cookies, and similar strategies. Using this data, retailers an predit onsumers taste,
preferene and the amount of money they are willing to spend on any given produt
[88℄. Consequently, a retailer may oer lower pries to prie sensitive onsumers
whilst onsumers with less prie sensitivity who are loyal to the retailer will be oered
higher pries. Oering dierent pries to onsumers based on their loyalty and prie
sensitivity inreases retailers prots and results in prie disrimination [8991℄.
Retailers may prefer to ompete for prie sensitive onsumers by oering targeted
oupons instead of lowering their pries, as oupon targeting engenders market seg-
mentation, whereas dereasing pries does not [24℄. It is also well understood that
targeted oupons and other innovative oupon strategies inrease the revenue of re-
tailers [92,93℄, and results in prie disrimination [73,94,95℄. Coupons are, of ourse,
ultimately beneial to the onsumers owing to prie redution and minimizing the
need to "shop around" for merhandise.
Coupons targeted at spei ustom areas based on their preferenes, however,
engender a fundamental violation of individual privay. Preferene for a partiular
produt, or a lass of produts, an often lead to sensitive information revealed to
retailers. A noteworthy example is when the father of a teen inadvertently disovered
his daughter's pregnany due to a targeted oupon from Target [96℄. Knowledge
of privay violations an make onsumers stop purhasing from spei retailers,
or at the very least, derease the onsumer loyalty towards the retailer [23℄. It is
also shown in [7℄ that onsumers are more willing to purhase from online retailers
who protet their privay. In eet, prie sensitivity and brand loyalty alone do not
ditate onsumer purhasing deisions, and impat of privay violation ought to be
onsidered in retailer deisions to send targeted oupons. It is this privay aware
deision proess that this artile aims to shed light upon. More speially, we study
ompetitive oupon targeting between a pair of retailers when prie and privay are
expliitly onsidered as fators in the onsumer deision making.
In this setion, we use the privay sensitivity model as proposed by Sankar et al
in [23℄, wherein onsumers are assumed to exist in one of two states with respet to
a retailer 1) Non-alerted state where onsumers trust a retailer, and 2) Alerted state,
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where onsumers are aware and wary of privay violations by the retailer. Consumers
swith between these states depending on whether they reeive targeted oupons
from a retailer. The swithing is modeled probabilistially using Markov hains; a
onsumer in a non-alerted state swithes to an alerted state with a xed probability
if s/he reeives a targeted oupon, and a onsumer in an alerted state swithes bak
with some xed probability if s/he does not reeive a targeted oupon.
Following the oupon targeting model in a prie sensitive market in [24℄, we assume
that onsumers are loated on a Hotelling line suh that the loation of onsumers on
the line represents their preferene for the retailers. It is known that the Hotelling line
in a prie sensitive market is divided into four segments whih are shown in Figure
23. The ompetition between retailers in a prie sensitivity market at eah segment
is modeled by a stati bimatrix game. However, in a privay sensitive market, stati
games annot apture the prot of retailers, as they need to onsider both immediate
reward and the impat of their ation on futures rewards. For example, a retailer may
reeive some prot by sending a targeted oupon to a onsumer, but as a onsequene
of sending the targeted oupon, the onsumer may get privay alerted about the
retailer and stop purhasing from this retailer in the future. Thus, we model the
ompetition of retailers in a privay sensitive market using nonzero-sum stohasti
games. Note that in [23℄ the interation between a single retailer and a single onsumer
using Markov Deision Proesses with a similar setting is investigated.
In this work, we demonstrate that a privay sensitive market is divided into 12
segments. Moreover, we derive the optimal stationary oupon targeting poliies and
disounted rewards for both retailers at eah spei segment of the Hotelling line. We
prove that onsumers with weak preferene for a retailer will hange their purhasing
brand if they notie their privay is violated by the retailer. We also prove that
at segments whih adopts mixed strategies, the popular retailer has a less defensive
strategy whilst the rival retailer has a more oensive targeting strategy as the disount
fator inreases. In other words, as the importane of future prot gets higher, the
popular retailer will be more onservative about onsumers with weak preferene for
it, beause, these onsumers are more likely to hange their purhasing brand in the
future, if they get alerted about this retailer. On the other hand, the rival retailer will
be more aggressive to 1) get a higher share of market, 2) push the popular retailer
to distribute targeted oupons. Eventually, we demonstrate that despite the prie
sensitive market, the rival retailer will have a non-negative disounted reward on the
onsumers with weak preferene for the inumbent retailer.
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In order to model a privay sensitive market, we need to adopt a measure for
privay in our model. There are several popular approahes to quantify privay in lit-
erature. Information theoreti metris suh as Shannon entropy [97℄, or min-entropy
[98℄ whih are based on Bayesian assumptions about prior probabilities. Although
information theoreti measures are tratable and onave, they measure average pri-
vay. Statistiians use dierential privay as a tool to measure point-wise privay (no
Bayesian assumption) in data olletion [85℄. While quantitative measures of privay
allows one to inlude privay as a tangible ommodity, in the ontext of onsumer
markets, we need a mehanism to study user behavior in response to privay viola-
tions. The approah proposed in [23℄ provides this mehanism, and we adopt it in the
ontext of market ompetition. In this approah, instead of measuring privay, we are
looking at privay violation as an ation-reation phenomenon, and using probabilis-
ti models for that investigation. Suh phenomenon is modeled by a Markov Chain
(MC) with two states of privay (alerted and non-alerted) for a spei onsumer,
representing the status of the onsumer about a spei retailer.
The primary goal of this setion is to investigate market behavior when on-
sumers' purhasing deisions are impated by prie dierenes and privay violations.
Through this investigation, several questions arise: (1) What is the market segmenta-
tion in a privay sensitive market? (2) How does the privay-sensitivity aet retailers'
prot? (3) What are the optimal targeted oupon strategy of retailers in eah segment
of a Hotelling line? (4) How does the disounting fator for future prots inuene
retailer deision making? (5) What are the long term onsumer purhasing patterns
and optimal strategies for onsumers in a privay sensitive market?
7.1 Overview of Coupon Targeting Problem in a Prie Sensitive
Market
In this setion, we survey the model and main results in lassial oupon targeting
ompetition between two retailers in a prie sensitive market. In the oupon target-
ing ompetition problem studied in [24℄, there are two retailers A, and B selling a
ommodity produt, with dierent brands assoiated to eah retailer, a xed prie
P , and a marginal ost c. Retailers may distribute targeted oupons to spei on-
sumers with disount value d and the marginal ost of distributing a oupon for eah
retailer, denoted by z > 0. Consumers are distributed uniformly on the line segment
[0, 1] while eah retailer is loated at one edge of this line, i.e., retailer A is loated
on x = 0 and retailer B is loated at x = 1. The loation of onsumers reets their
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loyalty to eah brand and aet their purhasing deision. For example, onsumers
who are loated loser to retailer A are more willing to buy this produt from retailer
A. However, if they get a targeted oupon from retailer B, they may purhase from
retailer B. In [24℄, the inuene of loyalty on purhasing deisions is modeled using a
transportation ost t. If V is the ommon reservation prie for eah onsumer, then,
a onsumer loated at x = X is willing to pay V − tX for brand A and V − t(1−X)
for brand B. It is assumed that V is large enough suh that eah onsumer will
purhase this produt. Under this model, the market was shown to be divided into
four segments dened as follows: (See Figure 23)
• Consumers loyal to retailer A: these onsumers would purhase from retailer A
regardless of whether they reeive oupons from either retailer. Consequently
the loation of suh a onsumer satises: P + tX ≤ P − d+ t(1−X), in other
word, these onsumers are loated in the interval [0,XA] where:
XA =
−d+ t
2t
(62)
• Consumers with weak preferene for retailer A: Consider a marginal onsumer
loated at x = Xˆ who is indierent if s/he does not have targeted oupon from
both retailer or s/he has targeted oupon from both retailers. Suh a onsumer
is loated at Xˆ = 12 . The onsumers in the interval [XA, Xˆ ] are alled onsumers
with weak preferene for retailer A. These onsumers purhase from retailer B
if they have a targeted oupon from B and they do not have a targeted oupon
from retailer A. Otherwise, they will purhase from retailer A.
• Similarly, onsumers loyal to retailer B are loated in the interval [XB , 1] and
onsumers with weak preferene for retailer B are loated in the interval [Xˆ,XB ],
where XB =
d+t
2t .
These segments are shown in Figure 23 for symmetri ost parameters for both retail-
ers. We note that the loation of a onsumer indiates her/his loyalty and preferene
for retailers, and parameter t > 0 represents prie sensitivity of the market. For ex-
ample, if t→ 0, then, the market will be divided into two segments, eah representing
onsumers with weak preferene for one of the retailers. Suh a market represents the
highest prie sensitivity degree, as all the onsumers hange their purhasing brand
if they are oered a targeted oupon from the rival retailer. On the other hand, if
t→∞, the market is divided into two segments suh that onsumers at eah segment
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Figure 23: Market Segmentation in a Prie Sensitive Market.
have strong preferene for one of the retailers, representing a market with no prie
sensitivity, i.e., all onsumers will purhase from their favorite retailer.
The equilibrium and optimal strategy of retailers at eah segments is derived in
[24℄ and we review these results in the following theorem.
Theorem 7.1 Denote by pi the probability assoiated to retailer A sending targeted
oupons to onsumers in ith segment, and denote by qi the probability assoiated to
retailer B sending targeted oupons to onsumers in the ith segment. Aording to
[24℄, the optimal strategies for an one-step game between retailer A and B in eah
segments are as follows:
p = [p1, p2, p3, p4] = [0,
P − c− d− z
P − c− d
,
d+ z
P − c
, 0]
q = [q1, q2, q3, q4] = [0,
d+ z
P − c
,
P − c− d− z
P − c− d
, 0]
And the reward of eah retailer at the equilibrium are as follows:
VA = [P − c, P − c− d− z, 0, 0]
VB = [0, 0, P − c− d− z, P − c]
The results in Theorem 7.1 are intuitive, as in segment 1, none of the retailers are
willing to distribute targeted oupon between the onsumers, as they annot inrease
their reward by doing so. However, the bimatrix game in segment 2 whih is shown
in table 2 adopts a mixed strategy at the equilibrium point. In this segment, if both
retailers do not distribute targeted oupons, retailer A reeives the maximum possible
reward, P − c and retailer B reeives 0 reward. However, retailer B an improve their
reward by distributing a targeted oupon. In this ase retailer B reeives P −c−d−z
and retailer A reeives zero. On the other hand, retailer A an again inrease their
reward by distributing a targeted oupon. Consequently, the bimatrix game in this
segment is similar to prisoner's dilemma. In this segment, retailer A has a defensive
strategy and tries to enourage the onsumers with weak preferene towards retailer
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VA, VB Targeting Not Targeting
Targeting P − c− d− z,−z P − c− d− z, 0
Not Target-
ing
0, P − c− d− z P − c, 0
Table 2: Bimatrix Game in Segment S2
A to maintain their loyalty, whereas retailer B has an oensive strategy and tries to
inrease its market share by oering them targeted oupons.
Subsequently, we adapt this Hotelling line model to study oupon targeting when
onsumers inlude privay violations as a fator in their deision making whih we
model as an inrease in transportation osts under an alerted state.
7.2 System Model
In the basi Hotelling line model [24℄ desribed previously, the bimatrix games were
stati and resulted in simple mixed strategy equilibria. In a privay sensitive market,
however, the ompetition is played out over the entire time horizon, sine retailers
sending oupons not only need to worry about immediate prots but also privay
related onsequenes in subsequent time steps as well. Privay sensitivity, as men-
tioned earlier, is modeled as in [23℄, wherein onsumers exist in one of two states with
respet to eah retailer: alerted or non-alerted. Consequently, onsumers exist in one
of four possible groups {S, SB , SA, SAB}explained in the following paragraph. We
model the impat of privay using a dierential in the transportation osts. In parti-
ular, a onsumer alerted about retailer A would inur a higher transportation ost tA
from that retailer as opposed to a transportation ost tNA < tA were s/he is not alert
about that retailer. (Note that the subsripts "A", and "NA" stand for "Alerted",
and "Non-Alerted", respetively.) When applying this notion to the Hotelling line
model, four dierent Hotelling lines arise, one for eah group.
• S: Consumers in this group are in non-alerted state about both retailers. Con-
sequently, the transportation ost for both retailers will be tNA. Assuming
symmetri onditions, the marginal onsumers for this group are loated at
X1A =
−d+ tNA
2tNA
, Xˆ1 =
1
2
, X1B =
d+ tNA
2tNA
, (63)
We assume all the onsumers start in this group at the beginning of the game.
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• SB : Consumers in this group are in the non-alerted state about retailer A and
in the alerted state about retailer B. Consequently, the transportation ost for
retailer A and B will be tNA, and tA, respetively. The marginal onsumers in
this group are loated at:
X2A =
−d+ tA
tNA + tA
, Xˆ2 =
tA
tNA + tA
, X2B =
d+ tA
tNA + tA
, (64)
• SA: Consumers in this group are in the alerted state about retailer A and in
the non-alerted state about retailer B. Consequently, the transportation ost
for retailer A and B will be tA, and tNA, respetively. The marginal onsumers
in this group are loated at
X3A =
−d+ tNA
tNA + tA
, Xˆ3 =
tNA
tNA + tA
, X3B =
d+ tNA
tNA + tA
, (65)
• SAB : Consumers in this group are in alerted state about both retailers. Con-
sequently, the transportation ost for both retailer will be tA. The marginal
onsumers in this group are loated at
X4A =
−d+ tA
2tA
, Xˆ4 =
1
2
, X4B =
d+ tA
2tA
, (66)
The two dimensional nature of the privay sensitive market results in a market seg-
mentation with 12 segments as shown in Figure 24. Due to idential marginal osts,
these are omposed of two symmetri groups of 6 segments eah. Note that for any
i, the segment S ′i is symmetri with respet to the segment Si and therefore it is
suient to investigate the segments Si for all i.
Consumers in a spei segment may move from one group to the other group
within the same segment. However, they will not move from one segment to another.
Consequently, the stohasti game at eah segment is independent of other segments.
Eah retailer aims to maximize its disounted reward over an innite horizon at eah
segment. As disussed before, eah retailer may get a higher immediate reward by
distributing a targeted oupon at a spei group of a segment. However, onsumers
may get alerted about this retailer and swith to the other retailer. Consequently,
retailers' ations at the urrent time will inuene both their immediate reward and
future reward. This interation between retailers and onsumers in a spei segment
of the Hotelling line is modeled by a nonzero stohasti game.
We model the stohasti game at segment Si as a tuple (S,AA,AB , P, rA, rB , β),
where S is the set of states suh that α = [αS , αSB , αSA , αSAB ] ∈ S represents the
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(a) If onsumers get alerted about a retailer, then there will be a higher transporta-
tion ost for that retailer.
(b) Market segmentation of a privay-sensitive market. Note that the segment S ′
i
is symmetri to Si
Figure 24: Market Segmentation in a Privay Sensitive Market
distribution of onsumers at segment Si over the four groups identied above. AA
and AB are the set of ations for retailers A, and B, respetively. Eah player may
either send a targeted oupon to onsumers in eah group of the segment or not.
Consequently, AA = AB = {T,UT}, where T denotes sending a targeted oupon and
UT represents not sending a targeted oupon. At time t, if the urrent state is αt, and
player A, and B hoose the ations aA, and aB , respetively, player A and B will reeive
a orresponding immediate reward of rA(αt, aA, aB) and rB(αt, aA, aB). Following
this, the state of the game will transient to αt+1 with probability P (αt+1|αt, aA, aB).
The disount fator of the stohasti game is 0 ≤ β < 1.
Following the model in [23℄, we assume that a single onsumer an be in a state
s ∈ {A,NA} about retailer X. If retailer X takes the ation aX , then the next state
will be s′ with probability Pax(s
′|s). The matrix Pax for eah ation ax ∈ {T,UT} is
dened as follows:
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PT =
(
λN 1− λN
0 1
)
, PUT =
(
1 0
1− λA λA
)
, (67)
where the rst row and olumn orrespond to the non-alerted state, and the seond
row and olumn orrespond to the alerted state. Here, 1 − λN represents the prob-
ability that a non-alerted onsumer gets alerted if s/he reeives a targeted oupon,
and 1−λA represents the probability that an alerted onsumer transients to the non-
alerted state if s/he does not reeive a targeted oupon. Note that if a onsumer is
alerted and s/he reeives a targeted oupon, s/he will remain in the alerted state.
Similarly, if a onsumer in the non-alerted does not reeive targeted oupon from the
retailer, s/he will remain in the non-alerted state. λN and λA represents the privay
sensitivity of the market. For example, a market with no privay onern an be
modeled by λN = 1 and λA = 0, and a full privay sensitive market an be modeled
by λN = 0 and λA = 1. Note that
tNA
tA
represents the eet of getting privay alerted
on purhasing deision of onsumers.
The matrix dened by P = PaA⊗PaB , where ⊗ represents the Kroneker produt,
aptures the 4 × 4 transition matrix of our game. If the urrent state of the game
is αt and player A and B take ations aA and aB , respetively, the next state of the
game will be αt+1 whih is derived as follows:
αt+1 = αt(PaA ⊗ PaB ), (68)
The set of stationary poliies of player X is denoted by ΠX suh that a poliy
πX ∈ ΠX identies a probability distribution on the ation set of the player at a
spei state. For example, πX(α) = [π
S
X(α), π
SB
X (α), π
SA
X (α), π
SAB
X (α)] denotes the
poliy of retailerX, and πsX(α) represent the probability that retailer X will distribute
a targeted oupon to the onsumer in group s when the urrent state of the game is
α. Note that throughout this work, we use πsX(α, T ) and π
s
X(α) interhangeably and
we use πsX(α,UT ) and 1−π
s
X (α) interhangeably. If player A and B x their poliies
πA and πB, respetively, the total reward of eah of the players is as follows:
V πA,πBA =
∞∑
t=0
βtEπA,πB(rA(St, AA,t, AB,t))
V πA,πBB =
∞∑
t=0
βtEπA,πB(rB(St, AA,t, AB,t))
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Denition 7.1 The poliies π∗A and π
∗
B results in an equilibrium if and only if the
following holds:
∀πA ∈ ΠA : V
π∗A,π
∗
B
A ≥ V
πA,π
∗
B
A
∀πB ∈ ΠB : V
π∗A,π
∗
B
B ≥ V
π∗A,πB
B (69)
So far, we have assumed that the state spae of our non-zero sum stohasti game
is ontinuous and represents the distribution of onsumers over the identied four
groups. However, in the following lemma, we prove that the optimal poliy of eah
retailer in both nite and innite horizon games is independent of the onsumers'
distributions. In other word, it is suient to restrit the state spae of the game to
four states, suh that eah group denotes a state of our non-zero sum game.
Lemma 7.2 The optimal poliy of retailers in the non-zero sum stohasti game at
eah segment is independent of the onsumers' distribution over four groups and it is
suient to onsider S = {S, SB , SA, SAB} as the state spae .
Proof: First, we prove the lemma by indution for the nite horizon ase. Speially,
we prove that if Lemma holds for the ase where N horizons left, it will also hold for
N +1 horizon. The results hold for all Ns inluding N →∞. For proof's detail, refer
to setion 7.5.1. .
Lemma 7.2 implies that onsumers move between the four groups and not as
frations in groups. Moreover, it is suient to onsider a state spae inluding just
these four groups, i.e. S = {S, SB , SA, SAB}. In the rest of this paper, we maintain
the same notation introdued so far. However, instead of αt, we use the notation st ∈
{S, SB , SA, SAB} whih represents the state. For example, V πA,πBA,N (S
AB) represents
the total disounted reward of retailer A, when N periods are left, retailer A, and B
have poliies πA and πB , respetively, and the initial state of the game is S
AB
. Refer
to table 3 for a omplete explanation of the notation.
While the equilibrium of a nite-horizon non-zero sum stohasti game has non-
stationary poliies, the innite horizon ompetition has an equilibrium in stationary
poliies spae [99, 100℄. If player A and B x stationary poliies πA and πB, respe-
tively, the innite horizon reward of eah player is as follows:
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V πA,πBA =
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
a1∈{T,NT}
∑
a2∈{T,NT}
diag(πA(a1), πB(a2))(Pa1 ⊗ Pa2)rA(a1, a2)
V πA,πBB =
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
a1∈{T,NT}
∑
a2∈{T,NT}
diag(πA(a1), πB(a2))(Pa1 ⊗ Pa2)rB(a1, a2),
where diag(x, y) is an n×n diagonal matrix suh that the element on (i, i) is the
produt of the ith element of vetor x and the ith element of vetor y and the rest
of the elements of this matrix will be zero and V πA,πBX = [V
πA,πB
X (S), V
πA,πB
X (S
B),
V πA,πBX (S
A), V πA,πBX (S
AB)]T . On the other hand, we an also rewrite the disounted
reward using Bellman Equations:
∀s ∈ S : V πA,πBA (s) = r
A(s, πA, πB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
immediate reward
+β
∑
s′∈S
P (s′|s, πA, πB)r(s
′, πA, πB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
reward to go
The above equation implies that the total disounted reward of eah rm ontains
two parts: 1) Immediate reward 2) Reward to go, where both parts depend on the
urrent state and both retailers' poliies.
7.3 Retailers Competition at eah Segment
In this setion, we study the equilibrium of ompetition at eah segment of the
Hotelling line and disuss how privay onstraints eets the poliy and disounted re-
ward of eah retailer at eah segment. Segments on Hotelling line of a privay sensitive
market an be ategorized to three: 1) Segments not aeted by privay onstraints.
2) Segments fully aeted by privay onstraints. 3) Segments partially aeted by
privay onstraints. In following setions, we study eah of these ategories:
7.3.1 Segments not Aeted by Privay Constraints
In this setion, we study the oupon targeting ompetition at segments S1 and S5,
where the ompetition is not aeted by the privay sensitivity of the market. The
primary reason that these segments are not aeted by privay sensitivity of the mar-
ket is that in these segments, onsumers at all four groups have the same preferene
on retailers.
1. Coupon Targeting Competition in Segment S1: In segment S1, at all four
groups, onsumers have strong preferene on retailer A and they will purhase
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Symbol Meaning Symbol Meaning
XiA, Xˆ
i,XiB marginal onsumers at
group i
⊗ kroneker produt
Si segment i [T ]i,j element on ith row and
jth olumn of matrix T
S state spae P transition matrix
AX ation spae for player
X
rX(s, aA, aB) immediate reward of
player X if the urrent
state is s and player A,
and B take ations aA
and aB , respetively
ΠX set of stationary poliies
of player X
β disount fator
αj proportion of onsumers
at group j
πX(s) probability that re-
tailer X sends targeted
oupon to onsumers at
group s
λN probability that a
non-alerted onsumer
remains non-alerted if
s/he reeives a targeted
oupon
πX(s,A) probability of retailer X
taking ation A to on-
sumers at group s
λA probability that an
alerted onsumer stays
alerted if s/he does
not reeive a targeted
oupon
V πA,πBX (s) reward of retailer X if
retailer A and B have
poliies πA, πB , respe-
tively and the urrent
state is s.
V ∗X(s) optimal reward of re-
tailer X if the initial
state of game is s
V ∗X vetor of optimal reward
of retailer X in innite
non-zero sum game
Table 3: Table of Notations
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from retailer A in all irumstanes. The onsumers in segment S1 have privay
independent strong preferene for retailer A and even if they notie privay
violation by retailer A (or retailer B), they will still purhase from A. It is
straightforward to hek that in all four groups of segment S1, none of the
retailers is willing to distribute targeted oupon, as, by doing so, they annot
they annot inrease their rewards, i.e., π∗A = [0, 0, 0, 0] and π
∗
B = [0, 0, 0, 0].
Consequently, the optimal disounted reward of retailer A and B in the innite
horizon non-zero sum stohasti game of segment S1 will be as follows:
V ∗A = [
(P − c)
1− β
,
(P − c)
1− β
,
(P − c)
1− β
,
(P − c)
1− β
] (70)
V ∗B = [0, 0, 0, 0] (71)
2. Coupon Targeting Competition in Segment S5: Similar to segment S1,
onsumers at all four groups of segment S5 have similar preferene for retailer B.
In other words, onsumers at this segment have privay independent weak
preferene for retailer A, meaning even if they get privay alerted about retailer
A (or retailer B), they purhase from B if they only have targeted oupon from
retailer B. The following theorem derives the optimal poliies and disounted
rewards of retailers at segment S5.
Theorem 7.3 The optimal disounted reward of retailer A and B in the innite
horizon non-zero sum stohasti game of segment S5 will be as follows:
V ∗A = [
(P − c− d− z)
1− β
,
(P − c− d− z)
1− β
,
(P − c− d− z)
1− β
,
(P − c− d− z)
1− β
], V ∗B = [0, 0, 0, 0] (72)
Moreover, the optimal poliies of retailer A and B will be π∗A = [
P−c−d−z
P−c−d ,
P−c−d−z
P−c−d ,
P−c−d−z
P−c−d ,
P−c−d−z
P−c−d ] and π
∗
B = [
d+z
P−c ,
d+z
P−c ,
d+z
P−c ,
d+z
P−c ]
Proof: Refer to setion 7.5.2. .
The result of Theorem 7.3 are intuitive as onsumers' purhasing behavior will
be the same in all states. In other words, in this segment whether onsumers
are privay alerted or non-alerted about either of the retailers, they will have
a weak preferene for retailer A. That being said privay violation by retailers
will not eet onsumers' purhasing deision in segment S5.
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VA(S), VB(S) Targeting Not Targeting
Targeting P − c− d− z+βVA(S),−z P − c− d− z + βVA(S), 0
Not Target-
ing
βVA(S), P − c− d− z P − c+ βVA(S), 0
Table 4: Bimatrix game for innite horizon game in segment S5 at state S. Note that
the bimatrix game at states SB, SA, and SAB will be ompletely similar.
7.3.2 Segments Fully Aeted by Privay Constraints
In this setion, we study the equilibrium of nonzero-sum stohasti games at segments
S2,S4, and S6, where both optimal poliies and disounted rewards of retailers are
aeted by privay parameters. It is shown that in segments S2, and S4, retailer
B reeives zero disounted reward, however, in segment S6, retailer B has nonzero
reward. In other words, in a privay sensitive market, onsumers who initially had
a weak preferene on the popular (here retailer A) will be driven away to the rival
retailer (here retailer B), if they notie that their privay is violated by the popular
retailer.
1. Coupon Targeting Competition in Segment S2: Segment S2 is the rst
segment, where privay awareness eets popular retailer's prot. In this seg-
ment, if onsumers are privay alerted just about retailer A, i.e. if they are at
group SA, they have weak preferene on retailer A. Otherwise, they have strong
preferene about retailer A. It is straightforward to hek that both retailers
are not willing to distribute targeted oupon at groups S, SB , SAB . However,
in group SA, both retailers have mixed strategy. The following presents the
optimal poliies and disounted rewards at this segment.
Theorem 7.4 The optimal poliies of retailer A, and B in segment S2 are as
follows:
π∗A = [0, 0,
P − c− d− z
P − c− d
, 0]
π∗B = [0, 0,
(d+ Z) + β(1− λA)∆
(P − c) + β(1− λA)(1− λN )
1−βλA
1−βλ2
A
∆
, 0] (73)
Moreover, the disounted rewards of retailer A, and retailer B are as follows:
V ∗A(S) = V
∗
A(S
B) =
P − c
1− β
(74)
V ∗A(S
A) =
P − c
1− β
−∆, V ∗A(S
AB) =
P − c
1− β
− βλA(1− λA)∆
V ∗B(S) = 0, V
∗
B(S
B) = 0, V ∗B(S
A) = 0, V ∗B(S
AB) = 0, (75)
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where ∆ = (d+z)
(1−β)+β
(1−λN )λA(1−βλA)
1−βλ2
A
.
Proof: proof of this theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 7.5. .
If λA 6= 1, it is straightforward to hek that the stationary distribution at this
segment is unique and all the onsumers will eventually be in group S. This is
intuitive as in group S, none of the retailers is distributing targeted oupons.
Thus, onsumers in this group remain in this group. For λA 6= 1, there is
a nonzero probability of transiting from other groups to group S. Therefore,
group S is the only terminating state in the Markov Chain (MC), while there is
nonzero probabilities of transiting from other groups to group S whih proves
the laim. The interesting result of this laim is that for the ase β → 1,
where the disounted rewards onverges to the average reward, the disounted
reward of retailer A at all group onverges to
P−c
1−β . Consequently, for the ase,
where β → 1, the privay sensitivity of the market does not inuene any of the
retailers.
2. Coupon Targeting Competition in Segment S4: In segment S4, at groups
S, SA, and SAB, retailer B has an oensive strategies and tries to persuade the
onsumers with a weak preferene for retailer A to purhase from him. However,
retailer B will not distribute a targeted oupon to onsumers in group SB , where
onsumers are alerted about this retailer. This is intuitive as onsumers in group
SB will purhase from retailer A in all irumstanes. Thus, retailer B tries to
gain bak the trust of onsumers in this group by not distributing a targeted
oupon to them.
In order to derive the optimal disounted rewards and stationary poliies in this
segment, we solve the xed point equations. Note that the xed point equations
are derived by nding the unique stationary poliies whih solves the bimatrix
games shown in tables 5, 6, 7 ,8.
In the following theorem, we prove that reward of retailer B in innite horizon
game at all states will be zero. Moreover, retailer A will have an optimal poliy
of independent of disount fator β.
Theorem 7.5 The optimal poliy of retailer A in segment S4 is independent of
the disount fator β and is as follows:
π∗A = [
P − c− d− z
P − c− d
, 0,
P − c− d− z
P − c− d
,
P − c− d− z
P − c− d
] (76)
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Figure 25: Optimal poliies of retailer A and retailer B in segment S4
Moreover, the disounted rewards of retailer A, and retailer B are given by:
V ∗A(S) =
β(1 − λN )
(1− β)[(1 − βλA)(1− βλN )− β2(1− λN )2]
(P − c)−
(1− βλN )[β(1 − λN )− (1− βλA)]
(1− β)[(1 − βλA)(1 − βλN )− β2(1− λN )2]
(P − c− d− z) (77)
V ∗A(S
B) =
[(1− βλA)(1− βλN ) + β
2(1− λN )(λN − λA)]
(1− β)(1 − βλA)[(1 − βλA)(1− βλN )− β2(1− λN )2]
(P − c)−
β(1 − λA)(1− βλN )[β(1 − λN )− (1− βλA)]
(1− β)(1 − βλA)[(1 − βλA)(1− βλN )− β2(1− λN )2]
(P − c− d− z) (78)
V ∗A(S
A) =
P − c− d− z
1− β
(79)
V ∗A(S
AB) =
P − c− d− z
1− β
V ∗B(S) = 0, V
∗
B(S
B) = 0, V ∗B(S
A) = 0, V ∗B(S
AB) = 0 (80)
Proof: In order to derive the optimal poliy of retailer A, and the disounted
reward of B, we use bakward indution. Next, we derive the optimal disounted
reward of retailer A in two steps: First, we prove that the optimal disounted
reward at group SA, and SAB are independent of λA and λN , and we derive
these disounted rewards. Then, we will derive the optimal disounted reward
of retailer A by solving the xed point equations at group S, and SB . For
proof's detail refer to setion 7.5.3. .
As a diret result of Theorem 7.5, the optimal poliy of rm B in segment S4
an be derived, whih is presented in setion 7.5.4.
3. Coupon Targeting Competition in segment S6: Despite the rst ve
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V ∗A(S), V
∗
B(S) Targeting Not Targeting
Targeting P − c − d − z +
β(λ2NV
∗
A(S) + λN (1 −
λN )(V
∗
A(S
B) + V ∗A(S
A)) +
(1− λN )
2V ∗A(S
AB)),−z
P−c−d−z+β(λNV
∗
A(S)+
(1− λN )V ∗A(S
A)), 0
Not Targeting β(λNV
∗
A(S) + (1 −
λN )V
∗
A(S
B)), P − c− d− z
P − c+ βV ∗A(S), 0
Table 5: Bimatrix Game of Segment S4 in Group S.
V ∗A(S
B), V ∗B(S
B) Targeting Not Targeting
Targeting P − c − d − z +
β(λNV
∗
A(S
B) + (1 −
λN )V
∗
A(S
AB)),−z
P − c − d − z +
β(λN (1 − λA)V
∗
A(S) +
λAλNV
∗
A(S
B) + (1 −
λA)(1 − λN )V
∗
A(S
A) +
λA(1− λN )V
∗
A(S
AB)), 0
Not Targeting P − c+ βV ∗A(S
B),−z P − c+β(λAV
∗
A(S
B)+(1−
λA)V
∗
A(S)), 0
Table 6: Bimatrix Game of Segment S4 in Group S
B
.
V ∗A(S
A), V ∗B(S
A) Targeting Not Targeting
Targeting P − c − d − z +
β(λNV
∗
A(S
A) + (1 −
λN )V
∗
A(S
AB)),−z
P − c− d− z+ βV ∗A(S
A), 0
Not Targeting β((1− λA)λNV
∗
A(S) + (1−
λA)(1 − λN )V
∗
A(S
B) +
λAλNV
∗
A(S
A) + λA(1 −
λN )V
∗
A(S
AB)), P −c−d−z
P − c+β(λAV
∗
A(S
A)+(1−
λA)V
∗
A(S)), 0
Table 7: Bimatrix Game of Segment S4 in Group S
A
.
V ∗A(S
AB), V ∗B(S
AB)Targeting Not Targeting
Targeting P−c−d−z+βV ∗A(S
AB),−z P − c − d − z +
β((1 − λA)V
∗
A(S
A) +
λAV
∗
A(S
AB)), 0
Not Targeting β((1 − λA)V
∗
A(S
B) +
λAV
∗
A(S
AB)), P − c− d− z
P −c+β((1−λA)
2V ∗A(S)+
λA(1 − λA)(V
∗
A(S
B) +
V ∗A(S
A)) + λ2AV
∗
A(S
AB)), 0
Table 8: Bimatrix Game of Segment S4 in Group S
AB
.
segments, segment S6 is the only segment in whih retailer B has a nonzero
reward at the equilibrium. The primary reason for this is that if onsumers in
this segment get alerted just about rm A (Group SA), then they will have a
weak preferene for rm B. In other words, onsumers in Group SA will purhase
from rm A only if they have a targeted oupon from rm A and they do not
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Figure 26: Optimal normalized disounted rewards of retailer A and retailer B in
segment S4
have a targeted oupon from rm B. Consequently, in this segment, retailer
A has less defensive strategy and is less likely to distribute a targeted oupon
whilst retailer B is more oensive to get a higher share of the market as well as
pushing retailer A to distribute targeted oupon.
In order to nd the equilibrium of the stohasti game in this segment, we need
to solve the xed point games represented in tables 9, 10, 11, and 12. In the
equilibrium point of the game, eah retailer is indierent between sending or
not sending a targeted oupon at eah state (or group). For example in state S,
retailer A is indierent between sending or not sending a targeted oupon, i.e.,
its reward when it sends a targeted oupon to onsumers in this group should
be equal to to his reward if it does not send a targeted oupon to onsumers in
this group. Consequently,
π∗B(S)(P − c− d− z + β(λ
2
NV
∗
A(S) + λN (1− λN )(V
∗
A(S
B) + V ∗A(S
A)) +
(1− λN )
2V ∗A(S
AB))) + (1− π∗B(S))(P − c− d− z + β(λNV
∗
A(S) +
(1− λN )V
∗
A(S
A))) = π∗B(S)(β(λNV
∗
A(S) + (1− λN )V
∗
A(S
B)))
+(1− π∗B(S))(P − c+ βV
∗
A(S)) (81)
whih results in the following:
π∗B(S) =
d+ z + β(1− λN )(V
∗
A(S)− V
∗
A(S
A))
P − c+ β(1− λN )2(V ∗A(S)− V
∗
A(S
A) + V ∗A(S
AB)− V ∗A(S
B))
(82)
Similarly, we an nd the optimal poliies of retailers A and B, whih are pre-
sented in setion 7.5.5.
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V ∗A(S), V
∗
B(S) Targeting Not Targeting
Targeting P − c − d − z +
β(λ2NV
∗
A(S) + λN (1 −
λN )(V
∗
A(S
B) + V ∗A(S
A)) +
(1 − λN )
2V ∗A(S
AB)),−z +
β(λ2NV
∗
B(S) + λN (1 −
λN )(V
∗
B(S
B) + V ∗B(S
A)) +
(1− λN )
2V ∗B(S
AB))
P − c − d − z +
β(λNV
∗
A(S) + (1 −
λN )V
∗
A(S
A)), β(λNV
∗
B(S)+
(1− λN )V
∗
B(S
A))
Not Targeting β(λNV
∗
A(S) + (1 −
λN )V
∗
A(S
B)), P − c −
d − z + β(λNV
∗
B(S) + (1 −
λN )V
∗
B(S
B))
P − c+ βV ∗A(S), βV
∗
B(S)
Table 9: Bimatrix Game of Segment S6 in Group S
V ∗A(S
B), V ∗B(S
B) Targeting Not Targeting
Targeting P − c − d − z +
β(λNV
∗
A(S
B) + (1 −
λN )V
∗
A(S
AB)),−z +
β(λNV
∗
B(S
B) + (1 −
λN )V
∗
B(S
AB))
P − c − d − z +
β(λN (1 − λA)V
∗
A(S) +
λAλNV
∗
A(S
B)+(1−λA)(1−
λN )V
∗
A(S
A) + λA(1 −
λN )V
∗
A(S
AB)), β(λN (1 −
λA)V
∗
B(S) +
λAλNV
∗
B(S
B) + (1 −
λA)(1 − λN )V
∗
B(S
A) +
λA(1− λN )V
∗
B(S
AB))
Not Targeting βV ∗A(S
B), P − c − d − z +
βV ∗B(S
B)
P − c+β(λAV
∗
A(S
B)+(1−
λA)V
∗
A(S)),+β(λAV
∗
B(S
B)+
(1− λA)V
∗
B(S))
Table 10: Bimatrix Game of Segment S6 in Group S
B
V ∗A(S
A), V ∗B(S
A) Targeting Not Targeting
Targeting −z + β(λNV
∗
A(S
A) + (1 −
λN )V
∗
A(S
AB)), P − c− d −
z + β(λNV
∗
B(S
A) + (1 −
λN )V
∗
B(S
AB))
P − c − d − z +
βV ∗A(S
A), βV ∗B(S
A)
Not Targeting β((1− λA)λNV
∗
A(S) + (1−
λA)(1 − λN )V
∗
A(S
B) +
λAλNV
∗
A(S
A) + λA(1 −
λN )V
∗
A(S
AB)), P − c− d −
z + β((1 − λA)λNV
∗
B(S) +
(1− λA)(1− λN )V
∗
B(S
B) +
λAλNV
∗
B(S
A) + λA(1 −
λN )V
∗
B(S
AB)
β(λAV
∗
A(S
A) + (1 −
λA)V
∗
A(S)), P − c +
β(λAV
∗
B(S
A) + (1 −
λA)V
∗
B(S))
Table 11: Bimatrix Game of Segment S6 in Group S
A
.
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V ∗A(S
AB), V ∗B(S
AB)Targeting Not Targeting
Targeting P − c − d − z +
βV ∗A(S
AB),−z+βV ∗B(S
AB)
P − c − d − z +
β((1 − λA)V ∗A(S
A) +
λAV
∗
A(S
AB)), β((1 −
λA)V
∗
B(S
A) + λAV
∗
B(S
AB))
Not Targeting β((1 − λA)V
∗
A(S
B) +
λAV
∗
A(S
AB)), P − c − d −
z + β((1 − λA)V
∗
B(S
B) +
λAV
∗
B(S
AB))
P − c + β((1 −
λA)
2V ∗A(S) + λA(1 −
λA)(V
∗
A(S
B) + V ∗A(S
A)) +
λ2AV
∗
A(S
AB)), β((1 −
λA)
2V ∗B(S) + λA(1 −
λA)(V
∗
B(S
B) + V ∗B(S
A)) +
λ2AV
∗
B(S
AB))
Table 12: Bimatrix Game of Segment S6 in Group S
AB
.
One may solve for optimal disounted reward and optimal poliies by substi-
tuting equations (82)-(98) in the bimatrix game at eah state and solve the
resulting system of degree 2 polynomial equations using Puiseux series or the
Grobner basis methods [101℄. The alternative hoie is using nonlinear pro-
gramming to solve for the equilibrium of the stohasti game in this segment
[99℄.
In the following Theorem, we prove that the linear approximations of stationary
poliies in the form of π∗A(i) ≈ f
i
0 + βf
i
1 presented in Appendix 7.5.6) ahieves
an ǫ-equilibrium for the non-zero sum stohasti game in segment S6.
Theorem 7.6 The linear approximation of optimal stationary poliies of the
retailers forms an ǫ-equilibrium for the non-zero sum stohasti game in segment
S6, where ǫ ≤
4β2(P−c−d−z)max{2λN (1−λN )3,(1−λN )3(1−λA+λN ),λ2A(1−λA),2λA(1−λA)
3}
1−β
Proof: Refer to setion 7.5.7. .
7.3.3 Segments Partially Aeted by Privay Constraints
In this setion, we study the equilibrium of the ompetition in segment S3. In this
segment, the optimal poliies of both retailers are independent of the disount fator β,
and the privay sensitivity parameters λA and λN . However, the disounted rewards
of retailer A are aeted by these parameters.
1. Coupon Targeting Competition in Segment S3: In segment S3, if on-
sumers are in the non-alerted state about retailer B, they have weak preferene
99
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Figure 27: Stationary distribution of stohasti game at S4 for dierent λA. Note that
as λA inreases whih means alerted onsumers are less likely to transit to non-alerted
state, all onsumers end up being at group SAB.
for retailer A. Otherwise, they have strong preferene for retailer A. In other
words, in this segment, if onsumers get alerted about retailer B, they will
purhase from retailer A in all irumstanes.
Following the result of theorem 7.1, it is known that in a one-step game (one pe-
riod), retailer B has a reward equal to zero at all the states (groups). Moreover,
at the (Nash) equilibrium of a one-step game, none of the retailers are willing to
distribute a targeted oupon in states SB , and SAB . However, retailer A, and B
distribute targeted oupons over the onsumers at states S, and SA with prob-
ability
P−c−d−z
P−c−d , and
d+z
P−c , respetively. In the following theorem, we prove that
the above results hold for the innite horizon stohasti game at segment S3.
We note that the innite horizon stohasti game an be solved by nding the
equilibrium of four bimatrix game for eah state. The bimatrix game for state
S is represented in table 13 and 14. In these tables, eah element inludes two
parts: 1) instantaneous reward and 2) disounted reward to go. For example, if
both retailers distribute targeted oupon over onsumers in group S. Retailer
A reeives an instantaneous reward P − c− d− z and disounted reward to go
β
∑
s∈S P (s|S, T, T )VA(s).
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VA(S) Targeting Not Targeting
Targeting (P − c − d − z) +
β
∑
s∈S P (s|S, T, T )VA(s)
(P − c − d − z) +
β
∑
s∈S P (s|S, T, UT )VA(s)
Not Target-
ing
β
∑
s∈S P (s|S,UT, T )VA(s) (P − c) +
β
∑
s∈S P (s|S,UT,UT )VA(s)
Table 13: Reward of retailer A in the bimatrix game of segment S3 in state S (group
S). The reward inludes two parts: 1)an instantaneous reward 2) a reward to go. For
example, if both retailers distribute a targeted oupon over onsumers in group 1.
Retailer A reeives an instantaneous reward P − c− d− z and a disounted reward to
go β
∑
s∈S P (s|S, T, T )VA(s). Rows, and olumns orresponds to ations of retailer
A, and retailer B, respetively.
VB(S) Targeting Not Targeting
Targeting −z +
β
∑
s∈S P (s|S, T, T )VB(s)
β
∑
s∈S P (s|S, T, UT )VB(s)
Not Target-
ing
(P − c − d − z) +
β
∑
s∈S P (s|S,UT, T )VB(s)
β
∑
s∈S P (s|S,UT,UT )VB(s)
Table 14: Reward of retailer B in the bimatrix game of segment S3 in state S (group
S).
Theorem 7.7 The optimal poliy of eah retailer in the innite horizon game
in segment S3 will be as follows:
π∗A = [
P − c− d− z
P − c− d
, 0,
P − c− d− z
P − c− d
, 0]
π∗B = [
d+ z
P − c
, 0,
d+ z
P − c
, 0] (83)
Moreover, the disounted reward of retailer B, in this ase will be zero, ie for
i = 1, · · · , 4 : V ∗B(i) = 0
Proof: We prove this theorem by indution, i.e., we prove that if the results
hold for the ase of a nite horizon with N horizons left, it will also hold for the
ase where N + 1 horizons are left. For details of proof refer to setion 7.5.8.
7.4 Numerial Results
In this setion, we present our numerial result for segments S4 and S6. In our numer-
ial results, we derived optimal poliies and disounted rewards by value evaluation
and poliy iteration method. All the numerial results are derived with parameters:
P = 1, c = 0, d = 0.2, z = 0.1, λN = 1/3, and λA = 2/3. In Figure 25, we present the
optimal poliies of eah retailer in segment S4 as a funtion of β. Figure 25 shows
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Figure 28: Optimal poliies of retailer A and retailer B in segment S6 are shown by
solid lines while the linear approximations are shown by dotted lines.
that the optimal poliy of retailer A is independent of β. The optimal disounted
rewards of retailer A and retailer B in segment S4 are shown in gure 26, where it
shows that retailer B has reward equal to zero for all values of β. Moreover, we show
that V ∗A(S
B) ≥ V ∗A(S) ≥ V
∗
A(S
A) = V ∗A(S
AB) holds for all the values of β. In gure
27, we present the stationary distribution of onsumers on four groups of segment S4
as a funtion of λA. As λA → 1, all onsumers go to group S
AB
. The reason for this
is that as λA inreases, privay alerted onsumers are less likely to transit to a non-
alerted state. Therefore, in the Markov Chain of this game at the equilibrium, state
SAB is the terminating state, whereas there is a nonzero probability to transit from
other groups to SAB . Consequently, at the stationary distribution, all onsumers will
be at SAB, in other words, SAB is an absorbing state.
In gure 28, we present the optimal poliies for both retailers, shown as solid lines.
This is derived by poliy iteration. The dotted lines represents the linear approxima-
tion of poliies derived by Taylor expansion around β = 0. In gure 29, we ompare
the performane of optimal and suboptimal poliies in terms of the disounted rewards
of retailers.
In Figure 30, we present the poliies of retailers in segment S6 as funtion of λA.
In group S, retailer A beomes more onservative as λA inreases whih is intuitive as
it knows that if onsumers get alerted about it, retailer A is less likely gain bak their
trust. In group SA, as λA inreases, retailer A's probability of sending a targeted
oupon inreases. The primary reason for this phenomenon is that retailer B is
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Figure 29: Optimal normalized disounted rewards of retailer A and retailer B in
segment S6 (solid lines) and the suboptimal rewards by linear approximations (dotted
lines). As it is seen the dierene is negligible.
pushing" retailer A to send a targeted oupon by being more oensive.
In Figure 33, the disounted reward of retailers are plotted as a funtion of λN .
As λN inreases, i.e., the degree of privay sensitivity of the market dereases, the
reward of rm B dereases whih proves the fat that privay sensitivity of the market
is in favor of the rival retailer.
7.5 Proofs
Through proofs of some of the theorems in this setion, we an solve the ompetition
for the nite horizon ase and then, using these results, we prove the desired results for
the innite ase. In this appendix, V ∗X,N (s) denotes the optimal disounted reward
of player X where N periods are left. πX,N denotes the poliy of player X where
N periods are left (Note that this poliy is a funtion of N and is not neessarily
stationary). V πA,πBX,N (s) denotes the disounted reward of player X, when the urrent
state of the game is s, N periods are left, and player A and B have poliies πA and
πB, respetively.
7.5.1 Proof of Lemma 7.2
We prove this fat by indution. Let's rst onsider the nite horizon problem. Let's
onsider two states α = [αS , αSB , αSA , αSAB ] and α
′ = [α′S , α
′
SB
, α′
SA
, α′
SAB
]. We will
prove that optimal ation probabilities for the retailers in state α are indeed optimal
in state α′ as well. Let's assume that (π∗A(α), π
∗
B(α)), and (π
∗
A(α
′), π∗B(α
′)) are the
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Figure 30: Poliy of retailers as a funtion of λA ins segment S6. Note that β = 0.9.
optimal pair of ation probabilities for α and α′, respetively. The terminating reward
of eah of the players at group j will be as follows:
V ∗A,0(α) =
∑
i∈S
αi
∑
a1∈{T,NT}
∑
a2∈{T,NT}
π∗iA,0(α, a1)π
∗i
B,0(α, a2)rA(i, a1, a2)
V ∗B,0(α) =
∑
i∈S
αi
∑
a1∈{T,NT}
∑
a2∈{T,NT}
π∗iA,0(α, a1)π
∗i
B,0(α, a2)rB(i, a1, a2)
Let's assume player A hanges his ation probabilities in group S to π∗SA (α
′). As
(π∗A(α), π
∗
B(α)) is the optimal ation probabilities for state α, the following holds:∑
i∈S
αi
∑
a1∈{T,NT}
∑
a2∈{T,NT}
αiπ
∗i
A0(α, a1)π
∗i
B0(α, a2)rA(i, a1, a2) ≥
α1
∑
a1∈{T,NT}
∑
a2∈{T,NT}
π∗iA0(α
′, a1)π
∗s
B0(α, a2)rA(1, a1, a2) +
∑
i∈S−{S}
αi
∑
a1∈{T,NT}
∑
a2∈{T,NT}
π∗iA0(α, a1)π
∗i
B0(α, a2)rA(i, a1, a2)
Consequently, we have
α1
∑
a1∈{T,NT}
∑
a2∈{T,NT}
π∗SA0(α, a1)π
∗S
B0(α, a2)rA(1, a1, a2) ≥
α1
∑
a1∈{T,NT}
∑
a2∈{T,NT}
π∗SA0(α
′, a1)π
∗S
B0(α, a2)rA(1, a1, a2)
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Figure 31: Disounted rewards of retailers as a funtion of λA ins segment S6. Note
that β = 0.9.
whih results in:
α′1
∑
a1∈{T,NT}
∑
a2∈{T,NT}
π∗SA0(α, a1)π
∗S
B0(α, a2)rA(1, a1, a2) ≥
α′1
∑
a1∈{T,NT}
∑
a2∈{T,NT}
π∗SA0(α
′, a1)π
∗S
B0(α, a2)rA(1, a1, a2) (84)
By applying the same proedures for other groups and player 2, it is straightforward
to show that the following holds:
V
(π∗A(α),π
∗
B(α))
A,0 (α
′) ≥ V
(π∗A(α
′),π∗B(α))
A,0 (α
′)
V
(π∗
A
(α),π∗
B
(α))
B,0 (α
′) ≥ V
(π∗
A
(α),π∗
B
(α′))
B,0 (α
′)
The immediate result of above equations is that (π∗A(α), π
∗
B(α)) derives equilibrium
for the state α′. Now, let's onsider that for N − 1, the optimal ation probabilities
of retailers are independent of α and have the following strutures:
V ∗A,N−1(α) = [αS , αSB , αSA , αSAB ]
T


f1(π
∗
A(α), π
∗
B(α))
f2(π
∗
A(α), π
∗
B(α))
f3(π
∗
A(α), π
∗
B(α))
f4(π
∗
A(α), π
∗
B(α))


V ∗B,N−1(α) = [αS , αSB , αSA , αSAB ]
T


g1(π
∗
A(α), π
∗
B(α))
g2(π
∗
A(α), π
∗
B(α))
g3(π
∗
A(α), π
∗
B(α))
g4(π
∗
A(α), π
∗
B(α))

 (85)
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Figure 32: Poliy of retailers as a funtion of λN ins segment S6. Note that β = 0.9.
Then, by indution, we will prove the same properties holds for the N period problem.
The optimal reward of retailer A if N time steps are remaining will be as follows:
V ∗A,N (α) =
∑
i∈S
αi
∑
a1∈{T,NT}
∑
a2∈{T,NT}
π∗iA0(α, a1)π
∗i
B0(α, a2)(rA(i, a1, a2) +
4∑
k=1
[Pa1 ⊗ Pa2 ]i,kfi(π
∗
A(α), π
∗
B(α))),
where [T ]j,k is the element on the jth row and kth olumn of matrix T.
Let's assume that player A hanges his ation probabilities in group one to π∗1A,N(α
′)
and then, the following will be derived:
α′1
∑
a1∈{T,NT}
∑
a2∈{T,NT}
π∗SA,N−1(α, a1)π
∗S
B,N−1(α, a2)(rA(i, a1, a2) +
4∑
k=1
[Pa1 ⊗ Pa2 ]i,kfi(π
∗
A(α), π
∗
B(α))) ≥ α
′
1
∑
a1∈{T,NT}
∑
a2∈{T,NT}
π∗SA,N−1(α
′, a1)
π∗SB,N−1(α, a2)(rA(i, a1, a2) +
4∑
k=1
[Pa1 ⊗ Pa2 ]i,kfi(π
∗
A(α), π
∗
B(α))),
By applying the same proedure for eah group and player B, It is straightforward to
hek that (π∗A,N (α), π
∗
B,N (α)) is an equilibrium for state α
′
. .
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Figure 33: Disounted rewards of retailers as a funtion of λN ins segment S6. Note
that β = 0.9.
7.5.2 Proof of Theorem 7.3
Let's start with the nite horizon ase. We laim that for N−period nite horizon
game, the reward and poliies of retailer A, and B will be as follows:
V ∗A,N = [(P − c− d− z)
1− βN+1
1− β
), · · · , (P − c− d− z)
1− βN+1
1− β
)]
V ∗B,N = [0, · · · , 0]
π∗A,N = [
P − c− d− z
P − c− d
, · · · ,
P − c− d− z
P − c− d
]
π∗B,N = [
d+ z
P − c− d− z
, · · · ,
d+ z
P − c− d− z
] (86)
It is straightforward to hek that above ondition holds for the terminating state,
where N = 0. We will prove that if the above poliies are optimal for the ase where
N−1 periods are left, it will also be optimal for N−period horizon ase. The bimatrix
game when N periods are left is the same in all four groups and is shown in table
4. In the equilibrium point, the optimal poliy of retailer A is ahieved when it is
indierent between sending and not sending a targeted oupon. Consequently,
π∗B,N (i)(P − c− d− z + β(P − c− d− z)
1− βN
1− β
) + (1− π∗B,N (i))(P − c− d− z
+β(P − c− d− z)
1 − βN
1− β
) = π∗B,N (i)(β(P − c− d− z)
1− βN
1− β
) +
(1− π∗B,N (i))(P − c+ β(P − c− d− z)
1− βN
1− β
) (87)
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VB(S) Targeting Not Targeting
Targeting −z + β × 0 0 + β × 0
Not Target-
ing
P − c− d− z + β × 0 0 + β × 0
Table 15: Bimatrix Game of Segment S4 in Groups S, S
A
, and SAB. (Finite Horizon)
whih results in π∗B,N =
d+z
P−c−d−z . Similarly, at the equilibrium point retailer B is
indierent between sending and not sending targeted oupon results in the following
equilibrium ondition:
π∗A,N (i)(−z) + (1− π
∗
A,N(i))(P − c− d− z) = 0 (88)
Thus, the optimal poliy of retailer B is π∗A,N (i) =
P−c−d−z
P−c−d . By substituting π
∗
A,N (i)
and π∗B,N (i) in the bimatrix game rewards, the desired result for disounted rewards
V ∗A,N and V
∗
B,N is derived. .
7.5.3 Proof of Theorem 7.5
First, let's derive the optimal poliy of retailer A, and optimal disounted reward
of retailer B using bakward indution. Considering the nite horizon game, at the
terminating step, it is straightforward to hek that retailer B has zero reward in
all states. Moreover, at the terminating step, retailer A does not distribute targeted
oupons in state SB and distributes targeted oupons in the other states with proba-
bility
P−c−d−z
P−c−d . Now, if we assume that these onditions hold for the game when N−1
horizons are left, we just need to prove the same onditions hold for the ase where N
horizons are left. The rewards of retailer B in group S, SA, and SAB is shown in table
15. Solving the bimatrix game for N horizon problem results in mix poliy of retailer
A equal to
P−c−d−z
P−c−d for states {S, S
A, SAB} whih is derived by neutrality of retailer
B on sending or not sending targeted oupon. The reward of retailer B in group SB is
represented in table 16. In this group, both the retailers are not willing to distribute
targeted oupon as they annot improve their reward by hanging their strategies.
Thus, in group SB of segment S4, none of the retailers distributes targeted oupons.
By substituting the derived poliies of retailers and the fat that at equilibrium of
this game player B will be in dierent of sending or not sending targeted oupon, we
derive that retailer B has zero reward for N horizon stohasti game. As the results
holds for all N, it also holds for innite ase, where N →∞.
Now, let's prove the rest of theorem in two steps:
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V 2B(S
B) Targeting Not Targeting
Targeting −z + β × 0 0 + β × 0
Not Target-
ing
−z + β × 0 0 + β × 0
Table 16: Bimatrix Game of Segment S4 in Group S
B
. (Finite Horizon)
1. Optimal disounted reward at group SA and SAB Let's assume that
V ∗A(S
A) and V ∗A(S
AB) are independent of λA and λN . Let's onsider the xed point
equation for group SAB when λN = λA = 1. As in the equilibrium point, the reward
of retailer A at rst row and seond row of bimatrix game represented in table 8 are
equivalent, the following holds:
V ∗A(S
AB) = π∗B(S
AB)(P − c− d− z + βV ∗A(S
AB)) +
(1− π∗B(S
AB))(P − c− d− z + βV ∗A(S
AB)) (89)
whih results in V ∗A(S
AB) = P−c−d−z1−β . Similarly, we an write the xed point equation
for group SA, and onsidering the fat that at equilibrium point reward of rst row
and seond row of bimatrix game represented at table 7, the following holds:
V ∗A(S
A) = π∗B(S
A)(P − c− d− z + βV ∗A(S
A)) +
(1− π∗B(S
A))(P − c− d− z + βV ∗A(S
A)) (90)
whih results in V ∗A(S
A) = P−c−d−z1−β . Now, we prove our primary assumption that
V ∗A(S
A) and V ∗A(S
AB) are independent of λA and λN holds and the derived disounted
reward for group SA and SAB satisfy xed point equation of both groups for any λA
and λN . The following are xed point equations for group S
A
and SAB .
V ∗A(S
A) = π∗B(S
A)(P − c− d− z + β(λNV
∗
A(S
A) + (1− λN )V
∗
A(S
AB))) +
(1− π∗B(S
A))(P − c− d− z + βV ∗A(S
A)) (91)
V ∗A(S
AB) = π∗B(S
AB)(P − c− d− z + βV ∗A(S
AB)) +
(1− π∗B(S
AB))(P − c− d− z + β(λAV
∗
A(S
AB) + (1− λA)V
∗
A(S
A))) (92)
It is straightforward to hek that the above equations hold if V ∗A(S
A) = V ∗A(S
AB) =
P−c−d−z
1−β . Thus, our assumption is veried.
2. Optimal disounted reward at group S and SB Now, let's onsider the
xed point equation at group SB, where both retailers have pure stationary poliies
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π∗A(S
B) = π∗B(S
B) = 0. Fixed point equation of group SB result in following:
V ∗A(S
B) = P − c+ β(λAV
∗
A(S
B) + (1− λA)V
∗
A(S)) (93)
Consequently,
V ∗A(S
B) =
P − c
1− βλA
+
β(1 − λA)
1− βλA
V ∗A(S) (94)
The xed point equation of group S is as follows:
V ∗A(S) = π
∗
B(S)(β(λNV
∗
A(S) + (1− λN )V
∗
A(S
B))) + (1− π∗B(S))(P − c+ βV
∗
A(S))(95)
By rearranging equation (95) and using equation (94), we will have the following
equation:
π∗B(S) =
(d+ z) + [−β(d+z)(1−λN )−(P−c−d−z)(1−βλA)β−βλN−1+βλA +
(1−β)(1−βλA)
β−βλN−1+βλA
V ∗A(S)]
(P − c) + (1− βλA)
λN (1−β)+β(1−λA)
β(1−λN )−(1−βλA)
V ∗A(S)
(96)
Combining equations (96),(?? ) and V ∗A(S
A) = V ∗A(S
AB) = P−c−d−z1−β , we have the
following:
V ∗A(S) =
β(1− β)(1 − λN )
(1− β)[(1 − βλA)(1− βλN )− β2(1− λN )2]
(P − c)−
(1− βλN )[β(1 − λN )− (1− βλA)]
(1− β)[(1 − βλA)(1 − βλN )− β2(1− λN )2]
(P − c− d− z)
And substituting the above in (94), we have
V ∗A(S
B) =
(1− β)[(1 − βλA)(1− βλN ) + β2(1− λN )(λN − λA)]
(1− β)(1 − βλA)[(1 − βλA)(1− βλN )− β2(1− λN )2]
(P − c)−
β(1 − λA)(1− βλN )[β(1 − λN )− (1− βλA)]
(1− β)(1 − βλA)[(1 − βλA)(1− βλN )− β2(1− λN )2]
(P − c− d− z) (97)
.
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7.5.4 Optimal Poliies of Firm B in Segment S4
Corollary 7.7.1 The optimal poliy of retailer B in segment S4 will be as follows:
π∗B(S) =
(d+ z) + β2 (1−λN )
2
[(1−βλA)(1−βλN )−β2(1−λN )2]
(d+ z)
(P − c) + β (1−λN )
2(1−βλN )[β(1−λN )−(1−βλA)]
(1−βλA)[(1−βλA)(1−βλN )−β2(1−λN )2]
(d+ z)
π∗B(S
B) = 0
π∗B(S
A) =
(d+ z) + β2 (1−λA)(1−λN )
[(1−βλA)(1−βλN )−β2(1−λN )2]
(d+ z)
(P − c) + β (1−λA)(1−λN )(1−βλN )[β(1−λN )−(1−βλA)]
(1−βλA)[(1−βλA)(1−βλN )−β2(1−λN )2]
(d+ z)
π∗B(S
AB) =
(d+ z) + [β2 (1−λA)
2(1−λN )
[(1−βλA)(1−βλN )−β2(1−λN )2]
(P − c) + β (1−λA)
2(1−βλN )[β(1−λN )−(1−βλA)]
(1−βλA)[(1−βλA)(1−βλN )−β2(1−λN )2]
(d+ z)
+
β
(1−λA)λ2A(1−βλN ))
[(1−βλA)(1−βλN )−β2(1−λN )2]
](d+ z)
(P − c) + β (1−λA)
2(1−βλN )[β(1−λN )−(1−βλA)]
(1−βλA)[(1−βλA)(1−βλN )−β2(1−λN )2]
(d+ z)
Proof: The results of orollary are diret results of Theorem 7.5. .
7.5.5 Optimal Poliies of Retailers in Segment S6
π∗A(S) =
P − c− d− z + β(1− λN )(V
∗
B(S
B)− V ∗B(S))
P − c− d+ β(1− λN )2(V ∗B(S
B)− V ∗B(S) + V
∗3
B − V
∗
B(S
AB))
π∗B(S
B) =
d+ z + β(1− λN )(1 − λA)(V
∗
A(S)− V
∗
A(S
A))
P − c+ β(1− λN )(1− λA)(V ∗A(S)− V
∗
A(S
A) + V ∗A(S
AB)− V ∗A(S
B))
+
β(1− λN )λA(V
∗
A(S
B)− V ∗A(S
AB))
P − c+ β(1− λN )(1− λA)(V ∗A(S)− V
∗
A(S
A) + V ∗A(S
AB)− V ∗A(S
B))
π∗A(S
B) =
P − c− d− z + β(1− λA)(V
∗
B(S)− V
∗
B(S
B))
P − c− d+ β(1 − λN )(1− λA)(V ∗B(S
B)− V ∗B(S) + V
∗
B(S
A)− V ∗B(S
AB))
π∗B(S
A) =
P − c− d− z + β(1 − λA)(V
∗
A(S
A)− V ∗A(S))
P − c− d+ β(1 − λN )(1− λA)(V ∗A(S
A)− V ∗A(S) + V
∗
A(S
B)− V ∗A(S
AB))
π∗A(S
A) =
d+ z + β(1− λN )(1− λA)(V
∗
B(S)− V
∗
B(S
B))
P − c+ β(1 − λN )(1− λA)(V ∗B(S)− V
∗
B(S
B) + V ∗B(S
AB)− V ∗A(S
A))
+
β(1− λN )λA(V
∗
B(S
A)− V ∗B(S
AB))
P − c+ β(1− λN )(1− λA)(V ∗B(S)− V
∗
B(S
B) + V ∗B(S
AB)− V ∗A(S
A))
π∗B(S
AB) =
d+ z + β(1− λA)
2(V ∗A(S)− V
∗
A(S
A))
P − c+ β(1 − λA)2(V ∗A(S)− V
∗
A(S
A) + V ∗A(S
AB)− V ∗A(S
B))
+
β(1− λA)λA(V
∗
A(S
B)− V ∗A(S
AB))
P − c+ β(1− λA)2(V ∗A(S)− V
∗
A(S
A) + V ∗A(S
AB)− V ∗A(S
B))
π∗A(S
AB) =
P − c− d− z + β(1− λA)
2(V ∗B(S
B)− V ∗B(S))
P − c− d+ β(1− λA)2(V ∗B(S
B)− V ∗B(S) + V
∗
B(S
A)− V ∗B(S
AB))
+
βλA(1− λA)(V
∗
B(S
AB)− V ∗B(S
A))
P − c− d+ β(1− λA)2(V ∗B(S
B)− V ∗B(S) + V
∗
B(S
A)− V ∗B(S
AB))
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7.5.6 Linear Approximation of Poliies in S6
fS = fS0 + βf
S
0 =
P − c− d− z
P − c− d
− β
(P − c− d− z)2(1− λN )
2
(P − c− d)2
gS = gS0 + βg
S
1 =
d+ z
P − c
+ β
(P − c− d− z)(1 − λN )(P − c− d− z + λN (d+ z))
(P − c)2
fS
B
= fS
B
0 + βf
SB
1 =
P − c− d− z
P − c− d
− β
(P − c− d− z)2(1− λN )(1 − λA)
(P − c− d)2
gS
B
= gS
B
0 + βg
SB
1 =
d+ z
P − c
+ β
(P − c− d− z)2(1− λN )(1 − λA)
(P − c)2
fS
A
= fS
A
0 + βf
SA
1 =
d+ z
P − c
+
β
(P − c− d− z)(1− λN )(λA(P − c− d− z) + (d+ z))
(P − c)2
gS
A
= gS
A
0 + βg
SA
1 =
P − c− d− z
P − c− d
−
β
(P − c− d− z)(1− λA)(z + λN (P − c− d− z))
(P − c− d)2
fS
AB
= fS
AB
0 + βf
SAB
1 =
P − c− d− z
P − c− d
−
β
(P − c− d− z)(1− λA)(P − c− d− z + zλA)
(P − c− d)2
gS
AB
= gS
AB
0 + βg
SAB
1 =
d+ z
P − c
+ β
(P − c− d− z)2(1− λA)
2
(P − c)2
(98)
7.5.7 Proof of Theorem 7.6
Consider the 16-dimensional vetor dened as follows:
z = (VA, VB , πA, πB), (99)
where VA = (VA(S), · · · , VA(S
AB)), VB = (VB(S), · · · , VB(S
AB)), πA = (πA(S),
· · · , πA(S
AB)), πB = (πB(S), · · · , πB(S
AB)). Then, the equilibrium of non-zero
sum stohasti game at segment S6 an be found by solving the following nonlinear
programming:
Ψ : min f(z) =
∑
X∈{A,B}
1T (VX − rX(πA, πB)− βP (πA, πB)VX)
subjet to:
∀s ∈ S : RA(s)
(
πB(s)
1− πB(s)
)
+ βT (s, VA)
(
πB(s)
1− πB(s)
)
≤ V sA12
∀s ∈ S :
(
πA(s) 1− πA(s)
)
RB(s) + β
(
πA(s) 1− πA(s)
)
T (s, VB) ≤ V
s
B1
T
2
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where ∀X ∈ {A,B} : RX(s) = [rX(s, a
A, aB)]aA ,aB and T (s, VX)s are 2× 2 matries
suh that the elements of eah matrix is the same as reward to go of bimatrix games
of tables 9 10 11 12. For example, T (S, VA) will be as follows:
T (S, VA) =(
(λ2
N
VA(S) + λN (1 − λN )(VA(S
B) + VA(S
A)) + (1− λN )
2VA(S
AB)) (λNVA(S) + (1 − λN )VA(S
A))
(λNVA(S) + (1 − λN )VA(S
B)) VA(S)
)
The solution of nonlinear optimization problem Ψ is the equilibrium of the non-zero
sum stohasti game of segment S6 [99℄. Moreover, at the optimum solution z
∗
,
f(z∗) = 0 and all the inequalities in nonlinear optimization problem Ψ hold with
equality.
In order to prove this theorem, we rst refer to the follwoing result from [99℄.
Corollary 7.7.2 Let zˆ be a feasible solution for problem Ψ, then, the (πˆA, πˆB) of zˆ
forms an ǫ-equilibrium with ǫ ≤ f(zˆ)1−β
By xing the poliies by the linear approximations given in equations (98), the
nonlinear optimization problem Ψ will be transformed to the following linear pro-
gramming:
Φ : min
VA,VB
κ(z) =
∑
X∈{A,B}
1T (VX − rX(f, g)− βP (f, g)VX )
subjet to:
∀s ∈ S : RA(s)
(
gs
1− gs
)
+ βT (s, VA)
(
gs
1− gs
)
≤ V sA12 (100)
∀s ∈ S :
(
f s) 1− f s
)
RB(s) + β
(
f s 1− f s
)
T (s, VB) ≤ V
s
B1
T
2
, (101)
where f = (fS, · · · , fS
AB
) and g = (gS , · · · , gS
AB
)T . This optimization problem
has 16 linear onstraints suh that eah pair involves one olumn or one row of bi-
matrix game at eah state. For example onstraint RA(S)
(
gS
1− gS
)
+βT (S, VA)(
gS
1− gS
)
≤ VA(S)12 inludes two onstraints orresponding the rows of bimatrix
game at state 1. By substituting RA(S) and T (S, VA), inequalities simplify to the
followings:
FS1 (VA, VB , f, g) = (P − c− d− z) + VA(S)(βλ
2
Ng
1 + βλN (1− g
S)− 1)
+VA(S
B)(βλN (1− λN )g
1) +
VA(S
A)(βλN (1− λN )g
S + β(1− λN (1− g
S))) + VA(S
AB)β(1 − λN )
2 ≤ 0
FS2 (VA, VB , f, g) = (1− g
S)(P − c) + VA(S)(βλNg
1 + β(1 − gS)− 1) +
VA(S
B)(β(1 − λN )g
S) ≤ 0
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We not that the objetive funtion of Φ an be written in terms of F ji as follows:
κ(z) = −
∑
i∈S
(f iF i1 + (1− f
i)F i2)−
∑
i∈S
(giGi1 + (1− g
i)Gi2) (102)
By deriving the dual of linear programming Φ, and onsidering omplementary slak-
ness, one an hek that one of the pairs of inequalities F i1 or F
i
2 should hold with
equality while the other one will be hold with strit inequality. It an be shown
that there exists a threshold β10 suh that for β < β10, the rst inequality of state
1 holds with equality and the seond one holds with strit inequality, i.e, FS1 = 0
and FS2 < 0. By multiplying F
S
1 with λN and subtrating F
S
1 ∗ λN from F
S
2 (note
that FS1 ∗ λN = 0 ), and using the fat that VA(S), · · · , VA(S
AB) < P−c−d−z1−β , we an
bound FS2 × (1− f
S) as follows:
−FS2 × (1− f
S) < 2β2λN (1− λN )
3(P − c− d− z) (103)
By performing the same proedure for other states and retailer B, and for dierent
amount of β (note that for β ≥ β10, the seond inequality will hold with equality and
rst one with strit inequality), one an verify that:
κ(z) <
4β2(P − c− d− z)
1− β
max{2λN (1− λN )
3, (1− λN )
3(1− λA + λN ), λ
2
A(1− λA), 2λA(1− λA)
3}
.
7.5.8 Proof of Theorem 7.7
We prove this theorem by indution on remaining time steps. The solution to the
game played in the nal period should be idential to the one step desribed in Setion
7.1, expressed as follows:
π∗A,0 = [
P − c− d− z
P − c− d
, 0,
P − c− d− z
P − c− d
, 0]
π∗B,0 = [
d+ z
P − c
, 0,
d+ z
P − c
, 0] (104)
Moreover, the disounted reward of retailer B is zero in the nal period. Now, we
prove that if the onditions of the theorem hold for N-1 steps remaining, it should hold
of N steps remain as well. At the equilibrium of the game, retailer A will be indierent
between sending or not sending targeted oupon, i.e. the rewards for sending and not
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sending targeted oupon should be equal. Consequently,
π∗B,N (S, T )[(P − c− d− z) + β
∑
s∈S
P (s|S, T, T )V ∗A,N−1(s)] + (1−
π∗B,N−1(S, T )[(P − c− d− z) + β
∑
s∈S
P (s|S, T, UT )V ∗A,N−1(s)] = π
∗
B,N (S, T )[
β
∑
s∈S
P (s|S,UT, T )V ∗A,N−1(s)](1 − π
∗
B,N−1(S, T )[(P − c) + β∑
s∈S
P (s|S,UT,UT )V ∗A,N−1(s)]
We note that V ∗A,N−1(S) = V
∗
A,N−1(S
A) and V ∗A,N−1(S
B) = V ∗A,N−1(S
AB). Similarly,
retailer B will be indierent between sending and not sending targeted oupon whih
results in the following
π∗A,N (S, T )(−z) + (1− π
∗
A,N (S, T ))[(P − c− d− z)] =
π∗A,N (S, T )(0) + (1− π
∗
A,N(S, T )(0)
Solving equations in (105) and (105) derives the optimal poliies of both retailers:
π∗B,N (S, T ) =
d+ z
P − c
, and, π∗A,N (S, T ) =
P − c− d− z
P − c− d
(105)
It is straightforward to hek that the same poliies holds at state SA, in the equi-
librium point. However, in SB and SAB, the equilibrium results in pure strategy of
not distributing oupons. The proof i s ompleted by verifying that VB,N (s) = 0 by
substituting π∗A,N and π
∗
B,N in the orresponding bimatrix game. .
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8 Conlusion and Future Works
In this dissertation, we investigated privay preserving mehanisms and tradeos
between privay and utilities in dynamial systems and networks. We studied three
topis of paket soure anonymity in mix networks, soure-destination anonymity in
Tor like networks, and dierential privay in stohasti ontrol and routing.
In the rst topi, we onsidered the problem of optimal routing in mix network.
Our approah used extreme tra onditions to derive key inferenes about routing
to maximize the delay anonymity tradeo. Delay is a spei utility riterion that is
impated by mixing strategies for anonymity. One of the main reasons for using delay
as a utility riterion is that, in ommerial anonymous systems, strategies suh as
mixing are not onsidered primarily due to inreased delay. The analysis presented in
this dissertation is a rst step to alleviating that onern and providing a mehanism
to inlude shuing and bathing strategies whilst maintaining lateny onstraints.
Other utilities suh as Memory utilization, fairness, ongestion are also impated to
a ertain extent, and we believe that the formal approah we presented here an be
expanded to study those relationships as well.
In the seond topi, we presented a relay seletion and ontrol framework to thwart
an omnisient eavesdropper who uses timing analysis to reveal the soure-destination
pairs ommuniating in an anonymous network. The omnisient eavesdropper as
modeled in this work is admittedly a onservative assumption and would likely apply
to powerful organizations suh as nation states. Pratial eavesdroppers would likely
monitor a fration of the links. The performane of our algorithms are guaranteed
against suh an eavesdropper as well but may not be optimal. While the work pro-
posed here fouses on a spei topologial struture, our analytial approah an be
extended to other topologies as well albeit with higher omputational omplexity. For
instane, in a network with |ME | entry guards, |MM | intermediate nodes, and |MQ|
exit guards, the anonymity alulation will require |ME |(|MM |+|MM |×(|MQ|−1))
variables and summations.
In the third topi of this dissertation, we studied the problem of ontrol poliy
design for Markov Deision Proesses (MDPs) under dierential privay onstraints.
The key takeaway from the work is the proposed value iteration methodology that
derived optimal inferene resistant poliies for a pair of MDPs. Our approah is easily
extended to more than two hypotheses. The hoie of ǫ is a key design aspet whih
should depend on the pereived length of time the system is likely to be monitored
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by the adversary. Setting epsilon to zero would guarantee perfet privay in that the
observed state dynamis would be idential for both MDPs, albeit at a signiant ost
in total rewards obtained. We also studied an appliation of the proposed framework
in routing problems in data olletion networks. The key assumption in the problem
of routing under dierential onstraints was knowledge of the set D whih is the set
of destinations hosen to provide privay. In a broader ontext, the hoie of the set
alongside the optimization in this work would provide a omprehensive solution to
private routing. An interesting diretion moving forward would be to apply this idea
in the ontext of reinforement learning wherein the agent has to explore and exploit
to maximize his reward with the added aveat that an adversary is unable to identify
the type of MDP.
In the last topi of this dissertation, we studied the eet of onsumers' privay
awareness in retail ompetition. Speially, we studied the ompetition between two
retailers who sell the same produt with the same prie and marginal ost in a privay
sensitive market. We modeled a privay sensitive market by a Hoteling line where
onsumers swith between alerted and non-alerted states about eah retailer. We
derived optimal poliies of eah retailer at eah segment of Hoteling line by solving
the xed point equations of non-zero sum stohasti games at eah segment. We
demonstrated that despite prie sensitive market, in a privay sensitive market, the
popular retailer will be more onservative sending targeted oupons to onsumers
with weak preferene for him, as they may notie privay violations by this retailer
and stop purhasing from him. We proved that privay sensitivity of the market is
in the favor of rival retailer, in other words, as the popular retailer is less defensive,
the rival retailer an inrease his prot by being more oensive.
We propose investigating targeting oupon for asymmetri pries and oupon val-
ues for eah retailer. Moreover, one may onsider a two steps ompetition where in
the rst step of the game, eah retailer sets his prie an oupon value and in the se-
ond step of the game, there is an innite horizon ompetition between the retailers.
Another interesting work will be the one where eah retailer an hange their pries
and oupon value. However, suh a ompetition will be more ompliated as it will
onstantly hange the market segmentation.
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